

many are represented or have interests.

The United States need have no concern. Its interests are if anything safer by reason of the alliance. England is so solidly with us and is so stable in her attachments that we have no reason to doubt the steady maintenance of the bulwark against European interference which, but for that, must have been let loose upon us at a time when we were least prepared for such a catastrophe. As Germany was one of these threatening elements and has been one of the most hostile and hardest to restrain, the additional purpose is accomplished of nullifying in a practical way all opposition from that source.

If the United States, in the days shortly to come, should take a notion to become a member of the new combination, what a mighty dreibund it would be! How the rest of the world, civilized and savage, would stand aghast and begin a complete readjustment of their affairs upon an absolute peace basis!

THE DREYFUS CASE.

The resignation of M. Cavaignac, minister of war in M. Brisson's cabinet, instead of measurably appeasing the rising tide of indignation among the French people, seems to have swollen it somewhat. It is an exceedingly perilous situation for France, and may yet eventuate war. Cavaignac could not or would not conceal his animus even in his letter of resignation, but in the face of the awful disclosures showing the culpability of high military authorities and the almost certain innocence of the long-suffering victim, held to it that Dreyfus was guilty. If this is not a case of the wish being father to the thought, it is certainly very much like it. If the man who is being slowly tortured to death on Devil's Island could only be hastened along and made to disappear from the scene altogether before the rehearing of his case, no doubt M. Cavaignac in common with many others would breathe much easier than at present. It is certain that some further disclosures are to come, and the showing made of how possible it is for such things to be in that nation is of itself much more dangerous to the government than the knowledge of how infamous is the treatment to which the scapegoat of military politicians has been subjected.

A good deal of questioning has been indulged in regarding the origin and motive of the Dreyfus prosecution, and as it seems to be "caviare to the general" a brief review of it is in order. The New York World last Sunday had a lengthy and elaborate statement of it, from which the following is compiled:

Captain Albert Dreyfus, of the French army, was in 1894, by a secret court-martial, convicted of treason to France. He was condemned on a single document—a bordereau or memorandum of French military secrets of no importance or value, alleged by one of the subordinates of Col. Paty du Clam to have been found in the waste-basket of the German ambassador. This memorandum was, the army's experts contend, in a handwriting identical in all essential points with that of Dreyfus. The opposition experts contend that it was the writing of Major Esterhazy, a French military spy. To influence the court-martial two secret documents were laid before them, but not shown to Dreyfus or his counsel. These were two letters written by the military attaché of the Italian embassy at Paris and referred to French secrets sold by a French spy, "D." The army now admits that one of these

letters referred to another person and not to Dreyfus, and both the Italian and German attaché, to whom he wrote, have pledged themselves convincingly that neither letter referred to Dreyfus, and that they had had no dealings whatever with him.

In 1896, two years after Dreyfus's condemnation and when the agitation for a re-trial began in earnest, Col. Henry forged a letter purporting to be a third in the Italian attaché's series. In this forged letter Dreyfus's name occurred in full. This forged letter was put forward as conclusive proof that Dreyfus was guilty. Confronted recently with a charge of forgery, Col. Henry killed himself.

When Paty du Clam was promoted in 1894 for catching and convicting Dreyfus, Col. Picquart became the head of the intelligence bureau. He was dismissed for collecting proofs that showed or tended to show that the bordereau was in the handwriting of the French spy Esterhazy, and that Esterhazy had sold French secrets to the Germans and the Italians both before and after Dreyfus was arrested and imprisoned. The explanation put forward by the army and the government for Esterhazy's published letters denouncing France and for his selling secrets is that he did it in the regular course of his business, the better to get hold of the secrets of other governments. The explanation of the resemblance of the handwriting of the bordereau to Esterhazy's handwriting is that Dreyfus, knowing Esterhazy's business, imitated his handwriting the better to conceal himself.

The army and the government have alleged from the first that there is other evidence against Dreyfus, which can in no circumstances be disclosed for "grave reasons of state." They allege that these reasons are so grave that any act to suppress the Dreyfus agitation would be justifiable. On the other hand, the friends of Dreyfus allege that these so-called "grave reasons of state" are merely the cover for a clique of disreputable army officers and their dupes who have been conspiring not against France directly but first against the Hebrews in the army and latterly to defend themselves from exposure and disgrace.

When Dreyfus was publicly degraded he cried out, "In three years the truth will be known!" This seems to indicate that he knew the real cause of the attack upon him and that there was some definite specific reason why this cause should not come out for at least three years. It is now three years and two-thirds of another since that statement was made and the truth seems to be slowly rising to the surface. But would such a state of things be possible in any other nation than France?

BELONGING TO A PARTY.

A cotemporary is generous enough to say that if a man gets tired of one party let him get into some other. There are some people who seem to look upon political organizations as the be-all and end-all of this life; the sine qua non, the sum and substance of all that is honorable and straightforward. This is their privilege which they can and do enjoy without molestation. Still, in an humble way, those who do not exactly so regard it ought to be entitled to opinions and enjoy the right (occasionally) of expressing them without the ones so doing being placed in doubt regarding their sanity or subjected to vituperative or insinuating criticism therefor.

It is not believed by everybody, here or elsewhere, that a man or woman is compelled to "belong" to a political party at all, or to give any such organizations the slightest aid, comfort, hope or encouragement. Doing either

of these things is a matter exclusively within the control of the person. He may attach himself to whatever party he chooses or refuse to be attached to any, and still be a good citizen. Or he may cease his connection with the party with which he is acting and still not be compelled by any moral reason or social obligation to act with any other. Or he may act partly with one and partly with another, not perhaps to the extent of participating in the deliberations or other official proceedings of two or more, but certainly to the extent of voting thereon. There is no penalty provided by law for any of these things; the only "punishment" that can be inflicted is the withdrawal of recognition as a fellow member, which the one who so acts is generally prepared for.

Another mistaken idea is that a person cannot point out what he conceives to be the error, either of the head or heart, on the part of those with whom he is acting as a co-partisan without abandoning the organization. This kind of thing would effectually bar out nearly all people who were not completely subservient and who attach themselves to a party because of the principles which underlie it. It does not follow that criticism should amount to antagonism nor that one person or a few should control the many; it does follow, however, that the voice of the one or the few should not be stifled nor should their endeavors to be heard subject them to reproach.

AGUINALDO'S ATTITUDE.

If Admiral Dewey has asked for more men-of-war to reinforce his naval force in the Philippines, he undoubtedly looks upon the situation there as grave. The telegraphic reports are to the effect that the rebels have been threatening to attack Manila and that General Otis has sent an ultimatum to Aguinaldo ordering him to withdraw his followers in order to avoid friction. His followers are said to have trenches around the entire city and to hold the waterworks, giving them a decided advantage.

It appears from these reports that the relations between the American forces and the insurgents are none too cordial. Should it come to hostilities, there can be no doubt of the final outcome. The Filipinos would be defeated and compelled to submit to the authority of the representatives of this country. But the complete subjugation of the rebels might be a tedious affair. War with barbarians sometimes costs much loss of life and money, as Great Britain has found out on several occasions.

The attitude of Aguinaldo may have some bearing on the peace terms and the final disposition of the Philippine islands. The rebel chief dreams of the possibility of an independent Philippine republic, but it is needless to say that this dream is, at present, impossible of realization. The natives are not the proper material nor have they the necessary preliminary training for self-government. The powers interested in the East cannot consent to the Aguinaldo program. The establishment of a stable government in the islands must be entrusted either to Spain or to the United States. The peace commissioners will have to decide this matter, and it is to be hoped that they will be influenced by the feelings of rectitude and humanity that prompted the nation to engage in the war with a foreign country. If so, the outcome cannot be doubtful.

Those Austrians who are wreaking vengeance on innocent Italians because of the murder of Empress Elizabeth are no better than the assassin. Their slaughter of Italians in Austria is no