

## THE INDIAN WAR.

NO INDIANS YET, AND NO PROSPECT OF CATCHING ANY THIS SEASON.

## TERRY'S CAMP,

On Yellowstone River,  
August 27th,  
Via Bismarck, September 4th.

Yesterday morning Terry moved his command, after an eight days' rest, marching twenty miles before camping. Crook had changed his camp the day before in search of better grass, going nine miles up Powder River, his last night's camp being about ten miles in advance of ours. Our road is that diabolical trail which had enticed us so far to so little purpose, and which had been abandoned as a hopeless job. The only reasons apparently for taking it up again were that the Generals were in absolute ignorance of where the Indians had gone and what they were doing, and that the campaign had proved a failure so that something had to be done for appearance' sake.

That trail was the only Indian sign found, and the army might reach the agencies by this route as well as another. Everybody has grown dissatisfied with what they claim to be a continued mismanagement of the officers, criticize the conduct of affairs severely, and frankly express their disgust at having anything to do with a campaign which is evidently based upon theories.

The steamers *Josephine* and *Yellowstone*, while coming up, forty miles below Glendine Creek, were fired upon by Indians, one private being killed.

Several small parties of Sioux were seen at different points on the north bank of the river, but only one of them came within range, and they quickly retreated before the sharp firing from the boats, one chap falling as though badly hurt.

Just above here the *Josephine* picked up a white man who hailed her. He, with another, had deserted from the little garrison at Glendine Creek, been surrounded by Indians, his companion killed, scalped and mutilated, and he himself badly wounded in the arm. Creeping between some rocks, he lay in the pelting rain two days and nights, the Indians firing at him once in awhile, and evidently waiting till he was starved out.

Captain Rice, commanding a company of infantry at Glendine, sends word that he has been attacked twice by small bands of Sioux, but nobody was hurt. His scouts claim to have discovered a large Indian village some distance down the river, numbering from 1,000 to 1,500 men. On the receipt of this news Terry rode over to Crook's camp and the following plan was agreed upon: To cross the Yellowstone at this point, twenty-five miles by water below Powder, march inland a few miles and swing down towards Glendine so as to tap the trail, if the enemy are moving north, and corral them, if they are still below the creek; to skirt the head waters of O'Fallon and Cobin creeks, and strike the Yellowstone near Glendine—thus preventing a countermarch of the Indians, and hemming them in. If the village really exists, which is doubted by many, a row may be expected within a few days at least. Should either column strike a fresh trail it will be followed without regard to the above mentioned village, and as both commands feel hampered another trail may possibly be found. Terry and Crook are much exercised over the newspaper attacks which pour in upon them with each mail, and are already bending their shoulders under the weight of public condemnation. All they say in reply is: "I have done my best." They at length acknowledge that there is scarcely a hope of striking the Indians this year—an idea long entertained by every clearheaded man in this army.

Sheridan states in his general order that the campaign must close by October 15th at the latest, by which time we may confidently look for snow, no marches and no fighting, other than with a handful of redskins here and there.

Under cross-examination the scout who reported a large village below Glendine creek, acknowledged that the account was much exaggerated. No village was found, but the marks of a camp several days old; and instead of 1,500 men

there might have been between 100 and 300 men. The whole story looks fishy, and may arise from a desire to prove his wages earned. The fact is that no one believes there are many Sioux in this vicinity, and many regard this yarn, and the subsequent hubbub over it at headquarters, as an attempt to prove activity and suspend judgment in the States. Had there been even a large force of the enemy around here they are now undoubtedly far away, for every opportunity for escape has been given them. For instance the news which fathered the present movement arrived on the 25th. A tremendous amount of headquarter business was transacted, but no night march was made. On the 26th Terry's command moved leisurely down the river, twenty miles distant, and camped; the steamers meanwhile lying moored to the bank.

To-day the *Yellowstone* and *Carroll* began to ferry the troops across, and here we are still, at 6.30 p. m., with orders to move at 7, and camp some four or five miles back—another twenty-four hours added to the many already waited. General Terry is popular as a man, but is losing caste as a soldier, for even his friends begin to apologize for, instead of denying, the mistake made.

The steamers *Carroll* and *Yellowstone* leave for Fort Buford tomorrow, to return immediately with material for the construction of two new posts at the mouth of Tongue and Big Horn rivers.

## GEN. TERRY'S CAMP,

near Yellowstone, Aug. 30,  
via Bismarck, Sept. 4.

No Indians yet, and no prospect of finding any. On the 27th we marched five miles inland from the ferrying point, making an almost dry camp.

The next day we got away with about twenty-one miles; on the next, seventeen were all we could manage, and one more has been added, leaving us about twenty miles from Glendine Creek—the objective point. Notwithstanding the marvelous accounts of Sioux to be found by the thousand on this side of the river, we have not come across the track of even one, and consider it a foregone conclusion that further attempts to catch the wily savage will be useless for this year. Terry is considerably annoyed about some dispatches received from Sheridan concerning the new posts, on account of the peremptory tone and style that is used toward a Brigadier General. In one of them he is ordered to establish a winter camp at Tongue River mouth, where the regiments selected will halt until spring, when the work of building proper quarters at that place and the mouth of the Big Horn will be commenced at the earliest opportunity.

Not a word from Crook, so he has evidently failed to connect at Glendine. Every one now agrees in my prophecy, that Crook has cut loose from Terry's thrall and would never join him again. It is not unlikely that he has struck over to the Little Missouri, and thence, if he does not find Indians, by way of the Belle Fourche trail to Red Cloud, in the Cheyenne agency, thus skirting the Black Hills and revictualing at the settlements. The health of the troops is fair, but the grumbling fever has become epidemic, no one appearing content with the summer's work. What our next move will be after reaching Glendine is unknown, and is really of little importance, as it can result in nothing.—*Sacramento Record-Union*.

## THE GRASSHOPPER PLAGUE

GOVERNOR PILLSBURY OF MINNESOTA, PROCLAIMS AGAINST THE PESTS.

## PROCLAMATION.

STATE OF MINNESOTA,  
Executive Department,  
St. Paul, August 30, 1876.

The continuance and increasing ravages of the locusts or grasshoppers in many of the territories and frontier states of the Union, have been deemed sufficiently serious to warrant a meeting of the governors of such states and territories for consultation, with a view to seek congressional aid, or otherwise secure combined action in resistance of the growing evil. Such conference has been called to meet in October. Meanwhile the widening

area of the visitations of these insects in this state induces me without delay to urge the people whose interests are most directly involved, to assemble in public meeting in their several localities, for the purpose of collecting information, interchanging views and devising plans of concerted action for the destruction of the insects, and for a common defence against their ravages. Both the correction of exaggerated reports and a promotion of an intelligent apprehension of the actual evil to be encountered, it is believed, would result from this course, while the hope of thus attaining practical means of mutual protection certainly justifies a united effort in behalf of an object common to the public welfare.

It is the concurrent belief of all who have given close attention to the subject that it is practicable to destroy the pests in great measure and to insure a vast mitigation of the worst results; by the timely, concerted and persistent efforts of the several communities directly concerned, and the employment of simple agencies readily available. To this end I have taken pains to collect, from the most reliable sources, information of the several modes which have been successfully employed, which I here detail for the consideration of all concerned, and I earnestly invoke the united and resolute action of the people in a manful defense against a common enemy:

First—The crushing of the insects by rollers and other implements, and the catching of them by bags and tarps during the season of copulation or mating, when by reason of their stupid and inactive condition they may be destroyed in vast numbers. This is the first and vital step towards their destruction, and can be resorted to immediately, the insects being in the condition named from about the middle of August variously until the approach of cold weather.

Second—The plowing under deeply of the eggs and the thorough harrowing of the bare dry knolls and other comparatively small, warm spots where the eggs are deposited, so as to dislodge them from their cells or pods, which destroys their germinating power. New breaking being a favorite resort for such egg deposits, this mode of destruction is readily available in the ordinary course of farm work, for which purpose these operations should be delayed to as late a period in the Fall as practicable.

Third—Co-operative action for the preservation of the prairie grass until the proper season for its burning in the Spring, by means of extended fire-guards along township boundaries or other large areas, to be accomplished by means of plowed strips or by wide parallel furrows and the careful burning of the intervening space. The burning of the grass thus preserved, when filled with the young grasshoppers in the Spring, has been found to be a very effectual means for their whole destruction.

Fourth—The placing of loose straw on or near the hatching places, into which the young insects gather for protection from the cold in early Spring, where they may be destroyed by firing the straw at the proper time. To this end straw should be carefully saved and not needlessly destroyed at threshing time.

Fifth—The construction of deep, narrow ditches, with deeper pits at intervals, as a defense against the approaching insects in their infant condition. Into these the young when comparatively helpless, accumulate in vast numbers and perish.

Sixth—The sowing of grain in "lands," or strips, fifty to one hundred feet wide, leaving narrow vacant spaces between, through which to run deep furrows and construct ditches into which the young grasshoppers may be driven and destroyed.

Seventh—The catching of the insects at various stages, and especially when young and comparatively inactive, by means heretofore employed, and by such improved instruments and processes as experience may suggest.

Eighth—And, finally, the driving of the winged and matured enemy from the ripening grain by passing over it stretched ropes continually to and fro, aided by annoying smoke from burning straw or other smudges, and by loud and discordant noises made by striking tin vessels, and by shrieking and

yelling with the voice, which are said to aid in disturbing the pests and inducing their flight.

Let the common enemy be thus fought at every stage of his existence and at every point of his attack. Each one of the modes here prescribed will doubtless aid to reduce the grand total of the annual destruction, while all of them, faithfully pursued in succession, together with other methods to be devised, it is confidently believed, will achieve substantial exemption from loss or avert its saddest effects. But should all means fail, there will remain the consciousness of having made such helpful and assiduous attempts as deserved success.

The danger of weakening the habit of self-reliance among the people, as well as the difficulty of reaching the most worthy recipients of public aid, renders the distribution of seed grain and other assistance heretofore extended to the sufferers, of very questionable policy; and I feel it my duty to warn all persons against relying upon public aid of this character. Whatever action may be taken by the next legislature or by Congress should wisely contemplate future protection rather than indemnity for past losses, and if practicable should discriminate in favor of such as evince a disposition to help themselves. At all events if aid or succor of any kind or from any quarter may reasonably be expected, it will be both better deserved and better employed, after courageous and determined efforts shall have been made for self-protection.

J. S. PILLSBURY,

Governor.

## The Indian War.

## CROOK'S COMMAND IN A BAD WAY.

Crook's Expedition in Camp on Heart River, Dakota, September 5, via Bismarck, Dakota, September 8.

Since August 24th this command has been employed in marching to Powder river and across the country over O'Fallons, Cabin and Beaver creeks, to the Little Missouri river, which we crossed on yesterday. This camp is about twenty-six miles eastward from that stream. Wet weather has caused much sickness and suffering among the men. Excellent pasturage has somewhat restored our horses, but many of them are in a deplorable condition and must inevitably break down. Crook followed the Indian trail all the way, and is now convinced that the redskins have broken up, some heading towards the British possessions, but the main body moving towards the Black Hills and the agencies. At this point we are about 160 miles from Deadwood in the hills, and have only two and a half days' rations left. Fort Lincoln is nearly the same distance from us, so Gen. Crook has decided to march on Deadwood at once. We hope to find rations at that point. Otherwise we must eat our spare mules in order to get in. Winter already begins to show itself in this region, and cold drenching rains harass us continually. Not a man of the command is prepared for bad weather, so that should cold overtake us the suffering will be intense.

It will take us at least eight days to make Deadwood. To-day Colonel Stanton and some of the scouts came upon a small party of Sioux, but the latter got away without loss. As a matter of fact this column is in an unserviceable condition, utterly unfit to do more than act as infantry. The horses are too poor and broken down for active pursuit of the enemy. Gen. Terry's column is living in comparative luxury, while we have marched almost continuously for a month on the poorest kind of rations, and without so much as a shelter-tent to keep the men dry during this rainy season. This may be Bonaparte's policy, but there is a vast deal of difference between campaigning minus shelter in Italy and doing the same in Montana or Dakota. Dysentery, rheumatism, and fever are spreading among the soldiers, and the sick have to be borne all the way from here to the railroad post, a distance of about 500 miles, in mule litters. All we need is a few snow-storms to make this column parallel, on a small scale, with the horrible retreat from Moscow. We have all else to make as miserable as were the French—short rations, used-up horses, a vast wilderness and a discouraged sol-

diery. As for the Indians, we have no chance to make them fight unless they wish it. Marching on Fort Lincoln would hardly improve our condition, and might tie us up there all winter. No more news can be had from Crook's brigade until it passes the Black Hills.—*Chicago Times*.

## INDIANS AT THE MISSOURI RIVER AGENCIES.

BLOODY STRUGGLE ANTICIPATED IN DISARMING THEM.

Lower Brule Agency,  
Dakota, Sept. 1, 1876.

The situation of affairs along the Missouri River with reference to the war in the north remains unchanged. Numbers of Indians have made their appearance at the Cheyenne agency near Fort Sully, from the hostile camps, but owing to a rumor said to have been circulated first by the Yanktons to the effect that the troops would first disarm them and then kill them, they keep shy of the military post, and thus far but one Indian has surrendered himself and given up his arms. The speech he made on the occasion is said to be a fearful arraignment of the government and the Indian Department. Large numbers of the so-called peaceable Indians are leaving Cheyenne for Lower Brule below, where many of the Cheyenne Indians belong. They take with them the wives and families of the warriors absent in the field and claim them as their own when they are enrolled for rations by the agent at the places they go to. Standing Rock is now garrisoned by seven companies commanded by a field officer. Cheyenne Agency has been reinforced by two companies of the Eleventh Infantry from Brownsville, Texas, and five more companies of the same regiment are now at Yankton awaiting transportation to Lower Brule and Cheyenne. When these posts are fully reinforced it is probable that something will be done of an aggressive nature, at least the preparation indicates that the regular garrisons are deemed sufficient for defensive purposes. What this something, if anything, is to be, no one yet seems to comprehend. It is possible that simultaneously the troops will move on the camps of all the "peaceables," and disarm them, but the spirit of the present instructions would seem to indicate that only the hostiles who return are to be disarmed. In either case a bloody struggle will be the result, almost without doubt, for faith with the Indians has so often been broken that they will not trust themselves to the mercy of the troops without their arms.

The returned hostiles report that they get ammunition from a place near the Spotted Tail Agency, on the White River, and that they have abundance of arms, and ammunition enough for a great battle, but do not want to fight both Crook and Terry combined, not doubting a victory, but through reluctance to losing many warriors. There are about 5,500 warriors in the field, and those who leave are more than replaced by the acquisitions.

Sitting Bull and his chiefs do not want peace, and will fight it out on that line if it takes all the summer, and will let the settlements hear from him when the troops are withdrawn, especially the towns in the Black Hills.

S. Bull does not affect pretension to strategic talent, and is not the linguist he is alleged to be, nor has he ever heard of Napoleon, but without realizing it himself is probably the foremost Indian of the Sioux nation, and undoubtedly excels in subtlety and Indian diplomacy, for his preparation for this war approaches very near the systematic. Last winter he made a journey to the Ree country and himself made peace with that immemorial tribe of enemies, and, leaving a present of a hundred horses, extorted a promise from them that they would not join the troops in the war, and it is a fair compliment to the importance of the Sioux chief that the promise has been kept.

There are no white men in the hostile camps.

The horses stolen from the peaceable Indians at the Cheyenne Agency by the Black Hills miners were sent for by Major Lazelle, commanding Fort Sully, Captain Tisdall going out with thirty-five men and an Indian guide. Only four horses were recovered out of sixty-three. The miners sent the