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Show ANOTHER LtQUOR LICENSE DECISION. . In a c-a.so LioukIiI before judge Kumreou, involving the liquor ordinance ordin-ance of I'rovo, a dcciiion was rendered, on Monday, which opens up a new f'ualure in the liquor license question. V. L. Thomaa was arreetod for a violation vio-lation of the liquor ordiuance in l'rovo, and wan brought before judo Kuier-Bon Kuier-Bon ou kuhea cut pus, who, after heur- in Llie case, ducidud that Urovo city could not collect the amount imposed by its ordinance, the city charter omitting omit-ting the word "tax" in the 3lat and and ucotioofl, which word ia found in thu and uiliur seoiiuuri; dinerioii-natinK dinerioii-natinK bulwceu ''liuunMQM and "taxing." "tax-ing." The beotioQ gives the corporation corpora-tion authority 'To licenne, regulate, prohibit, or restrain tho manufacturers, manufactur-ers, oellerri or vonduni of spirituous or fermented lirjuura, While Beo lion .'15 givca power "To liconso, tax, rcKuIate, tuppretia or prohibit billiard tables, pin alloys &o." Tho authorities authori-ties on which judge Emerson's decision is bawd, may bo found, first, in Aah o$. Tho l'coplo, Uoolcy 7, com mencing page 3-17, where it is decided that whiloa city has not power to assess as-sess a tax, uulons so tjpcoiGcd in its charter, it can aaoa3 a license fee sufficient suf-ficient to defray the ezpeuso of making out tho liconse and all the expenso attending at-tending tho supervision of the trade at , the plaoo licensed; and in Coley's Constitutional Con-stitutional Limitations, where it is laid down that: A right to lieense an employment it doeB not imply a right to charge ft liconso fco tho rotor with a view to revenue, unless such seems to be tho manifest purpose of tho power; but tho authority of tho corporation will bo limited to such a charge for the lieense as will oovor tho necesaary expenso ex-penso of issuing it and tho additional labor of officers and exponsos thereby imposed." Tho charter of Salt Lake City being somewhat similar, thcro has been considerable con-siderable interost exoitod conoerniDg this decision. As we understand it, Judgo Kmoraon's ruling is that tho city has authority to oxaot a license fee which will oovor all tho necessary exponsos oauaod by tho traffio: and as tho traffic in liquor is a principal oauso for requiring a polico foroo, a largo share of tho oxponsos of that force can bo properly thus raised. By tho tcrma of tho charter, also, the city had authority to "regulate, prohibit or restrain;" consequently it can say whether two persona or two thousand persons shall boII liquor, or it can refuse to license any person, and doelaro tho traffio altogether unlawful. Wo do not soo 'hat the authority of tho legislature to grant tho charter is questioned; nor tho validity of tho oharter; only that, because of the absence ab-sence of tho word "tax" in tho two sections touching tho liquor.traffio, tho construction is that tho city oan only oolleet tho lioonBC fco -requirod to meet tho nuoosdbry expenses consequent upon tho traffio, and not for purposes of rovouuo. Tho decision, with the authorities od which it is based, is presented for tho consideration of lawyers, judges and le trial atnrp. |