when sulphide of ammonium was added to it, and gave a heavy precipitate with oxalate of ammonia. On analysis I found that the body of the syrup was made of starch sugar (glucose) instead of true sugar. The free sulphuric acid (oil of vitriol) the sulphate of iron (copperas) and sulpho-saccharate of lime were probably the cause of the sickness in the Doty family."

Professor Kedzie was led by this result to make an examination of several samples of syrups, and the result we give below.

No. 1—Pure cane sugar syrup.

No. 2.—Starch sugar syrup contains some sulphate of iron (copperas), and contains in each gallon 107.35 grains of lime.

No. 3.—The grocer called it "poor stuff." I have seldom seen an article that better sustained its recommendation; made of starch sugar; contains plenty of copperas and 297 grains of lime in a gallon.

No. 4.—Nearly pure cane sugar sirup.

No. 5.—Starch sugar syrup, contains copperas, and 100 grains of lime in a gallon.

Nos. 6, 7, 8.—All made of starch sugar, contain sulphate of iron and plenty of lime.

No. 9.—This is the specimen from Hudson which caused the sickness in the Doty family. A starch sugar syrup; contains in the gallon 71.83 grains of free sulphuric acid, 28 grains of sulphate of iron, and 363 grains of lime.

No. 10.—Contains starch sugar, copperas and lime—amount not estimated.

No. 11.—A starch sugar syrup. Contains in the gallon 141.9 grains free sulphuric acid, 26 grains sulphate of iron, and 724.83 grains of lime.

No. 12.—Contains starch sugar, seasoned with sulphate of iron and lime.

No. 13.—Starch sugar. Contains in the gallon 58.58 grains of sulphate of iron, 83 14 grains of free sulphuric acid, 440.12 grains of lime.

No. 14.—Starch sugar. Contains in a gallon 80 grains of free sulphuric acid, 38 grains of iron, and 262.48 grains of lime.

No. 15, 16.—Contain starch sugar, sulphate of iron, and *lime.*

No. 17.—Starch sugar. Sulphate of iron and 202.23 grains *of lime.*

The Professor also shows that, supposing glucose is not injurious, people who pay for sugar that is adulterated with it are swindled, because a pound of pure cane sugar is equal to two pounds and a half of glucose.

Legislation is sadly needed in many parts of this country to protect the public against the numerous adulterations in food and drink, and laws to punish those who commit such frauds as are calculated to effect the health and lives of the public, should be made thoroughly effective.

Meanwhile, the people of Utah will do well to return to the culture of sorghum and manufacture their own syrup, and also take measures to prove the practicability of making sugar from the beet. Tests will be applied to samples sent to the Agricultural Department at Washington, of beets raised in various localities and on different kinds of soil. By availing themselves of this opportunity, our farmers may learn whether the sugar beet can be cultivated in Utah, containing sufficient saccharine matter of the proper kind for manufacture into sugar, and also whether bench land or bottom land, light soil or heavy soil, is best adapted to the production of this reliable root.

This is a matter of considerable importance to the people of this Territory, and we hope that, during the coming season, some steps will be taken towards testing and proving the capabilities of our soil for the production of beets that can be worked up into pure unadulterated sugar for home use, and that a sufficient breadth of land will be put in with the best kinds of cane, to be worked up after the most approved method, so that no one here need be under the necessity of purchasing poison under the name of clear and genuine syrup.

IDAHO LEGISLATURE.

THE Idaho Legislature experienced considerable difficulty in effecting an organization. The following dispatch from Boise, which appears in the Coast papers, shows that at the date of the telegram affairs were at a dead-lock.

"Boise City (Idaho), January 13.—The members of both houses of the Idaho Legislature met here today, but failed to effect even a temporary organization. The members of the Council met in the Council Chamber at 12 m. precisely, when they were called to order by Hon. James H. Hawley, Chief Clerk of the Council at the previous session. An effort on the part of the Republican members to proceed to a temporary organization was defeated by the refusal of the chief clerk to call the roll of members claiming seats by virtue of their credentials, which were certificates of election from the County Boards and from the Secretary of the Territory. As there was no other method of proceeding, or evidence that could then be offered as to who were members or whether any were elected to seats, no further progress seemed possible while the clerk held this position, and the council took a recess until 2 p. m., when they were again called to order by the chief clerk, and upon motion of Colonel Shouf, of Lemhi, the council adjourned until 11 a. m. to-morrow.

The council stands seven republicans to six democrats, one seat—that of Mayhigh, of Oneida—being contested by William Clemens.

The democratic members of the assembly, including the two contestants to seats from Oneida County, met in the hall of the Central Hotel between 11 a. m. and 12 m. a quarter to half an hour before the time fixed by law for the assembly of the legislature, and, in the absence of the republican members, proceeded to effect a temporary organization by admitting the contestants from Oneida—Messrs. Homer and Woodward—to a participation in the temporary organization.

At 12 m., precisely, the republican members came into the hall, and seeing what was being done, refused to recognize it as legal or proper, and after protesting, withdrew to the Supreme Court library room, which was under the charge of and was immediately prepared for them by the Secretary of the Territory. There [illegible] porary chairman and clerk, and called the roll of the members as certified to by the Territorial Secretary, and finding that they needed two for a quorum, adjourned until 10 o'clock a. m. to-morrow. It takes fourteen members for a quorum, and the democrats have only twelve—the same as the republicans—except by taking on the two contestants.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

The four per cent. bonds issued by the Government have been taken up with avidity by the people. They are a safe investment, and being untaxable, offer a better per centage without risk than can be obtained for money in many parts of the Union.

The City Council of Logan, in the exercise of powers conferred upon that body by its charter, has passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquors by any person within the coorporate limits of the City. We wish the civic authorities success in their endeavors to suppress the liquor traffic.

The California Constitutional Convention has rejected Woman Suffrage. A minority report in its favor was ably defended by several members, but the majority voted in support of the old platitudes about "woman's sphere, and the contamination of politics." It takes time to lift the average mind out of the grooves of centuries.

S. D. Richards, the cold blooded and unrepentant criminal who confesses to six murders, and asks no odds of God or man, has been found guilty of killing Peter Anderson last December, and sentenced to death. The law of Nebraska allowes 101 days between sentence and execution, and he will be hung on the 26th of April, if he is not lynched before.

The Omaha *Herald* is anxious to know how the decision of the Supreme Court in the polygamy case will be treated by the "Mormon" people. So far as we can learn, they treat it as one of the shallowest pieces of legal sophistry and feeble special pleading that has ever been presented in the shape of an argument against an essential part of their religion.

The Philadelphia *Times* in an intemperate article on the Reynolds case says: "By a single enforcement of plain law the crime of polygamy, within the Territories of United States, can be wiped out." Really! We were under the impression, which is general, that "a single enforcement" would not go far towards squelching a practice which extends through a whole Territory. If a single enforcement will settle the business, we do not see why there is so much fuss about the matter.

THE SUPREME COURT.

[Salt Lake *Herald* Jan. 16.]

(REVIEW.)

There is but one really Supreme Court in the United States, and that is the people of the whole country. The Washington tribunal has always been reviewed, criticised and corrected by this truly ultimate tribunal, the people themselves. This being so, the judgment lately rendered in the case against George Reynolds, comes under ultimate critical examination by the people of the whole country. Compared with this august court the Washington tribunal is a petty affair, and its judgments are liable to be unhesitatingly overruled as was the case in the Dred Scott matter, wherein not only was the decision examined and repudiated, but the institution of slavery which the judgment sustained was abolished.

Let us then respectfully but freely look into the judgment given by the court in the case of George Reynolds. It will be seen that the decision includes the two points—the law itself, and the reason of the law. The first amendment to the Constitution forbids all legislation which shall abridge the free exercise of religion. The debated point is whether or not the law of Congress making polygamy a crime is in contradiction to that amendment. Madison and Jefferson are quoted in explanation. Jefferson says: "It is a dangerous fallacy for the civil [illegible] sion and *propagation of principles* on the supposition of their ill tendency." Though this has not the remotest applicability to the question before the court, it does apply directly to the popular allegation against polygamy, and is in fact an answer to the court's subsequent averment that to tolerate polygamy would embarrass social and legal practice. Jefferson's preamble further quoted says: "It is time enough for civil government to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." Consequently government may not interfere in any case wherein principles have not broken out into acts against peace and good order. This really goes to secure the Mormons against interference, inasmuch as they have not broken the peace of society, and to make them guilty of offense against "good order" it would be necessary to assume the point by an *ex post facto* interpretation of "good order." To do the court justice, however, the distinction between principles and the acts flowing from them, as drawn in the quotation, is intelligible. Actions only and not opinions, are cognizable by law, says Jefferson. But "religion," according to all common judgment and common sense, is both action and opinion. And, therefore, to give the legislature control of action is to give it control of religion. Suppose Congress to prohibit the outward act of baptism, or of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, would it not interfere with religion? The whole distinction between opinion and action is, therefore, sophistical. As to the qualifying phrase—"good order"—an infidel legislature might say that the sacraments of the Christian religion were contrary to good order, as the French Assembly did say, and consequently abolished the religion itself, with which school of politics Jefferson was immediately and fondly connected. A co-partner in the triumvirate that produced the Federalist was not likely to be surprised in an ambitious attempt at glitter. "Coldly correct" but never "critically dull," Madison, in his quiet way, analyzed Jefferson's crudely conceived theory, and the result was the first amendment. And just here, it may be presumptuous, but one feels impelled to say that there is a miserable pettiness in all this reference to Virginianism, because there is a pettiness in Virginianism itself. The proper term for the states' rights school of opinion would be provincialism. Patrick Henry, for example, was a provincialist, except when acting and speaking under an indignant impulse against tyranny. He subsided so soon as his noble passion subsided. The choicest affections of the entire school of provincialists are, and have always been, lavished on the narrower statehood rather than on the nationality in the grand breadth of which Virginia provincialism is slightly pitiful. Glittering generalities, whether practical or not, were Jefferson's forte. Let us examine further quotations—pausing only to observe that the Washington court catches at and fondles the old Virginia hobby, *church and state*—a phrase which, borrowed from its rightful owners, helps to clear the question of the rights of conscience or give the distinction between opinion and action. The abolition of the union of church and state was for years the pet hobby of Virginian demagogues. But does that matter really illustrate the rights of conscience? The same rights of conscience which abolished the union of church and state in Virginia maintained and confirmed that union in Great Britain; and the British people are as free in establishing and upholding the union of church and state as in Virginia in abolishing that union. "Church and state" was and is only a demagogical catch-word, expressing no principle and vindicating no right either social or religious. Its use by the court at Washington is consequently neither pertinent nor dignified.

To determine what the word "religion" means in the constitution, an electioneering utterance of Jefferson is quoted. In reply to a rural committee of the Baptist, from Danbury — that is, the Virginia backwoods—Jefferson talks grandiloquently, if not confusedly, about religion being a matter solely between a man and his God, and says that man owes account to none other for his faith or worship. Is it easy to see the remotest bearing of this old truism—unless it goes to [illegible] eration? *Is the court capable of* trifling? Jefferson, however, further edifies his Baptist friends by repeating the conclusive phrase, "actions only and not opinions," winding up his declaration with the ever prevalent, popular catchword, "church and state." This, I will only say, is the whole of the Washington court's authoritive explanation of the meaning of religion in the constitution.

In the hope of measurably forestalling complaint that we are unnecessarily peevish and hard to please, one begs to say that the phrase "sovereign reverence," adopted by the court from Jefferson's stump utterance to the Baptist committee, is on the whole exceedingly apropos. There is a jumble, doubtless, in King Richard's mind when he "thanks God for *his* humility." Slightly in the same way Jefferson, and the court after him, talks of their "sovereign reverence" for the rights of conscience—very "sovereign" their "reverence" is—rather absolute one fears on the whole. But it was Jefferson's off-hand talk to the crowd, and he only meant to say something that should have an inspiring sound, never imagining that he was furnishing the true key wherewith to unlock the constitution. Nevertheless we are glad to have a precedent so eminently flexible, that while it establishes the judgment of the court, equally sanctions a critical rejection of that judgment. Frankly, therefore, we yield the court our "sovereign reverence," not, we are sorry to have to say, profound. But like Thomas Jefferson's, our reverence is "sovereign;" our deference is also "sovereign." Not to make the most of slip-shod, Jefferson probably meant that the people were sovereign when he talked about his sovereign reverence. And according to the best patriotic formula, the present reviewer shelters himself under the fact that he is "of the people."

And now for a brief glance at the reasons of the law of Congress against polygamy as those reasons are given in the judgment.

The court evidently supposes that it has touched bottom when talking of "the fundamental interest of society." Society has "fundamental interests." Plainly, however, those interests demand not the abridgment of the rights of conscience or even the severe limitation of them. It is really quite possible that polygamists would appeal to those fundamental interests in defense of their views and practices. At all events there is no conclusiveness in the reference to the fundamental social interests, but rather splendid opportunity is given for retort since those interests embrace both religion and purity of character in their proper scope.

The clinching of the court's decision is in the analogical illustration from human sacrifice and the immolation of widows. This takes one back to his childhood reading, and Sunday school books. None the worse argument, however, for having so long done service in the missionary cause. It would not do for Congress to allow human sacrifice and the burning of widows; therefore polygamy must be forbidden. That is to say: Congress may not legalize any special multiplication of the species because it would be wrong to legalize a special destruction of the species. You may not kill offspring; therefore offspring may not be begotten. *Human sacrifice is* bad, therefore human propagation is bad. This, it is necessary to say, is fundamental reasoning. This is the way in which the Washington court gets to the bottom of the question concerning the fundamental interests of society.

But human sacrifice, unfortunately for the court, and its clinching illustrations, is still in use. The old heathen were moved by reverence of the Deity—not "sovereign," however, but profound—to give the fruit of their bodies for the sin of their souls. The modern heathenism makes offerings of hecatombs of offspring, body and soul, to brute lust. The *old* sacrifices were open; the *modern* are in secret. Prostitution and the soul-and-body rottenness clinging to it surely have something to do with the fundamental interests of society. But the Washington court cannot see human sacrifice, unless lit up by flames, cannot sympathize with the woman whose very life is a living death. The court seems shocked at the offering of a widow on her husband's funeral pile, but is blissfully ignorant of the horror of the poor but honest creature whose body becomes a *living sepulchre in* her husband's lifetime. Think of it, however, men and women! Read the vile advertisements in the newspapers. Do not turn too quickly from the horror it implies. The Washington court never looked into the records of hospitals; never inquired into average medical practice; never glanced from civilized to savage life and witnessed the decay of races by the rottenness of prostitution and its invariable horrors. It is to be feared that, however, the court never dreamed of it, and languidly doses over the story of Bel and the Dragon, never, apparently suspecting that children can be destroyed except by fire. Human sacrifice has not been more rife in any land, at any time, than it is now in America. The court's phrase is a good phrase when it speaks *of* the fundamental interest of society. *Its instinctive* recoil from human sacrifice and the immolation of widows is a good instinct. Nevertheless, on its own showing argumentatively, since human sacrifice prevails in America by means of prostitution and kindred barbarities, and woman is actually immolated and suffers a hundred deaths while living—though the court has no suspicion of such facts contrary to the fundamental interests of society, yet it follows that its argument is nullified; and polygamy not being either human sacrifice or immolation of widows, should be legally tolerated, first, because consistent with humanity; second, because esteemed by its advocates a religion. Otherwise expressed: Since congress indirectly winks at human sacrifice and the immolation of woman, it may consistently tolerate polygamy, which instead of sacrificing offspring, proposes to replenish human kind. GENTILE.

We ask kindly attention for these pathetic words, which are to be found in the cemetery at Childewald, England. There is a tone of regret in them which may serve as a wholesome warning:—

Here lies me and my three daughters,
Brought here by using seidlitz waters;
If we had stuck to epsom salts
We wouldn't have been in these here vaults.