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$[illegible] A house of four rooms, frame, adobe lined; lot 2½ x 10 rods; half block from street car, 11th Ward.

$[illegible] An Adobe House of six rooms, high ceiling, well papered and finished, summer kitchen, coal house, bath room, [illegible] and pump; lot two and half rods by twenty, south front, on car line, 12th Ward.

$[illegible] A Two-story House of seven rooms, hot and cold water in house, gas [illegible]; lot 3x10 rods, on First South [illegible] in good location.

$[illegible] Will buy a three-roomed house and [illegible] in the 13th ward.

$2000 A new house of seven rooms, well painted and nicely surrounded [illegible] garden spot, coach house, pump, [illegible] car line, lot 2½ x 10 rods; 17th Ward.

[illegible]

Building Lots.

[illegible]

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EVENING NEWS.

Saturday, - Mar. 22, 1884.

[From Chicago *Inter-Ocean* March 15th.]

THE MORMON QUESTION.

MR. MOSES THATCHER REPLIES TO MR. JOHN MCBRIDE ON THE UTAH PROBLEM.

A GENERAL DENIAL OF ALL THE ALLEGATION AND A LEGAL DOCUMENT SUBMITTED.

CANNON SEAT, THE FRAUDULENT CERTIFICATE, GOV. MURRAY, EARLY LAWS, AND OTHER POINTS.

LOGAN, Utah, March 6th, 1884.

To the Editor of The Inter Ocean.

In a lengthy communication published in your issue of Feb. 16th, Mr. John R. McBride, an attorney, puts himself forward, not only as the Champion of his Excellency Governor Murray of Utah, but as the enterpreter also, of the executive message which forms the basis of this discussion. In endeavoring to answer my former refutation of portions of that message, Mr. McBride indulges in a degree of acrimony, the exhibition of which, in matters of public interest, is much to be regretted. Personal allusions can be of little interest to the average intelligent reader, and I shall, therefore, as far as possible seek to avoid them, while doing myself justice in replying to those made by my legal, and so far as I know, selfappointed Champion of a questionable cause, who seems better qualified to make assertions, than to sustain them when made. It does not require legal ability to comprehend, how much easier it is, to do the one than the other. The law of compensation, however, often demonstrates that proofs, sometimes hard to produce, furnish when produced, a firm basis upon which to construct argument; while unsupported assertions, "as I shall show further on," frequently lead the asserter into disagreeable predicaments, and annoying perplexities.

One of the noticeable features of the mock battles of children, is their proneness to magnify the numbers and strength of the enemy, in order to increase, correspondingly, the glory of the anticipated victory. Thus, in the remembrance of the methods and innocent conceits of childhood we may account for the following quoted from the prelude of Mr. McBride's remarkable letter. He says: "While Mr. Thatcher assumes the authorship and responsibility of the letter over his signature, its real paternity is known to be the labor of the Mormon lobby in Washington, consisting of Delegate Caine, Mr. Richards, a young Mormon attorney of much ambition, Mr. Thatcher, and at least one other apostle of the Mormon hierarchy, besides the regular church attorneys residing in that city." And that "in responding to it I am meeting the fire of the entire Mormon battery."

Now, while freely admitting that I avail myself, in the discussion of matters of public interest, of all honorable sources of information, and respectfully suggest that my legal opponent do likewise in the future, yet I really was not aware that there was a "Mormon lobby in Washington" or that there was "at least one other apostle," or that "the church had regular attorneys there." Being thus ignorant, will Mr. McBride please explain how the "paternity" of my letter "*is known*" to be the labor of the agencies named? That I conversed freely with Delegate Caine, and with Mr. Richards, and that I availed myself of such information as they were pleased to afford me in reference to the fraudulent intent of portions of Governor Murray's message is no secret, for I freely admit it; and I also admit, that I am not a lawyer. But while my learned opponent may be a veritable legal "Goliah," may have planned the raid that resulted in the passage of the Edmunds law, originated the Governor's peculiar mathematical system, advised him to issue under it a fraudulent certificate, written his recent message, and thrust him aside as a mere tool incompetent to explain, when attacked, that which appears over his official signature; modesty forbids my entertaining the thought, or expressing the idea, that I, in this discussion, meet the fire of the entire battery of the "Utah Ring." For, while the methods of that combination have been for years, and are still mainly unscrupulous, I am bound to accord to some of its members ability, as well as the faculty of making the counterfeit of truth resemble to a remarkable degree, the genuine article; and some of them I am sure have learned by experience that amateur—not experts, "bunch the game," fire at the flock, and leave the recoil only, to mark the position of the wounded goose.

Again, Christian charity forbids the belief that the "Utah Ring" as a whole, take stock in a proposition to "crucify" any body, it being about 1851 years too late for that kind of work. And notwithstanding Mr. McBride's announced intention of crucifying a poor "bantling," in order to make an unworthy object like myself, "suffer vicariously for the Washington Mormon Agents," whoever they may be, I am utterly unable to think that, had he lived in the days when Christ was fastened to the cross, he would have been the first to drive a nail into the quivering flesh of innocent God-hood. Men now, may entertain awful feelings, but they could never do anything so shockingly cruel, as was that deed of torture.

Now for the points originally at issue and others, as far as space will admit, brought forward by my legal opponent, who says: "Mr. Thatcher charges Governor Murray with misstating the existing laws of the Territory in several instances, and his first specification under this assignment of errors, as a lawyer would put it, is that he asks the repeal of the law making escheats result to the Perpetual Emigrating Fund Company." That is fairly stated, and in it I recognize the position I at first assumed and still occupy; but I did not expect Governor Murray or any of his friends, much less his champion to admit, under any circumstances, its correctness; but "I shall show further on" that he does just that thing. In an attempt to sustain the Governor's position, Mr. McBride quotes in full an Act approved about thirty years ago, in relation to the *management* not escheating of certain property, and immediately after the closing of the quotation, says: "This act never in terms provided for escheats." If it never "*in terms*" did it ever *out* of terms, provide for escheats? And if not, will Mr. McBride please inform us why he dragged it into the discussion, and then in another place, further humiliate his Excellency the Governor of Utah, by declaring positively that escheats never did vest in the company (i.e. the Perpetual Emigrating Fund Company), but that "it was the policy of giving it (the company) control and use of such property, and a far greater abuse, the right to confiscate to its use, the property of the living, that he was seeking to have overthrown." Indeed! then why did he not say so? Such a charge could have been met and refuted quite as easily as has been the one on escheats, but the champion might not, had the Governor made *that* charge have deserted him, as he has on the other (at the point above to which I referred as being "further on"); and while Governor Murray, in the presence of such a defense, may stand amazed, I humbly extend to this Daniel who comes to judgment—sacrificing Governor Murray—my thanks, for conceding even more than I had claimed.

"The exact language of the message is, 'I ask the repeal of all laws incorporating the Perpetual Emigrating Fund Company, and the repeal of all laws making escheats to the company, &c.'" The exact language of the champion defender and special interpreter of the message is, "*Escheats never did vest in the company.*" Governor Murray, please score one for the "bantling," give Shylock the pound of flesh nominated in the bond, and use your own judgment as to whether you retain or dismiss advisers who "bite off more than they can chew."

To force further argument on this point, would be cruel; I therefore dismiss it, by re-affirming that the only law governing escheats in this Territory, during the past eight years, is found on page 275, Compiled Laws of Utah, and reads as follows: "(713) Sec. 29. If the decedent leave no husband, wife, or kindred, the estate escheats to the Territory for the use of common schools," and which are, in no sense, "church schools," Mr. McBride's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding.

The next point under consideration is referred to by Mr. McBride as follows: "Now what was said in the message is this: 'I ask the repeal of chapter 5 of Compiled laws of Utah (1876), because unwarranted and dangerous process are therein granted to a church corporation; because it is a law respecting the establishment of religion; because it vests ecclesiastical courts with authority which may really (only) be exercised in the United States by the civil courts; and if for no other reason, because Congress by express statute approved July 1862, disapproved it, and yet the Legislature of Utah re-enacted it in the Compiled laws of 1876.'"

Upon these points I took issue in my former letter, asserting that the Governor's statement "that the law vests the ecclesiastical courts with authority which may only be exercised in the United States by the civil courts, is entirely without foundation in fact." Replying to this Mr. McBride says: "I affirm that in doing so he (Mr. Thatcher) not only falsifies the law, but it must have been done with the knowledge of not only the law but the practice under it." Let us examine. In the report (page 9), of his Excellency Governor Murray to the Hon. the Secretary of the Interior made September 16th, 1883, and with the contents of which there are reasons for believing that Mr. McBride is familiar, I find the following language: "Whether the second section of the above act (the act of July 2 1862) unqualifiedly disapproved the act (Territorial) of incorporation is, perhaps questionable." He then goes on, and on the same page, admits that the courts of Utah had decided that the incorporation "still had an existence." The decisions of the courts being final as to the construction of laws, will my legal friend please explain how the Governor, in his report held the question to be one of doubt, and then four months, less two days, later asked the Territorial Legislature to repeal it, "if for no other reason, because Congress by express statute approved July 1862, disapproved it." Had any judicial tribunal, between Sept. 16th, 1883, when the report was made to the Secretary of the Interior, and January 14th, 1884, when the message was read to the Territorial Legislature, determined that the act of Congress referred to, repealed or "disapproved"—the terms are synonymous—the Territorial law incorporating the Church? If so, by what tribunal, and when and where was it done? Perhaps some legal friend or judicial interpreter, prevailed upon his Excellency to say in the first instance that the matter decided by the courts was "questionable," and then later, for a purpose, declare notwithstanding a judicial decision to the contrary, that it was not a question, but a fact. Thus it appears, that our Governor has placed himself, or permitted an incautious adviser to place him between the two horns of a dilemma, either of which seems worse than the ragged edge of a forlorn hope, the postponed realization of which "maketh the heart sick," and the soul faint. And yet the real facts, stripped of the glamour of fraudulent sham and hypocricy thrown around it by pettifoggers, would appear not difficult of comprehension. The proviso contained in section 2 of the national law of 1862 itself, would seem to make the matter clear. It reads: "*Provided*: That this act shall be so limited and construed as not to affect or interfere with the rights of property legally acquired under the ordinance heretofore mentioned, nor with the right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience, but only (mark the language) to annul all acts of law which establish, maintain, protect, or countenance the practice of polygamy, evasively called spiritual marriage, however disguised by legal or ecclesiastical solemnities, sacraments, ceremonies, consecrations, or other contrivances." As no part of the act purports to do any of these things, is it not fair to presume that none of it is repealed? Such doubtless, was the conclusion reached by the compilers of the laws of 1876. And while they were responsible for their work, they availed themselves, I understand, of the assistance and legal knowledge of Judge Emerson, who did much of the work, and included the entire Act in the compilation.

In my former communication I affirmed that the courts had decided that the approval of the compilation did not amount to an enactment of any law in it, and that the Governor must have been aware of this, when he made the false assertion that it had been, re-enacted!" Mr. McBride does not deny that the courts had so decided, but seeks by evasive arguments and unsupported assertions to prop up the Governor's false position; and, as he has especially chosen this point, as one upon which to test my "reverence for truth in general," I accept it and in doing so am prepared to abide the result. I affirm, he denies. I refer to court decisions to sustain my position. As a lawyer, without any reference to his reputation as a gentleman of veracity, dare he deny that this matter has been judicially decided in Utah by Federal Courts, or by a Federal Court of the Territory? And if he dare not deny it, let him remember, that the decision was not rendered by a "Mormon Probate Court" for which he seems to have so much contempt, nor by a "Mormon ecclesiastical court" for which he appears to have such holy horror. Does he not know that it has been decided that the compilation, not only did not enact any law in it, but that it did not repeal any law that was left out of it by the compilers, unless previously repealed by the Legislature or by Congress! Being a lawyer, if he does not know these things, then as champion of Governor Murray and his message, he has undertaken a job for the accomplishment of which he is evidently sadly unfitted.

If the courts have so decided and Mr. McBride is aware of it, of what value is his unsupported assertion that the Governor was substantially correct when he said this act was re-enacted in 1876?"

Again, he asserts that the "Governor was insisting that this act had always been invalid, and asked its repeal because it not only had been once annulled by Congress but was invalid from the beginning." While pitying Governor Murray by reason of the unenviable attitude in which he finds himself, let us dispassionately look at the humiliating position in which this legal light has placed the Chief Executive of Utah. The champion says: "The Governor was insisting that the act had always been invalid." Then he did ask the Territorial Legislature to repeal that which, in his own view, was null and void, without force, without effect; and wanted it done *because* "it not only had been once annulled"—that is, as used appropriately of laws, decisions of courts, &c., reduced to nothing; obliterated; made void and of no effect; abrogated; abolished; repealed; reversed; rescinded; revoked; set aside; destroyed. Mr. Editor, in the presence of this logic, reason stands speechless, and his Excellency must feel sorely tried. But he should attribute it to a "system of shuffling" that "pettifoggers," even at the sacrifice of their best friends, are sometimes forced to adopt when "religious and political expediency rests upon the crumbling and ever shifting foundations of insincerity and falsehood." (The sentence is not quoted from the Bible, and has no reference to battles, swiftness or races.)

Mr. McBride further says: "It is adding insult to injury to permit a void act to remain on the statute book because its repeal does not affect its legal validity, and then assert the validity of the act itself." Conceded, but who has done anything of the kind? Certainly not I! On the other hand, is not an attempt to secure the repeal of a valid law, under the false plea that it was invalid from the beginning, and that Congress had annulled it, also, "adding insult to injury?"

I say the law is not, and has not been invalid, and I back my assertion by reference to judicial decisions. I say that Congress has never annulled it, and asproof refer not only to what the courts have affirmed but also to the fact that members of Congress now recognize the validity of the law, as evidenced by the bill introduced in the Senate January 28th, 1884, by the Judiciary Committee, through Mr. Hoar, wherein the church, as a corporate body, is clearly recognized, and the appointment of fourteen trustees to manage its property, contemplated.

Now "marines" might believe, that Governor Murray and his advisers did not know that the law was *not* repealed and that his assertions to the contrary were not meant to deceive, but intelligent people won't believe it.

One point more on this subject; Mr. McBride's Mormon client, to whom he refers, had a perfect right to consult him or any other attorney within his reach; and he had a right also, after paying the bills, to abide by the decision of the court and renounce his connection with the church, or take less than the court awarded him, and remain in it. It was simply a matter of "fellowship." Nothing more. Renouncing his connection with the church, it could have nothing more to do with him further than to excommunicate him, and that would end the matter. The church could not thereafter fine or inflict any punishment whatever upon him, nor could it in any degree enforce, so far as he was concerned, any decision which its ecclesiastical court might have rendered. But the judicial court had the power to force the other party to comply with its decision, whether the parties were in, or out, of the church. A distinction, with a vast difference. Mr. McBride should not feel badly because men place a value on their standing even in the "Mormon" church, it being a matter held sacred by members of other churches.

Dower is a life interest in one third of the real estate acquired solely during the coverture and left by a widow's deceased husband. Under the old common law a married woman became a legal nonentity. Marriage made the twain one, and the man was that one. Her personal property, if she had any, became his; it was her dowry or portion which by the contract of marriage passed to him absolutely; any real estate secured to her before marriage, passed to his control during their joint lives. As a sort of compensation for this marital slavery, after the husband's death the woman was entitled to a life interest only in one third of such lands, tenements or hereditaments as he became possessed of in his own right, during her wifehood. Mark it, this dower gave her no right to dispose of her third, either by sale or will; she merely had the use of it during her life. The right of dower was subject to be barred. The adultery of the wife destroyed it. So if she joined her husband in conveying his estate, or accepted a jointure, that is, a certain portion settled on her for life, if she survived her husband.

These and some other things that might be enumerated, barred the widow's right of dower. I will now give the entire statute by which the dower was abolished in Utah; the reasons for its abolition can be seen from the text at once by any candid mind:

(1020) Sec. 1. *Be it enacted by the Governor and Legislature Assembly of Utah*: That all property owned by either spouse before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent, with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is the separate property of that spouse by whom it is so owned or acquired as specified above, may be held, managed, controlled, transferred and in any manner disposed of by the spouse so owning or acquiring it, without any limitation or restriction by reason of marriage.

(1021) Sec. 2. Either spouse may sue or be sued, plead and be impleaded, or defend and be defended at law.

(1022) Sec. 3. No right of dower shall exist or be allowed in this Territory. Compiled laws, page 342.

In Utah, then, a married woman is a legal somebody. Her property acquired before marriage does not pass to her husband. After marriage, as before, she can hold it, or dispose of it in her own right. As a wife she can acquire other property and posses or convey it by sale, gift, or will. She can enter into contracts. She has an individual and indipendent legal status. She is a free person, as much as a man.

Once more therefore, I assert that Governor Murray's comments on the dower question give an entirely false idea of the property rights of women in Utah, and having shown still further, in this letter, wherein, I pass on, simply remarking that when he, or his champion, "assumes to voice" the sentiments of the women of Utah on this or any other subject, they "are agents without credentials, attorneys without authority."

In seeking to refute my affirmation that "no polygamous marriage has ever been claimed even by Mormons to be valid in law" and that "they have never been enforced or annulled by process of civil law," attorney McBride chides my memory thus: "He must be strangely forgetful. The writer of this article was an attorney in the noted case of Ann Eliza Young vs. Brigham Young, the father of Mr. Thatcher's polygamous wife, and well recollects, if Mr. Thatcher does not, that the Chief Justice of Utah, after three years of expensive litigation, entered a decree annulling the polygamous marriage involved in the case, at the cost of the defendant."

Well, confessing that my memory is at times somewhat faulty, and as Mr. McBride was, as he says, an attorney in the case and must have known whereof he was speaking, I felt I would have to yield this *one* point, and would without further investigation have done so, but after much reflection being wholly unable to remember of having ever married a daughter of Brigham Young; and, being finally convinced that I never had, I thought it just possible that my legal opponent might be in error on other points of his remarkable statement. Not intentionally of course! He is too honorable for that! But knowing that a faulty memory that "well recollects" leads sometimes to mistakes and to misstatement as well, I investigated this particular matter, as the following copy, under the seal of the 3rd District Court of Utah, duly attested—shows:

"In the District Court for the Third Judicial District, Utah Territory.

ANN ELIZA YOUNG, vs. BRIGHAM YOUNG. } Decree.

1877, April 20th, and now on this day this cause comes on to be heard on Bill, amended answer, and exhibits and testimony, and same being read, and the Court having heard the arguments of McBride for complainant and Williams and Sheeks for the deft. and the Court takes the matter under advisement. ——1877, April 27th and now the court having duly considered the same and being fully advised and having made its findings herein, which findings are herewith filed. It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the alleged marriage between the plaintiff and defendant on the 6th day of April 1868, was and the same is hereby decreed and declared to have been and to be null and void *ab initio*. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that all orders and decrees heretofore made by this court in this cause for the payment of temporary alimony by the deft. to the plaintiff which have not been complied with nor paid nor collected, be and the same are hereby revoked and annulled. It is, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendant herein pay the cost of this suit, taxed at $——

M. SHAFFER, Judge.

Decree.
Filed April 27, 1877.
C. S. HILL, Clerk.

Teritory of Utah, County of Salt Lake. } ss.

I, O. J. Averill, Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Utah Territory, do hereby certify that the following (foregoing) is a full, true and correct copy of the original Decree, made and entered by said court April 27th, 1877, in the above entitled action filed in my office.

Witness my hand and the seal of said Court at Salt Lake [Seal] City this 28th day of February A. D. 1884.

O. J. AVERILL, Clerk.
by H. G. MCMILLAN, Deputy Clerk."

Comment would seem unnecessary, and I cannot perhaps dismiss this point to better advantage, than by remarking that "the readers of *The Inter-Ocean* by this time will begin to comprehend what sublime reverence" this legal gentleman "has for truth; it is exhausted in his devotion to it in the abstract," but what can he say in extenuation, when investigation drags out facts in "detail," that dethrone fraud, and reveal hypocricy?

I am sorry that Mr. McBride's memory has served him so imperfectly as to cause him to state a judicial decree to have been exactly the *reverse* of what it really was. Then the awkward part of it consists in his having been an attorney in the case, and that in reference to it "he well recollected," etc.

If he would look into the matter deeply, especially in reference to the alimony *pendente lite* that was granted, he may be able to tell why the case extended over "three years," and was, indeed, made "expensive to the defendant. "A convict (I quote from Mr. McBride's letter) might as well quote his lawyer's argument to the jury, to prove his innocence," as to trust to the memory of some attorneys who, when discussing anything involving the rights of "Mormons," always act as though the end justifies the means.

My legal opponent having said that Judge Black "was as liable to err as any other attorney seeking victory for his client," I might show by comparison wherein he is incorrect. But when I think of comparing Judge Jere S. Black and his noble deeds with some attorneys whom I know, and with whose acts I am somewhat familiar, reverence checks the thought, and the unnerved hand refuses to pen anything that would belittle the memory of that dead but venerated statesman.

Mr. McBride thinks that a "Mormon" article without allusion to the fraudulent certificate "would be like the play of Hamlet with the Prince left out." Well, personally, I like the play better with the Prince left in. But why, if it is but "a dagger of the mind, a false creation," fear it? If it did not seek to murder the right of franchise in Utah, the nightmare of conscience-smitten minds, need not, Macbeth like, behold foul spots, like "gouts of blood," in a mere allusion to it!

Mr. McBride further says: "If Murray's act in refusing the certificate was "infamous," then the act of the House was equally so, for they acted on precisely the same facts and refused Cannon the seat." Reference to the *Congressional Records* containing the reports of the committee on elections, the discussions and final action of the House on that matter, show how utterly without foundation in fact the above statement is. To show this I submit a single paragraph from the speech of Representative House on the subject. He says: "The committee in the report reverse his honor on the naturalization question, and holds that his Excellency slightly erred in giving a certificate of election to a man who only missed an election by a failure to get the votes of the people he aspired to represent." The facts of the case are simple. The fraudulent certificate, whether as a part of a previously arranged conspiracy, I need not here discuss, was granted. Armed with it, Allen G. Campbell and his advisers, kept Hon. George Q. Cannon out of his seat until, under presure of public opinion brought to bear as part of the programme, the Edmunds bill passed the Senate, and by a false ruling of Speaker Keifer was gagged through the House, signed by the President, became law, and under its provisions, applied retroactively, Mr. Cannon having admitted in a former contest that he was a polygamist, was pronounced by majority vote of the House, disqualified to hold his seat.

That the fraudulent certificate played its part in the plot I have no doubt, but that George Q. Cannon lost his seat by an unfair application of the Edmunds law is, I think, beyond question. And when Murray gave the "certificate," he knew that former Congresses had held the practice of polygamy to be no disqualification, and that the question of naturalization had been decided, so far as Mr. Cannon was concerned, in his favor.

And here let me remark that in no other Territory in the Union, would Governor Murray, or any other Governor, dare to strike such a blow at the liberties of the people as he did, in granting that fraudulent certificate; for elsewhere people interpret by acts their idea of treachery in their treatment of the treacherous.

Thus I have, I believe, met all the points of importance mentioned in my former letter, and to which Mr. McBride has taken exception. The length to which this has already reached admonishes me that I shall only be able to meet in a general way some of the new points brought forward in his reply. I should like much to answer them all in detail, but it would be impossible in one letter, without extending its length beyond all reason, and even now, I fear that this may tax the patience of those who read it. I cannot therefore, go over the ground laid out by Mr. McBride in his allusions to old obsolete laws in reference to water claims, timber and cañon road grants, etc., further than to say that good reasons can be given for the enactment of laws applicable and necessary to the conditions existing in a new country first then being developed, that would seem now, without explanation, not only strange but improper, for we have outgrown them. But supposing, as Mr. McBride seems to think, that some of the early laws of Utah were eminently improper, he need only refer to the "Blue Laws of Connecticut" in order to find such to have existed elsewhere. Again, when in England a few years ago, I remember to have had my attention called to an old law—and by the way it was not then repealed either—under the provisions of which the husband could lead his wife into a public market, with a rope round her neck, and sell her to the highest bidder. An attempt to quote that law as an evidence of English civilization and sense of justice now, would be considered extremely foolish.

Again I want to say that I recognize, and am satisfied that most, if not all, "Mormons" in Utah do, "that the Territorial Legislature is a body created and existing by virtue of Congressional law." Not as a gift from Congress, but as one of the rights purchased at the sacrifice of the blood of freemen. In all the long list of questions and in everything Mr. McBride names I recognize it. I know also something about the congressional act of "June 23d, 1874;" and just for his satisfaction will inform him that the Territory had paid on that account, up to December 31st, 1883, $159,624.14. He is in error too, when affirming that "the Legislature in 1875 failed to appropriate money for enforcing the criminal laws." Perhaps such a statement was made to Congress, and it is not unlikely that it was acted upon by Congress, in "authorizing the use, by the courts of justice, of the money appropriated by it, for legislative expenses in Utah." The money was certainly diverted, and the Legislature, as I before stated, served without compensation, and did not make "a loud outcry" about it either. Mr. McBride comes forward now asserting that the members of the Legislature of 1876, "had gone to the county courts and procured appropriations out of the county treasuries, for their per diem and mileage," and then adds: "Mr. Thatcher was well aware that this game had been played, but was perhaps not aware that it had been exposed." Mr. Thatcher was not aware of anything of the kind, for he knew that the per diem and mileage of at least one member—himself—had never been paid out of any county treasury. But Mr. McBride's assertion led to inquiry; and, having looked for fraud, where naturally it would most likely be found, I trust that the publication of the result, will greatly edify my legal opponent. For some time previous to the year 1876, Tooele County had been in the hands of the "Liberals"—further on I will show how *liberal* they were to their kind—but here I note the fact that the mileage for a member of the Legislature from that county could not well exceed say $60, while the per diem would amount to $240, making a total of $300.* [Now I don't say that the member from that county received that or any amount from the county treasury for services as a law-maker [illegible]

[illegible]

... the horrid sight? Why Philip of Spain laughed for the first and only time in his life, when he heard of that awful massacre? [illegible]

[illegible]

MOSES THATCHER.

*The part marked above in brackets was omitted from the *Inter-Ocean* although included in the manuscript.