work of the inferior was m clerical, and he should be required to perform it as ex-officio an employe o the board of education. The court below erred in its decision, and the writ asked for would issue, and the collection of the school tax be proceeded with.

In the case of Frank L. Thirkfield vs Mountain View Cemetery association, Judge Barton rendering t e opinion of the court, affirming the decision of the court below. Judges Merritt and King concurred.

R. D. Jones and R. H. Jones vs. B. H. Jones; Judge Barton rendered the opinion of the Supreme court, the judgment of Judge Smith was affirmed, Judges Merritt and King concurring.

Joseph Holt vs Charles E. Pearson; Judge Merritt rendered the court's opinion, reversing the action of the court below. This decision is conclusive in favor of Mr. Pearson.

Sarah E. Chipman vs. Union Pacific and Oregon Short Line and Utah Northern railways; opinion by Judge Merritt; the judgment of the court below was affirmed. This is where the plaintiff, a three-year-old child had her foot cut off owing to the lack of care by the railway servants. The damage awarded was $10,500.

Philip T. Cook vs Bullion-Beck and Champion Mining company; opinion by Chief Justice Merritt; he ruling of the court bel w was revered and a new trial ordered. This action is favorable to the Bullion-Beck.

In the case of John H. Linck vs Francis Armstrong, Mayor of Salt Lake City, and other city officers, a mandate from the U. S. Supreme Court dismissing Linck's appeal was filed. This is the ca e where Mr. Linck and others attempted to jump Capitol Hill several years ago.

United States vs. L. A. Scott Ellio t; judgment of the court below reversed; this result is in favor of the government.

W. W. Thornton, L. A. Hoffman, F. Margetts, a id W. B. P.imao, from other state , were admitted to the bar.

On recommendation of examining committee, Messrs. Lombard, Nebeker, Tibbs, McDanie s, Van Cott, Perry and O'Brien, all local applicants for admission to the bar, had their request granted.

F. Snyder applied for admission and was referred to the committee for examination as to his qualifications.

The case of Ogden city vs Daniel Hamer was set for the next sitting of court in four weeks. The court then took r cess till this afternoon; the anticipation being that the question of women voting would be passed upon at that time.

WOMEN MAY NOT VOTE.

The Supreme court room was well filled again Saturday, as the anticipation that the qualification of women to vote in November next would be passed upon had deepened almost to a feeling of certainty. At 2:20 the chief justice and Associate Justices Bartch and King entered the room, and Judge King immed ately announced the decision in the case of James Chapman vs Union Pacific railway, affirming the judgment of the lower court, in favor of Chapman.

Judge Bartch announced that in the case of A. E. Barnes vs M. D. Cox, appellant, judgment of the lower court was reversed.

In the case of the First National bank vs Charles Foote et al, appellants, the judgment of the court below was affirmed.

In the case of Sarah E. Anderson vs Charles Tyree, involving the question of women voting, Chief Justice Merritt said that Judge Bartch and himself had arrived at a conclusion, Judge King dissenting on the subject. Mrs. Anderson has asked that her name be placed on the registration list. Judge Merritt said the Edmunds-Tucker law had not been repealed, and would remain effective till statehood was achieved. Section 2 of the enabling act had extended the franchise among males, but had not referred to females. To allow females to vote would be in conflict with the act, and was forbidden. There had been stress laid on the fourth section of the enabling act, where the "qualified voters of the proposed State" were authorized to vote. In his view these qualified voters were those qualified under existing laws and the enabling act. There had been no intention on the part of the Constitutional Convention to allow women to vote at the first election, in November next, but to allow them to v te thereafter. This was clearly shown in section 11 of the schedule of the Constitution. Judge Merritt said e would file a written opinion, reversing the judgment of the lower court.

Judge King said he was unable to assent t any of the views of the decision. He regarded them as utterly repugnant to the provisions of the enabling act and of the Constitution. He regarded that the Edmunds-Tucker act was not a prohibition of women voting on the Constitution; he considered the view of the majority of the court as absolutely wrong. He did not believe the purpose of the Edmunds-Tucker act was to have any effect upon voters for State officers or on the Constitution. If it had been, it was superseded by the enabling act. That act had permitted a disfranchised class to vote for delegates to the Convention and on the Constitution, being an enlargement of the franchise. At the election for delegates, only males could vote, but unquestionably Congress delegated to the Constitutional Convention the power of prescribing the electorate at the first election for State officers and on the Constitution. That was a power which the people of the State alone had the right to exercise. The proposed voters of the State, Judge King thought, were those who were enfranchised by the Constitution, including males and females. It was the province of the Constitution-makers to define the electorate, and they had done so, classifying men and women as citizens. He regarded as an absurdity the ruling that women were disfranchised, which ruling outraged every principle of construction, and was wrong. He regarded the proviso in section 11 of the schedule in the Constitution as repugnant to article 4, if it was to be taken as a restriction. However, he would not take it as such restriction, but merely to define that such persons should vote. To say that the women should be disfranchised at this election he regarded as wrong and an outrage.

Judge Bartch said he concurred in the opinion of the chief justice, and as to the Edmunds-Tucker act, if it was repealed for the purpose of the enabling act, it was repealed for all purposes. He did not believe the Edmunds-Tucker act was repealed at all. In this special case, the franchise was extended, but all the acts remained in force, and if the Constitution failed, then the Edmunds-Tucker act remained in force.

Court adjourned until September 28, at 10 a. m.

BANNOCK TROUBLES.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 30.—The department of justice has received from the United States district attorney and marshal of Wyoming the official reports of their investigations into the Bannock Indian troubles, made by the direction of the attorney-general. The reports are dated August 23rd.

The district attorney for Wyoming reports as follows: "I have no doubt whatever that the killing of the Indian Tanega on or about the 13th of July was an atrocious, outrageous and cold-blooded murder, and it was a murder perpetrated on the part of Constable Manning and his deputies in pursuance of a scheme and conspiracy on their part to prevent the Indians from exercising a right and privilege which is, in my opinion, very clearly guaranteed to them by the treaty before mentioned.

"Should prosecution on the part of the United States be determined on, it would be useless to commence it before a commissioner. As the law now is, we are bound to bring prisoners before the United States commissioner nearest to the place of arrest, and in this case, it would be before Mr. Pettigrew, the commissioner of Marysvale. I am informed that he is thoroughly in sympathy with the so-called settlers in that region, and that he advised Constable Manning and his posse that the provisions of the treaty under which the Indians claimed the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States had, for some reason, ceased to be operative. Hence I think that to cause the arrest of these men and take them for hearing before this commissioner would simply result in their discharge.

"It seems to me to be a great pity that there is no national law which can be certainly invoked for the protection of these, our domestic subjects, weak and defenseless as they are, in their right to enjoy these privileges guaranteed to them by a solemn treaty, to the enforcement of which the honor of the country is pledged, and that their only protection against forcible resistance to their employment of these rights must be found in the courts of the state, wherein the juries will unquestionably look on them as possessing no rights which a white man is bound to respect."

The district attorney has been advised that the department concurs with him in the opinion that there is no Federal statute under which the offenders can be punished.

Accompanying the report of the dis-