

WHY JAPAN CONCLUDED PEACE

She Realized She Was Making a Sacrifice but Was Looking to The Future.

CAINED ALL SHE FOUGHT FOR.

In Russia News is Received Without Joy and Making of Peace Deplored.

Portsmouth, Aug. 30.—Actual work of drafting the "treaty of Portsmouth" was begun today. It is being done by Mr. De Martens and Mr. Denison, acting as legal advisers for the respective sides. While the "bases" of peace have been accepted by the plenipotentiaries, considerable detail remains to be worked out in the elaboration of the articles of the treaty. This is especially true in regard to the articles dealing with the Chinese Eastern railroad and the surrender of the leases of the Liao Tung peninsula and Port Arthur and Tsingtao (Dahli).

Mr. Pokotoff, the Russian minister to Pekin, who was formerly manager of the Russ-Chinese bank at Pekin, and who has intimate knowledge of all the details relating to those matters, is assisting De Martens.

A very anomalous situation exists as to the impression created by the conclusion of peace. While the outside world applauds, in Japan there is evidently great disappointment in the terms, and in Russia, where it would seem that there should be universal rejoicing over the great diplomatic victory M. Witte has won, the government seems to have accepted it coldly.

With the people it will make M. Witte a great and popular figure and add to his laurels, but at court evidently the very victory that M. Witte has achieved makes it all the more bitterly resented. It is an open secret that when the emperor appointed M. Witte chief plenipotentiary the "military party" expected him to talk hard, but not want peace. The war-free prediction of St. Petersburg, when M. Witte left, that he had been given an impossible mission. They expected him to fail in the negotiations or to make a "bad peace," and either would have spelled political ruin.

Instead, upon the very terms which the emperor gave him, he would make peace, and upon which the military party did not believe it possible for peace to be negotiated, M. Witte succeeded in securing a treaty honorable and under the circumstances favorable to Russia. This has only exasperated his enemies the more, and intrigue is again at work to discredit him.

Now Japan was in a conciliatory mood; they now say he has made a mistake in surrendering half of Sakhalin. Yet so did so by the czar's orders, and himself insists that personally he would have stuck to the end to his original declaration not to cede territory and give indemnity.

Now a whole line about the receipt of the money comes out of Japan. In view of the situation both at Tokio and St. Petersburg, alarmists are inclined to make much of the fact that the minutes of yesterday's fateful meeting have not been signed by the plenipotentiaries of the two powers.

M. Witte insisted on that either side could withdraw from the agreement, but both plenipotentiaries refuse to admit even the possibility of such a happening.

The following statement of the Japanese argument which governed their decision to waive the question of indemnity can be accepted as authoritative:

"Japan realized fully she was making a sacrifice for peace, but she was looking to the future. It was not a question of whether the war could be successfully continued, but of whether peace was not now more advantageous to Japan."

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PEACE IN SIGHT BUT NOT ACCOMPLISHED

"We Are Getting Into the Thin Timber, but We Are Not Yet Out of the Woods."

EXPRESSES PRESIDENT'S VIEW

He May Make Formal Expression of His Views of Work Done—None Of Treaty Undecided.

BP. POTTER'S SANCTIFIED SALOON WILL CLOSE

New York, Aug. 31.—The Subway Tavern, which was opened 11 months ago with an address by Bishop Potter and the singing of the Doxology, closed its doors at midnight for the last time as a "sanctified saloon." Today its proprietor will be seated, sign over hand, to gain what he has gained in the restaurant on the premises. The new owner will take out the "water wagon" sign and after extensive alterations will run the place as an ordinary saloon.

While all those connected with the establishment have been seen last night more reticent concerning their change several employees in the tavern explained that there had not been sufficient income from sales to pay running expenses. Instead of well known citizens who established the tavern drawing a per cent dividend, as they expected, it was said that in the last month the business had been so poor that the proprietors had decided to go down into their losses to make a good deficit that they had been made tired and wished to be rid of the tavern entirely.

When the tavern was opened in October, 1904, it was announced that only pure liquors would be sold. One room was fitted up with a soda fountain, another with a billiard table, and a third with a beer. The outer walls of the building were painted with texts of scripture and highly colored signs, but, in the words of one of the bartenders, it was found that "rum and religion would not mix."

This admission represents accurately President Roosevelt's view of the situation of Portsmouth. Peace is in sight, but is not yet an accomplished fact. Profoundly as he is gratified at the results already achieved by the plenipotentiaries, the president realizes fully that the most important work remains yet to be done. Until more is accomplished it is scarcely the part of wisdom, he thinks, to do more than "whistle pretty."

It is probable that President Roosevelt may make a formal expression concerning the work accomplished at Portsmouth by the Russian and Japanese envoys, but the intimation to-day was that he would not make such a statement in any event, unless it had been assumed to be the result of the conference.

The president has no definite idea how long the plenipotentiaries may be engaged in the negotiations of the treaty of peace. Most important of all is the fact that the formal recognition of the independence of the Chinese Eastern railroad by the Kharchine, the junction of the branch of Kritin, involves payment by Russia of a sum estimated at \$75,000,000. This is the Chinese interest in the road and for it China must be remunerated. The question of ultimate possession of the road is a matter to be settled in the White House.

The Russ describes the conclusion of peace as being "of supreme benefit to the foe."

The Pan-Slavic Svet says:

"All the Japanese concessions pale before the Russian's. The Chinese are not yet recognized as the independent nation of the Chinese Eastern railroad by the Kharchine."

The popular Listok welcomes as enabling Russia to enter heart and soul into internal reorganization.

In view of the forthcoming electoral campaign, the police have drawn up regulations concerning meetings. The elections in Poland will be held simultaneously with those in the rest of the country, enabling Poland to be represented at the first meeting of the national assembly.

Gen. SUMNER'S REPORT

Desertions in Depts. of California And Columbia About 14 Per Cent.

Washington, Aug. 30.—In his annual report for the last fiscal year, Maj.-Gen. D. Summer, commanding the Pacific division, makes the following recommendation: "It is recommended that enlisted men other than non-commissioned officers, upon the existing command school basis."

"First, that it be precisely determined as to whether the idea is to conserve as a primary object the scholastic interests of the less or better educated men in the command system or the enlisted men in the command system."

"Second, whether attendance shall be voluntary or not, and that the principle that shall determine attendance shall be precisely settled that this source of doubt be removed."

Gen. Summer states that the statistics show that there were in the department of California and the command of the Columbia 30 and 35 desertions respectively, or about 14 per cent of the average enlisted strength in the department of California and 14 per cent in the department of Columbia.

The causes assigned were generally as indeterminable as in past years when the cause of each desertion was made a matter of some inquiry.

"Third, that the commandant of the command school be authorized to make arrangements to threaten the interest of the railroad, and in the negotiations which preceded the railroad asked Russia to bind herself not to impede this aim. It is considered likely that she would herself prefer the railroad to the Chinese."

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