

[From the New York Herald, July 21.]

## THE WAR.

## BATTLE OF JUNE EIGHTEENTH.

## The Russian account of the affair.

The *Invalide Russe* says:

We have just received the following detailed report from Aide-de-camp-General Prince Gortschakoff of the assault of the French on the 6th (18th) of June, on the bastions 1, 2 and 3, and Kornileff, of the line of defence of Sebastopol, and of their repulse by our troops.

The enemy having resolved to make a decisive attack on our left flank, opened on the 5th (17th) of June, at 3:30 A.M., a "fire of hell" against the fortifications of the Karabelnaia Faubourg (sections 3 and 4). For two consecutive hours all their batteries fired almost uninterrupted broadsides. On our side we kept up a quick fire in return. At two in the afternoon, at a given signal, the besiegers opened a heavy fire against our right flank. The fire, which was now opened along the whole line of our defence, lasted till an advanced hour of the evening.

At dusk and throughout the night the enemy threw shells and rockets into the town, into the roadstead and the north side. A steam frigate, which had left the allied fleet at the same time, fired broadsides into the roadstead and against the town. The greater portion of its projectiles fell into the sea without touching our ships.

This terrible cannonade and incessant bombardment did not prevent the brave defenders of Sebastopol from actively repairing the damage done to the works; despite a terrible front and flank fire, the works were successfully completed, the guns which had been dismantled replaced by new ones on every point, and on the morning of the 6th (18th) of June we were perfectly prepared to receive and drive back the enemy.

In the night between the 5th and 6th (17th and 18th) of June, to be prepared for an assault, our troops were disposed as follows on the left flank of our line of defence:

Bastion No. 3, and the neighboring batteries, were defended by the 2d brigade of the 11th division of infantry, a regiment of the Briansk Chasseurs, and a battalion of reserve, consisting of men of the Minsk and Volhynia regiments.

In the Kornileff Bastion and in the Gervais Battery there was the first brigade of the 8th infantry division and the Sevsk regiment of infantry.

In bastion No. 2, the Vladimir regiment of infantry and the first battalion of the Souzdal regiment; another battalion of the same regiment was drawn up along the curtain between bastion Kornileff and bastion No. 2. Bastion No. 1 was occupied by the Chasseur regiments Kremenchong and Prince of Warsaw.

The general reserve of troops who defended the works of the Karabelnaia Faubourg consisted of the 1st brigade of the 11th division of infantry, with eighteen pieces of field artillery of the 11th and 17th brigades.

On the 6th (18th) of June, at daybreak, the enemy in a dense chain, supported by strong reserves, attacked simultaneously bastion No. 1, the fortified barracks between bastions 1 and 2, bastion No. 2, the Kornileff bastion, bastion No. 3, and the so-called Gribok work, situate on the right of the Peressyp; the enemy entertained the hope of forcing a passage somewhere along this long line of defence.

The number of troops they brought to the assault was 35,000 men, without counting their distant reserves. The French advanced on the right flank and centre, the English on the left flank.

The besiegers, provided with ladders, fascines, and sappers' tools, advanced rapidly to the attack. Despite the heavy fire of grape and musketry we poured into them, their columns advanced, reached our ditches, and commenced scaling the parapets.

But the line of the intrepid defenders of Sebastopol never swerved. They received the daring assaults with the points of their bayonets, and threw them back into the ditches. The enemy's columns then threw themselves on the Gervais Battery, entered it, drove out the battalion of infantry in charge of it, and, following in pursuit, occupied the houses nearest the Karabelnaia Faubourg from the Malakoff Mamelon to the bay of the docks.

The success of our adversaries was not of long duration. Lieutenant General Chrouleff, the vigilant chief of the line of defence of the Karabelnaia Faubourg, ordered up a reserve of six hundred riflemen to the curtain between Bastions 2 and Kornileff. When the enemy had passed through our line near the Gervais Battery, Lieutenant General Chrouleff, placing himself at the head of a company of the Sevsk regiment of infantry, which was returning from a *corvee*, and taking with him a battalion of the Poltava regiment, led them to the charge.

These troops, reinforced in good time by five companies of the Yakoutsk regiment, and later by a battalion of the Yeleta regiment, routed the French, and having driven them out of the Gervais battery, pursued them into their own trenches, putting the stragglers in the rear to the bayonet. The company of the Sevsk regiment distinguished itself by its intrepidity during the combat.

On all the other points of the line of defence the troops, animated by their commanders, Rear Admiral Panfiloff and Major General Prince Ourousoeff, fought with exemplary courage, and drove back the assailants.

Our batteries on the North side, and our steamers, which swept the enemy's columns at every point upon which they could bring their guns to bear, contributed considerably to the success of the brilliant affair; the steamer Vladimir in particular, commanded by Captain Boutakoff, approached repeatedly to the entrance of Careening Bay, from which point it swept the enemy's reserves.

The heroism and disregard of danger of the gar-

risson of Sebastopol, in which all, from the general to the private, fought with most extraordinary daring and intrepidity, are above all praise. Among those who most distinguished themselves, in addition to the commander of the garrison, Aide-de-camp Count Osten Sacken, and his colleague, Admiral Nachimoff, (who so valiantly direct the whole defence of Sebastopol). I must mention Lieutenant General Chrouleff, to whom the chief honor of the day is due, as commanding the whole of the line attacked; Rear Admiral Panfiloff, who drove back the assault on bastion No. 3; Major General Prince Ourousoeff, who defeated the assailants between bastions 1 and 2; the Chiefs of Sections and Naval Captains de Kern and Perelschine; Major General Youferoff, Colonel Goleff, Lieutenant Col. Malefsky, and Capt. Boutakoff.

Our losses during the bombardment of the 5th and 6th (17th and 18th) of June, and during the assault, consist of 1 superior officer, 4 subalterns, and 530 men killed; 5 superior officers, 42 subalterns, and about 3,378 men wounded.

Among the brave defenders of Sebastopol we have unhappily to deplore the loss of some distinguished officers. Thus, the brave Captain Boudistcheff, of the navy, was killed. Among the wounded are Major General Zamarine, the gallant Captain Yourkovsky, of the navy, commander of the fourth section, seriously; the captain of naval artillery, Stanislawsky, commander of the artillery of the Kornileff bastion.

The loss of the enemy, whose columns were exposed to a most terrible fire of grape and musketry, is very considerable; the removal of the dead, which took place on the following day, at the request of the commander-in-chief of the allies, at six in the evening, is a proof of it. The number of corpses was so considerable that the French had not sufficient stretchers to carry them off, and the officer intrusted with the duty requested us to bury those they could not remove.

Such is the recital of this unexampled exploit of the garrison of Sebastopol, which, after nine months of siege and three terrible bombardments, repulsed the desperate assault of the enemy, occasioned them an immense loss, and with heroic devotion is still ready to meet any new attempt on their part.

The *Invalide Russe* adds:

To complete this report, a telegraphic dispatch from Prince Gortschakoff announces that up to the 9th (21st) of June nothing of importance has since occurred before Sebastopol, or any other point of the Crimea.

For more clearness it is indispensable to say that the space between which the attack of the besiegers was made, has an extent of about four wersts, from Careening Bay to that of the Laboratory, and forms a convex curve. Bastion No. 3, is detached from the Bay of the Docks and Kornileff, on the right shore of which, connected with this bastion, is the Gervais Battery, the fire of which commands the bay and the ground in front of Bastion No. 3.

## The Allied Generals—Their Defeat.

The dispatch of Gen. Pelissier, giving a detailed account of the assault upon Malakoff and the Redan, was published in the *Moniteur* yesterday. From this, and from reliable private sources, I gather the following points, from which it will be seen that the defence was conducted with immense ability and address, while the attack was both slovenly and confused:

First—The Russians were aware of the precise moment at which the assault was to be made. The nature and the vivacity of the bombardment indicated clearly enough that an assault was to follow, but we are not told how the Russian commanders learned that the hour was three in the morning. This shows conclusively that the Allies will never find the enemy off their guard.

Second—Gen. Meyran mistook a fusee discharged from the Mamelon, for Pelissier's signal, to be sent up from the Lancaster battery. His division therefore marched to the attack before the other two, and the Russians consequently had a divided and successive assault to repel, instead of a united and simultaneous onset.

Third—Gen. Brunet was not ready when the genuine signal was given, and was actually twenty-five minutes behind Meyran, who was himself a quarter of an hour in advance.

Fourth—Malakoff and the Redan, the two works especially to be assaulted, had pretended, the evening before, to be so badly used that they could no longer reply to the enemy's fire. Both Pelissier and Raglan were completely deceived; the former says: "It is possible that these works had not really suffered as much as we had the right to suppose they had, from the effects of our artillery." The armament of Malakoff had been changed during the night, and pieces adapted for grape had been substituted for the long range cannons of the day before.

Fifth—During the night the Russians had sunk the ditch lining the exterior of Malakoff, a couple of feet, and the French scaling ladders were found at the critical moment to be considerably too short!

Sixth—The Russian fleet, locked up in the harbor, which Pelissier had given us to understand was radically damaged, did the allies the most serious injury. One letter says that there were spots in part of Malakoff, which the fleet rendered positively impassable; "nine men out of ten were swept away by its plowing fire."

Seventh—There were 20,000 men under arms behind Malakoff alone, with 30 field pieces, besides the armament of the bastions itself.

Eighth—A battery of terrible power was unmasked upon the assaulting columns.

Pelissier recognizes and acknowledges all these errors and misconceptions. He says that "with Spartan coolness and ensemble in the attack, the object might have been attained; but an inconceivable fatality defeated our plans." He speaks of the success and the address of the movements of the Russian fleet. Lord Raglan never saw in his life such discharges of grape, and that, too,

from works that had been reduced to silence the night before! The Russians having learned that 23,000 men were to be employed against them, were ready to send 40,000 of their own into action.

Thus, the assault has been made; and at the moment of commencing the attack, not a single individual in the allied camp doubted for an instant of its success. What are the inferences to be drawn from its failure? In answering this question we must remember that the death of Lord Raglan seems to have been hastened, if not determined, by the defeat, and that Louis Napoleon, having withdrawn to a country seat near Versailles, is living in isolation, and as may be easily believed, in alternate fits of rage and despondency.

The inferences are evidently that the Russians can never be taken unawares; as the London Times declares, they have agents in the heart of the allied camp; that they are more than a match for the French and English in those ruses de guerre which neutralize the first advantages of valor, number and position; that their resources are still inexhaustible; that their invention is still lively; and there is neither lack of provisions nor ammunition; and that the regular fortifications of the city, will be defended with ten-fold the vigor which characterized the defence of the exterior works, or the heights of Alma, or the valley of Inkermann. The Allies have suffered a severe defeat; have undergone a sudden and violent check, and are laboring under a natural disappointment, and under what is much worse—the consciousness that they have overrated themselves and underrated their enemy. Pelissier was never famous for prudence, and he has now lost a portion of his credit for sagacity. Another charm has also been destroyed—the happy influence of famous anniversaries. Louis Napoleon is especially superstitious on this point, as is well known. The 18th of June was the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, and was chosen, and indeed waited for, in order that a victory gained in common might obliterate all old grudges, and dissipate, at least for present purposes, any yet active prejudices. The anticipated victory was a disastrous and even disgraceful defeat. A Russian asked an Ally during the truce for the burial of the dead, if the English and French generals were not drunk during the assault.—[Ex.

## The Hango Affair.

[The Russian General to Admiral Dundas.]

HELSINGFORS, June 5, (17th) 1855.

MONSIEUR L'ADMIRAL; Before replying to the letter of your excellency of the 3d (15th) of June, I must observe with regret that the vessels of the English fleet hoist Russian colors the more easily to capture any Russian vessel they come across. The journals have sufficiently made known how, from the commencement of the war, the flag of truce has been abused in every sea to take soundings and to make military observations. The hostility displayed against inoffensive towns and villages inhabited by peaceful populations has been but too well proved by all that has taken place in the Baltic.

On the 14th (26th) of May, a cutter, I do not know from which ship, landed with a little white flag near the village of Twerminna. Not finding any troops stationed near the village, the crew of the cutter wantonly set fire to some huts and boats, despite the white flag.

On the 26th May, (5th June) another cutter, belonging to the corvette *Cossack*, made for the Hango coast. The boat had the British flag flying. The officer in command of her pretends to have hoisted a little white flag in her prow on a stick. Neither the men on duty at the telegraph on the neighboring heights, nor the military post on the coast, perceived this pretended white flag. It was, consequently, quite natural that they should attack the cutter and its crew as soon as the latter landed.

Lieutenant Louis Geneste pretends that a servant carried by his side a stick with a white flag on it.—The soldiers and officers of our advanced posts questioned as to the existence of this flag, affirm that they never saw it at all.

M. Geneste pretends that he was sent with a flag of truce to give up some of the crews of merchantmen captured during that fortnight. If such had been his intention, it would have been a much simpler plan, as the *Cossack* came from the neighborhood of Cronstadt, to have sent them to Sweaborg, or to have landed them on some island, from which they could easily have reached the coast.

The Captain of the *Cossack* ought to know that the bearer of a flag of truce cannot, and ought not to be received upon the first landing place, rock, or promontory it may suit him to select.

My outposts see, and will continue to see, in such missions, only military reconnaissances, which use similar pretexts to make explorations and secure provisions.

The hostile, and by no means truce-like character of this mission is, moreover, proved.

1. By the loaded arms seized. Three muskets show by their exploded caps that the crew of the boat made use of them in the struggle.

2. By the care shown in providing the cutter with 360 cartridges, and a chest full of incendiary articles, which is actually in our possession.

On the following day the *Cossack* kept up a heavy fire against the village of Hango and its peaceful inhabitants, and a few days later, the 1st (13th) of June, the attack was repeated, to set fire to the telegraph and destroy some houses, instead of going to Sweaborg to demand explanations.

Despite the superiority which steam and screws give to your vessels, they do not cease to hoist the Russian flag to seize our coasting vessels.

In the same manner some yards of white canvas have evidently been turned to account to take soundings and make explorations.

I am willing to believe, M. l'Admiral, that this is done without your knowledge. Allow me to

express the hope that you will in future prohibit the missions of such pretended flags of truce. The crew of Lieut. Geneste's boat were caught in their own trap. Seven men were killed, four wounded and the remainder made prisoners, as the list I enclose will inform you. The affair only lasted a moment. It was impossible to distinguish the English from the prisoner sailors they brought with them. One of them, Lundstrom, who spoke English, was the first man killed, and two others were wounded.

The responsibility of the whole affair rests with the irregularity with which missions of this sort are made.

It appears to me that it would be more suitable to make communications to Sweaborg, and intrust them to some vessel sent there in the same manner as you sent your letter of the 3d (15th) of June.

The *Cossack* should not have deviated from the rule. Vessels wishing to enter into parley should hoist a white flag of large dimensions, and anchor beyond long range, and await a boat to receive their message in writing. We will never receive any other. The *Cossack* did nothing of the sort. It seems to me that the honor of your flag ought to exact the most strict and scrupulous observance of the rules established on such occasions.

The honor of my flag will never permit me to depart from them.

I can assure you that the wounded are well taken care of, and the prisoners well treated.

I have the honor to be, Monsieur l'Admiral, your very obedient servant,

DE BERG,

Aide-de-Camp General of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias.

## Cost of the War.

The war has put the Sultan and his Western friends to the following trifling expense:—

British loans extraordinary	\$130,000,000
French do do	250,000,000
Turkish do do	16,000,000
Total	\$396,000,000.

What the Russian expenditure may have been we have no means of knowing positively. That it must have been large is clear from the number of troops kept on foot, and of course fed and clothed at the expense of the Imperial government.

It has been estimated by a well-informed and apparently an honest writer at \$250,000,000 a year for extra military expenses occasioned by the war, and as much more for the wilful or necessary destruction of property.

At this rate, the war must have cost Russia half as much again as the Allies, and \$600,000,000 would not square the account. But a large portion of this expenditure was in buildings, ships, produce and merchandise, and though as serious in the long run as the expenditure of hard cash, it will be longer in being felt.

Probably three hundred millions of money have passed from the Imperial treasury into the hands of army agents, contractors, purveyors and contractors on account of the army.

Taking this figure as the basis of calculation, we arrive at the conclusion that within less than twelve months, about seven hundred millions of dollars have been diverted from trade and agriculture and expended by the belligerents in the prosecution of the war.

Some idea of the enormousness of this sum may be derived from a knowledge of the fact that the united incomes of the whole people of Great Britain and Ireland are only supposed to amount to five times as much. It is equal to three-fourths the total debt of Austria, under which the House of Hapsburg has been tottering this many a year; more than half the whole debt of France; twice the debt of Russia up to 1853; nearly four times the average assets of the Bank of England at the present day; and more than fourteen times as much as the whole national debt of the United States. Former wars never cost anything like it. The old wars with England were waged for what it has cost in this war to fit out a single expedition.

The Peninsular war under Wellington, and the naval wars of Nelson, Collingwood, and England's other heroes—which swelled the debt of England to its present awful figure—were economical pastimes compared with this. Pitt was a niggard in comparison with Palmerston. Never has the world seen money flow so freely before.—[N. Y. Herald of July 23.

## Latest War News.

THE CRIMEA.

Sebastopol was bombarded again, July 5, without effect.

Additional formidable works were being erected by the allies against the Malakoff and Redan. The Russians were erecting equally strong in opposition.

Another general assault is not far off.—40,000 men employed on the works. The Russians in addition to other defences were throwing a formidable star fort behind the Redan. A weak fire was kept up on the 10th and 11th.

Cholera was decreasing, and the health of the allied armies was satisfactory.

The Russians made a sortie on the night of the 7th, on the works in front of the Mamelon. They effected nothing.

ENGLAND.

A dispatch, by steamer *Atlantic* which arrived in New York July 25, states that Lord John Russell had resigned. The circumstances which led to the resignation were disclosures made by him of his course at Vienna, which disclosures led to a debate in the House on Friday the 6th. At the close of the debate, Mr. Lytton Bulwer moved, that the conduct of the Minister charged with the negotiations at Vienna, and his con-