senting inexactitudes with a cold-blooded apparent earnestness and artfully assumed sincerity that are apt to deceive those who are uninformed upon the subjects he professes to treat. We know of no greater adept in that direction than J. R. McBride. He has a faculty for presenting statements made for a purpose, for which he knows there is not the most slender foundation, in a way that is so childlike and bland that the uninformed listener is apt to believe he is telling the truth. In our opinion the gentleman has got this manner so near perfection in its operations that he is enabled to reduce misrepresentation to the status of a fine art.

When occasion requires Mr. McBride can, with astonishing facility, become "all things to all men, that he might gain some" ulterior object of which he is in pursuit. As an illustration in point we have sometimes related the circumstance of his participating, on Sunday, May 7th, 1882, in a Methodist anti-"Mormon" meeting in the Methodist Church in this city, when, although understood to be an infidel, he exclaimed, "I feel on this occasion as if I were a devout Methodist." It was on this same occasion—when the politicians and Methodist ministers were mixed up in an anti-"Mormon" love-feast—that the Rev. Mr. Rudisill ventured the assertion that principally through the efforts of his church Congress had been compelled to pass the Edmunds law. As Mr. McBride warmed to his theme he, in the innate modesty and toleration of his religious soul, said, "I believe I would make an excellent prosecutor of the 'Mormon' Church."

It takes no stretch of inference to assume that such a position is still an object of his desire. It is generally believed that his soul will never be satisfied until he reaches the post of U. S. District Attorney for Utah. His idea of that office is such that if it were named from his estimate of its nature it would be consistent to call it "prosecutor of the 'Mormon' Church." Whether he will ever attain the object of his ambition—the end to which he appears to be working—is a question involving a good deal of doubt.

Col. Ferry also doubtless imagined he was swinging some heavy blows as he dilated before the committee upon Mormon exclusiveness.

The dispatch giving a concise statement of what he was driving at stated he contended that "the Mormon motto in all affairs over which they had jurisdiction was that no Gentile need apply."

It would be easy to establish the fact that Col. Ferry made a glaring misstatement when he uttered this assertion. Proofs to the contrary of his position, furnished by existing circumstances, are understood and accessible. If, however, he had been correct, what an appaling situation it would have manifested. The base ingratitude that could have thus been exhibited by the Mormons after the transcendant magnanimity shown by the other side, in "all affairs over which they had jurisdiction," would have been highly reprehensible.

The evidence of the superior liberality of the non-"Mormon" side holding jurisdiction, toward "Mormons," can be shown by a mere cursory glance. It is exhibited wherever such jurisdiction, in the most limited degree, exists.

As instances, the facts may be cited that every federal officer, of every stripe and grade, is a Gentile, in every locality where one can be found qualified to act.

The Utah Commission have appointed all registration officers from the non-"Mormon" minority, and the custom of the same body has been to appoint, of the three judges of election at each polling place, two from the same minority class.

The Poland law, relating to the securing and empaneling of juries, provides that the selection of citizens for service be made numerically equal from the two distinct classes of the community. Notwithstanding that the non-"Mormons" are but a small minority in Salt Lake County, as soon as a Gentile probate judge was appointed and qualified practically the entire selection was made from the non-"Mormon" minority.

In a school district in this county, at the last election of trustees, a non-"Mormon" majority was chosen to compose the board. A teacher was soon wanted. An application was made by a gentleman of that profession. The first question asked of him was, "Are you a Mormon? If so we don't want you." In other words, it might as well have been said, "As we have jurisdiction in this affair, no Mormon need apply."

And so on, instances might be enumerated indefinitely, showing that that kind of magnanimity and liberal example is pretty nearly if not quite universal.

How the Colonel could ferry over this stream of truth in order to attempt to make a showing of Mormon exclusiveness is a little remarkable. One would have thought that he would have struck a snag in the shape of a squirm of conscience.

AN INFAMOUS OUTRAGE.

No INTELLIGENT and fairminded person can peruse the account of the proceedings in the Hendrickson *habeas corpus* case without being filled with ineffable disgust. He must also feel humiliated at the fact that there are things in human shape so completely lost to common decency and common humanity as to perpetrate so infernal an outrage as the act in question. We are of opinion that men, no matter what may be their position, official or otherwise, who will commit such an outrage as appears in the Hendrickson case are worthy of being covered with eternal contempt.

Not only is the act of consigning an innocent and respectable woman to the confines of a prison and compelling her, as in this instance, to associate with the vilest of vile characters, in conflict with every human instinct, but is in flat and positive contravention of an express statutory enactment and of the law as rendered by the highest tribunal in the land. The law in relation to the privilege of the witness in this instance is so plain that a fool might run and read, unless his eyes were covered with the green goggles of malignity.

What can be said of an attorney representing this great government at second hand who will, in the face of law, superior court construction, and the most ordinary rules of common sense, contend that the competency of a witness should not be passed upon before the giving of a ruling as to the materiality of questions propounded by a grand jury? Any one with an amount of brains falling to the lot of an ordinary ass ought to see that the question of competency must first be decided, because the materiality of evidence necessarily depends upon that point. It is in the matter of acting as a witness as in that of a juror, whose competency or elegibility must be determined before he can be required to serve. Otherwise the service might be illegal and void. But it seems to be the object, in the case of Mrs. Hendrickson, to compel her to give illegal testimony. The ascertainment of competency must precede the act beyond it in the very nature of things.