OCR Text |
Show . I 'I tll'i.i":iiiilil,!irii 'iifMiin-tii;i!i FORWARD MARCH By H. S. Sims, Jr. mite strategic bombing of synthetic syn-thetic oil plants, which, coupled with loss of Rumanian oil fields, carries a threat to the mobility of the Nazi army. Territorial gains have been important, and, according accord-ing to some observers, these are probably ahead of schedule, even though the great decisive battle has not yet occurred. Continuous Campaign Involved The continuous offensive being staged by Gen. Eisenhower creates cre-ates the major "second front," which the Russians demanded for many months. Soviet leaders asserted as-serted that the war could be won quickly if the Red army was given giv-en the support of a determined assault in the West. This has come but, with it, there has been no such tremendous surge of Soviet power-blows as expected. Following the great offensive in central Poland, which advanced to the gates of Warsaw, the Soviet tactics have involved concentration concentra-tion upon other sectors, relatively unimportant in a knockout blow, however much they may speed the eventual collapse of Germany. In the Baltic area, in Rumania and now along the Danubian front, south of Austria, the Red army has put new pressure upon the extended ex-tended German lines, but there has been no resumption of the all-important all-important effort to invade Germany. CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE HAS SCORED TREMENDOUS GAINS ALTHOUGH ENEMY HAS NOT COLLAPSED. The progress of the war in Europe is not to be measured by the length of advances recorded. The Germans are desperately attempting at-tempting to protect vital areas, fighting resolutely and stubbornly. stubborn-ly. The length of Nazi resistance, which determines the duration of the struggle, has become a question ques-tion of German reserves. It is utterly impossible for us to know the exact state of German Ger-man manpower. Hence it is futile to attempt any forecast as to the results being accomplished by the bloody battles along the Westwall. The relationship between German losses and reserves cannot be calculated cal-culated but so long as the Teutons -have sufficient men to man their fortified lines the war will continue con-tinue to be a bloody affair. The Allied armies have made ground gains, important approaches approach-es to the industrial heart of Germany. Ger-many. From this side of the ocean it appears likely that small gains will continue to be made but, apparently, ap-parently, they are limited to advances ad-vances made possible by thorough artillery preparation to blast Russian Offensive Expected Nobody knows when the quiet zone, north of the Carpathians, will blaze into action. Equally uncertain un-certain was the explanation of Russian strategy. Perhaps the efforts ef-forts in other areas were counted upon to drain off Nazi reserves or, again, there may be reasons for the delay until winter freezes the Polish plains to make ideal the conditions for mechanized warfare. war-fare. Moscow gives no inkling of plans but Soviet sources deny that the Red army has failed to carry out its part of the pragram planned plan-ned at Teheran. In the Pacific the Leyte campaign cam-paign continues, with indications that the complete occupation of the island will be somewhat delayed. de-layed. Whether there will occur, in the near future, another attack, mounted from the sea, remains to be disclosed. Meanwhile the B-29's are making regular visits to the Japanese homeland, bombing vital j Japanese plants. specified objectives. As the fourth year of warfare begins, there is no indication of a collape of Nazi military power, or anything to suggest that the enemy has not sufficient divisions to carry on. the struggle. By skilfully skil-fully utilizing fortified terrain the Germans seek to inflict terrific losses and to discourage any occupation oc-cupation of the Reich. Loss Ratio Key to Situation It is not possible to appraise our losses in battle or to compare them with enemy casualties. If we could discover this ratio it would have an important bearing on the course of the present offensive, of-fensive, the scope of our success and the probable time of a decision. deci-sion. It may be that the High Command has a good idea of the answers to these questions and that all operations are carried out with this knowledge as a guide. It is a mistake to attempt to interpret the present offensive, which began, in a limited way, about a month ago when the Third Army began to move forward. All that occurs is a part of the grand scheme to decisively defeat the Germans by blasting and destroying destroy-ing the military machine upon which Nazism rests. This process began with the invasion of Normandy, Nor-mandy, some six months ago, was implemented by the break-through at St. Lo, intensified by the victorious vic-torious recapture of most of France and Belgium and now carries car-ries on in the inexorable pressure applied to Germany's great defensive defen-sive wall. Allied Armies Ahead of Schedule The extent of our gains has been, we believe, underestimated and somewhat unappreciated by the people who follow the war only by the headlines and measure success suc-cess only. by forward motion. Since D-day the Allied armies have captured cap-tured almost three-quarters of a million soldiers. Dead and wounded wound-ed probably bring German losses to 1,250,000 men. These men have been replaced but the dregs of German manpower had to be tapped tap-ped to get the necessary manpower. man-power. In addition, the enemy has lost vast quantities of material. It is useless to enumerate the categories. categor-ies. We should include the def- |