Show j LUSITANIA AFTERMATH e D of ot the British v J-v cabinet does loes not necessarily Indicate Indi 4 cate any serious dissatisfaction in iii EngI Eng Eng- I land with the conduct of tho the war Con I In Lord Kitchener continues t I undiminished the complications apI apparently ap- ap I patently being localized in tho the AdI Ad- Ad I where professional and cx- cx naval men resent the domInation domi dom- dom i of ot a civilian I J There is er e every likelihood that r. r r the j government change will be for tOl the bettel bet bet- ter tel A cabinet in which all parties I are represented and which mirrors all aU j t shades of or political thought though t Is less exposed exposed ex ex- posed to criticism and better guaran tees that permanence and solidarity essential to a a. government go that is prosecuting prosecuting prosecuting pros pros- a war was for tor national existence Tho The won wonder er Is la not that readjustment should be necessary but that It should have havo been to so long delayed National I p I s call for national unity and the ther r opposition benches henches are better bettor able toI tol to I give that unqualified support that Is h Iseo 1 eo so essential If it the they are represented f Inthe in l I the government L Gu Guarded predictions aJI appeared in the London press immediately after aCter the Lusitania horror that the resultant criticism would result in the tho demotion of or C Winston Churchill first lord of the British Admiralty Failure to pro protect project ho tho great liner after the ample warnIngs warnIng's warnIngs warn- warn Ings Ing's of or its danger clanger with the terrible consequences consequence appears to have crystallized crystallized crystal- crystal the growing dissatisfaction on the part part of the public and the unwillingness unwilling unwilling- ness of oC the na navy nato to continue under the direction of oC a civilian Mr Churchill's situation Is much like Ike that of or an American Secretary of or the Na Navy NaIn In time of ot war He Hc Is given full lull credit for tor the quick mobilization of ot the fleet net at the beginning of tho the war var and nd the efficiency with which h it entered the tho struggle but the naval tactics are considered to be better In Inthe i tho the hands of ot those familiar with the possibilities and necessities of oC naval warfare I |