

were to declare, as requested, that he had "full faith in his creed," but "there was nothing in it which imposed any obligation upon any man to give up his conscience to the keeping of another," he would be simply repeating something that has been enunciated times without number; and if he were to call, as desired, "for emancipation for himself and his people" he would only make his hearers wonder what he was driving at.

There is no greater liberty in any ecclesiastical organization on earth than in the "Mormon" Church. If there is anything to be deplored in this connection it is that its members are often permitted too great liberty, to depart from its order and neglect its regulations without proper reproof and discipline. There is nothing irksome in its obligations to a religious mind. Its yoke is easy and its burden light. It binds no man's conscience. It fetters no one's thought. Even when any of its members entertain opinions different to its standards of faith and principle it does not interfere with them.

Of course, if one of its ministers were to publicly proclaim false doctrines in the capacity of an authorized expounder, he would be called to account, and if he persisted his authority would be taken from him. But no one would interfere with his free agency to think and speak and act for himself, unless by overt acts he infringed upon the rightful liberties of another.

So all these appeals to cast off a bondage that has no existence are wasted words. They are void and without effect except as they may aid in the dissemination of unjust and incorrect ideas concerning the "Mormon" Church. If the author has this object in view, we are sorry to see so much ability misused. If he really believes he is working for a good purpose, we are surprised at his lack of information. And he may attribute his lack of success with "young Utah" to the fact, that every young man and woman in the Church who knows anything of its doctrine, practice and spirit and who happens to read his effusions will only smile at his distortion of the doctrines and purposes of their creed and pity his mental blindness.

"Mormonism" is neither lawless nor tyrannical. It comes nearer to "a perfect law of liberty" than anything on earth. And he who would be truly free, as the Great Creator designs his children to be, can learn the way to that heavenly

liberty to enjoy it forever, in the system that has its centre in these mountain vales and that is derisively called by the name of "Mormonism."

ERRORS OF INGERSOLL.

In the April number of the *North American Review*, Col. R. G. Ingersoll has an article in praise of the philosophy of Professor Huxley, and in condemnation of that of the Principal of King's College, Cambridge. The former opposes and the latter, so far as he understands it, defends the theology of the Bible. Without entering into the merits of this tripartite discussion, we will take up a few propositions put forth by Col. Ingersoll, which are evidently designed to be general in their character, and not confined to points raised in that debate. Col. Ingersoll says:

"There is a relation between evidence and belief. The mind is so constituted that certain things, being in accordance with its nature, are regarded as reasonable, as probable."

It is very easy to see that the noted Agnostic is in deep water here, and that he is not the metaphysician he would assume to be. His attempt at defining the "relation between evidence and belief" is a complete failure. Evidently he does not himself comprehend that relation, and hence cannot state it. The "relation between evidence and belief" is simply that of cause and effect. Faith respecting any thing, matter or proposition, pertaining to science, religion, or any affair of life, is created in the human mind by evidence. Without evidence there can be no faith. If the evidence be true, the faith created by it will also be true; if the evidence be false, the faith will be fallacious.

Again, Ingersoll says:

"What knowledge has the Christian of another world? The senses of the Christian are the same as those of the Agnostic. He hears, sees and feels substantially the same. His vision is limited. He sees no other shore and hears nothing from another world."

This is a misstatement of the facts. "The senses of the Christian," using the term Christian in its proper meaning, are not simply and only "the same as those of the Agnostic." Two men stand upon an ocean beach; the waves lash the shore, making music at once sweet and impressive. One of the twain listens and his spirit is awed and subdued; the other stops up his ears and denies that there is any

melody. Can it be truthfully said that the two hear "substantially the same?"

Again, several persons stand in a group, gazing at a rainbow; one can distinguish but three colors, another can see four, a third plainly makes out five, and a fourth declares there are seven. Few persons are entirely free from color-blindness, and have the power to see and describe all the tints and hues that characterize a many-colored object or scene. What may be said in this regard of the physical eyesight, is still more emphatically true of man's mental vision.

It is not true that the Christian "sees no other shore and hears nothing from another world." He does both, and what he sees and hears of that other shore is to him as real, reliable and substantial as what he sees and hears of this.

Ingersoll further declares:

"Knowledge is something that can be imparted. It has a foundation in fact. It comes within the domain of the senses. It can be told, described, analyzed, and, in addition to all this, it can be classified. Whenever a fact becomes the property of one mind, it can become the property of the intellectual world. There are words in which the knowledge can be conveyed."

What is here said of knowledge is utterly untrue in reference to many cases. Knowledge is not always "something that can be imparted" by one human being to another. Indeed, a major part of the knowledge a given individual has acquired during life could not be by him imparted to a second person. The first could do no more than testify to what he knew, and it would remain with the second to believe or disbelieve that testimony. As a proposition of refined metaphysics it may be doubted whether it is possible for one human being to "impart" to another any "knowledge" at all. Is it not more accurate to say that the evidence of a truth may be "imparted," but that the mind of the person listening to it digests it and extracts knowledge from it by innate powers of assimilation?

A man may know certain truths with a knowledge as vivid and positive, as clear and indubitable as he may the fact of his own existence, and yet be powerless to communicate it, or even the faintest shadow of belief in it, to a second individual. The persons executed in New England for witchcraft are cases in point. There did not exist "words in which the knowledge" of their