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Show THE SEARCHLIGHT Supreme Court Backs Maw Scheme (Continued from page 1) And when the Legislature in 1955; again in 1937; and again in 1939 used exactly the same language, the Searchlight began to suspect that the Legislature intended to continue the office of State Road Commission in existence. But when the Legislature in 1941 again used the identical words, ‘“‘The State Road Commission shall be composed of three members’’ it must have been talking through its hat, because a majority of the Supreme Court now insists that the Legislature actually intended to abolish that office. Don’t has ask us why the State Road Commission continued to function under the same legis - lative language out that for 15 years, and suddenly finds the same language doesn’t work in 1943. It’s a bit thick for us. And please don’t ask why it is now functioning every day if it has been abolished. It’s one of those things that “pas seth all understanding.” The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Wolfe went to great lengths to aseribe good faith and bona fide intent to both the Executive and the Legislature in the formulation and enactment of reorganization legislation affecting the State Road Commission. The involved reason. ing by which the Court arrived at its decision was based on the constitutional prerogative of the Legislature to shorten the term of an jncumbent official. The Court said: Im the last analysis the power Legislature to truneate* one who is appointed be found to depend of the incumbeney the of for a fixed term will on the purpose for ——— “Our hazy recollection of the word “truncate”, which the Court tossed back into modern usage, seemed to give it some relationship to the word “circumcism.” Sure enough, reference to Noah Webster’s big book disclosed that “truncate” means to lop off, maim, or mutilate, but on different human terminals and otherwise. We wish the judiciary would stick to such good old legal standbys as “Mandamus” and “Goddamus.” Our comprehension of such words is much readier and clearer. which it was done. Then by ascribing to the Legislature bona fide intent, the Court was able to deduce that legislation on the subject was not a mere artifice instigated by the Executive to remove W. D. Hammond and George Abbott from office. Thus the Court placed itself squarely—though on a three to two basis—back of the Maw reorganization scheme. And the purpose of State reorganization, so far as the State Road Commission was concerned, was to oust certain Democrats from office and put other Democrats in. For his part, His Excellency received a vast increase in executive powers and was given control of large sums of money belonging to the State of titah. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Larson presents a clearer and better reasoned view of the case. We quote excerpts from his minority opinion: The laws from 1933 to date reveal that there were no substantial changes in the duties of the Commission or the characteristics of the office, the tenure of the office, or any other thing that would substantially change the office or its duties. In fact, the defendants (Maxfield and Evans) frankly admit this when they say in their brief: “We cannot take issue with the general statement made by the relators (the plaintiffs) that the State Road Commission as a body corporate, continues unchanged.’ Neither can issue be taken with statement that the defendants in the the dis- charge of the duties imposed upon the State Road Commission the Kngineering bers of the act not as Commission State Road members but as of mem- Commission. The fact that they are ex-officio members of the State Road Commission does not put the administration of the laws relative to State roads in the hands of the Engineering Commission. [t still leaves everything as theretofore in the State Road Commission, not in the (Continued on page 5) |