tled by law, perhaps additional legislation would be desirable.

From a review of the entire past legislation of Congress on the subject under consideration, our conclusion is, that the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding of the Territorial courts, as well as their respective jurisdictions, subject, as before said, to a few express or implied conditions in the Organic act itself, were intended to be left to the legislative action of the Territorial assemblies, and to the regulations which might be adopted by the courts themselves. Of course, in case of any difficulties arising out of this state of things, Congress has it in its power at any time to establish such regulations on this, as well as on any other subject of legislation, as it shall deem expedient and proper.

The judgment is affirmed.

Chief Justice Waite did not sit in this case aud took no part in the decision.

Hornbuckle vs. Toombs. } No. 139. Davis vs. Bilsland. } No. 141.

Hirshfield vs. Griffith. } No. 208.

Davis and Strong, *JJ.*—We dissent from the judgments in these cases for the reason that this court has several times decided that claims at law and claims in equity cannot be united in one action even in the Territorial courts. And we think, if a change in the rule is to be made, it should be made by Congress.

WASHINGTON NOTES.

WASHINGTON, May 15.—The Senate Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment this morning considered Mr. Wright's bill, which proposes to reduce the pay of the subordinates and employes of the Senate and to apportion the Executive Department clerkships among the various Congressional districts of the United States. No vote was taken on the bill, but it was evident from the discussion that the committee unanimously disapprove of its provisions.—*N. Y. Herald.*

Somebody, at a little kettledrum, the other afternoon, said that the House was going to investigate the honorable gentleman's morality, at which innocent idea Crossbones burst into such a roar of laughter that it took nearly a gallon of lemonade to restore his strength. He says morality is such a delicate question for the House, and besides it would be such a shame to hurt the honorable Cannon's feelings; and Miss Prim, severe of aspect as Minerva, wonders if the four wives will insist upon being presented to Washington society.—*Washington Capital, May* 17.

MR. NEWMAN'S BROTHER-IN-LAW.—Frequent mention has been made in these columns of the Rev. Major Ensign, a brother-in-law of Chaplain Newman, who has combined missionary efforts among the Blackfeet Indians with the labors appertaining to an Indian Agent under government pay. Some time ago he left his field of labor in Montana, as it was reported in the Territory, in order to give an account of missionary efforts among the savages. We regret to say that the reverend gentleman's absence is likely to prove expensive to some of his friends, as they will be compelled to pay $2,500 dollars for his non-appearance at court to stand trial upon an indictment found against him for defrauding the government and the Indians confided to his care. It will, doubtless, gratify the friends of the Rev. Major to know that President Grant promptly removed from office the United States Attorney who brought his frauds to the attention of the grand jury.—*N. Y. Sun.*

Montana Cattle.—The time was when cattle used to be driven from this Territory to Montana and sold in the latter market. It seems now that the tables are turned in that respect and that Montana is sending cattle to Salt Lake and disposing of them in the beef market here. A large herd of animals from Montana were in town to-day, and considering the distance they had traveled, they looked remarkably well, as a general thing.

SUPREME COURT DECISION.

Guarantees to Pay the Debts of Others.

Opinion of Associate Justice P. H. Emerson, Chief Justice James B. McKean and Associate Justice J. S. Boreman concurring.

First National Bank of Utah, A Corporation, Plaintiff, *vs.* M. Kinner, Defendant. } Supreme Court of Utah Territory.

Marshal and Royle for Plaintiff.

Robertson and McBride for Defendant.

OPINION OF EMERSON, J.

This case comes up on appeal on the part of the defendant from a judgment of the Third District Court overuling the demurrer to the complaint.

As shown by the record the case is substantially as follows: On the 20th of March, 1872, Nounnan and Gilmer made their joint promissory note by which, for value received, they promised to pay to the order of A. Godbe, cashier of the plaintiff corporation, fifteen hundred dollars, on the first day of September, A. D. 1872, with interest at two per cent. per month.

This note was delivered to and discounted by the bank, and on the 7th of May following, and before maturity, was taken up by Nounnan, one of the makers. On the succeeding 7th of June, and when nearly three months of the current time of the note remained unspent, Nounnan reproduced it to the bank, and at his request they re-discounte l it. When it became due and payable according to its tenor, Nounnan applied to the bank for an extension until the 1st of January, A. D. 1873. The extension was agreed upon, but as a part of this arrangement the defendant was to guarantee the payment of the note at the expiration of the time agreed upon. The complaint states that the defendant, with full knowledge of such agreement, "and for a valuable consideration to him moving, as well as in further consideration of the said extension of time, did guarantee the payment of said note," in the following terms—"For value received I hereby guarantee the payment of the within note."

The complaint sets up the carrying out of the agreement on the part of the bank, and the failure of the payment. The suit is on the guaranty. The defendant demurs, and the only matter of consequence arising on the demurrer is the validity of the guaranty. Upon the face of the complaint the written undertaking does not specify the time when the payment was to be made, and does not explain the consideration. If the case was on trial and verbal evidence should be offered that the agreement was for payment on the 1st day of January, A. D. 1873, there would be some ground for the objection that it was proposed to vary the legal effect of the writing by parol—since, as the note was part due, the written guaranty would import an agreement to pay in a reasonable time, and not on the 1st day of January, A. D. 1873.

There is a peculiarity about this proceeding that impressed me from the very outset, and which was not removed at the close of the elaborate argument of counsel.

Taking it for granted that the defendant intended to go upon the idea that the doctrine applicable, where the statute of frauds prevails, should be administered, I am unable to see how he can raise the question supposed to be aimed at, by resorting to a demurrer, to the complaint. Whenever the statute of frauds is recognized, or in force, so far as I know, the plaintiff is not required to set forth that the guaranty was in writing and signed, etc. It is considered as a matter of evidence, and the want of it as a matter of defence.

If the defendant demurs he thereby confesses that the agreement was in writing and he precludes the plaintiff from giving legal evidence. (Gould's Plead, chp. 4, ss. 45; 2 Saunder's Plead. and Ev. 546; Campbell *vs.* Wilcox, 10 Wall. 421.

Waiving this consideration how ought the case to be viewed.

The demurrer is understood as implying two general propositions. The first is that the essential portion of that branch of the statute of frauds which relates to guarantees is in force in this Territory as common law. The second is, that by force of that law the defendant's undertaking as set forth was not binding. The second proposition may be first considered. Supposing the principles of the statute to be law in this Territory, it is requisite to ascertain what they are so far as they could be held to bear on this case.

It may be assumed that the operation of the statute, admitting it to be recognized as common law, is to save any one from being charged upon a promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, unless the agreement to so answer is in writing signed by the guarantor or by his authority. This statement is intended to recognize the statute as most stringently framed and expounded.

In some of the States, Michigan among the number, the consideration is not required to be expressed in the writing. In England and in the State of New York it must be in it. According to the exposition of the statute in some States, where it is most rigidly applied, it has been held that if the object of the guaranty is a benefit to the guarantor which he did not before possess, a benefit acrueing immediately to himself, and the basis for his undertaking is a consideration going directly to him, the case is not within the statute. This doctrine is stated with great precision by Chief Justice Savage in Farly *vs.* Cleveland 4 Cow. 432; and S. C. in error 9 Cow. 639. Referring to those cases which he says do not fall within the statute, and are within the third class of cases, as this branch of the statute of frauds was divided and classified by Chief Justice Kent, in Leonard *vs.* Bredenburg, (8 John 29), he observes, "In all those cases founded on a new and original consideration of benefit to the defendant, or harm to the plaintiff, moving to the party making the promise, either from the plaintiff or original debtor, the subsisting liability of the original debtor is no objection to a recovery." In the case just referred to (S. C. in error 9 Cow. 639.) the reporter's note expresses the doctrine of the decision in very clear and concise language. It is as follows: "Where promise to pay the debt of a third person arises out of some new consideration of benefit to the promisor, or harm to the promisee, moving to the promisor either from the promisee or the original debtor, such promise is not within the statute of frauds, although the original debt still subsists and remains entirely unaffected by the new agreement. See Mallory *vs.* Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412; Fusbush *vs.* Goodnow, 98 Mass. 296; Nelson *vs.* Boynton, 3 Met., 396; where the doctrine is much considered. In as much as upon a fair construction of this complaint, it must be held that it alleges a benefit to the defendant, and a new consideration going to him, as a basis for his promise. I was at first inclined to the opinion that the doctrine as above stated applied to the case made by the complaint. But upon a more careful study of the cases referred to, with a more extensive comparison with other decided cases. I am satisfied, that, admitting the statute of frauds to be in force, the case made by the compaint would come within it.

In all the above cases the plaintiff surrendered and the defendant received, a fund or security charged with the payment of the plaintiff's debt, and all come within the class of Williams *vs.* Leper 3 Bun. 1886, which is the starting point in all this class of cases; and Castling *vs.* Aubert 2 East. 325, which followed it, and upon the same ground with them, were no doubt properly held not to fall within the statute. I have found no case where the parol promise of one to pay the subsisting debt of another, has been sustained by the courts upon any other consideration than the receipt of some fund or security either from the debtor or creditor charged with the payment of the debt. So that in making the payment of the debt he was really fulfilling an obligation of his own.

It seems to me that to carry the doctrine so far as to apply it to the case made by the complaint, and that it is not within the statute, would be virtually a repeal of the statute. Donnan, C. J. in in Green *vs.* Cresswell 10 Ad. and Ellis 453.

In regard to the promise to pay money, which goes in discharge of the subsisting debt of another, the the true test, whether within the statute or not, is that it is made and accepted by the creditor as an original undertaking and not merely as subsidiary to that of another. In the present case I regard the defendant's promise as one for the payment of a preexistiug and still subsisting debt of another, and therefore within the terms of the statute.

If the effect of the promise or contract of the defendant had been to discharge the original debt and he become the sole debtor, and there was no debt of another to which his promise was collateral, then the contract was not within the purpose and spirit of the statute and it need not have been in writing. The complaint, as before said, alleges the contract to have been in writing, and the demurrer admits it. Even where the statute is most stringently applied it is held that the words "value receved" sufficiently explain the consideration going to the guarantor. Douglas *vs.* Howland 24 Word 35, Miller *vs.* Cook 23 N. Y. 495. But however this may be, what opinion ought to be found of the proposition, that this branch of the statute of frauds is in substance a part of the Territorial laws.

In American Insurance Co. *vs* Canter (1 Pet. 511) the court by Judge Marshal, say substantially that the laws of Florida as they were when the Territory was ceded, so far as not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States, continued in force until altered by the newly created power of the State. See also United States *vs.* Powers (11 How. 570), Strathers *vs.* Lucas (12 Pet. 410, 426). This appears to be the settled doctrine in regard to conquered and ceded territory, in the absence of special treaty stipulations. It applies to territory acquired from Mexico, since the treaty of Guaduloupe made no special provision on the subject. Utah was embraced in that acquisition. As in Florida, the preexisting law was Spanish, so in Utah it was Mexican; and in both cases the laws were derived mainly from the laws of Rome. In neither did the English common law or the statute of frauds prevail. Congress made no special change, and the Territorial legislature, upon whom authority was conferred, have made no express enactment upon the subject.

This Territory was first settled in 1847, and from that time up to the acquisition and treaty in 1848, the settlers were comparatively few in number. There were no settled laws, usages and customs among them. They came here as American citizens, under the flag and claiming the protection of the United States government. The particular class of persons forming the greater, if not entire, bulk of emigrants claim to have furnished troops from among their own numbers to assist this government in its war against Mexico. At the time of the acquisition and treaty they could not claim Mexican citizenship, and have never adopted its laws and customs.

Soon after the change of sovereignty by the treaty, emigrants in large numbers flocked from the States and surrounding Territories, and for many years there has been an organized community.

When we turn to the communities from whence these emigrants proceeded, we find that they differed one from another more or less in regard to their laws and institutions. No two are alike. In the most it is true, many common law principles and doctrines were in force. Still the body of the common law in each was peculiar to the particular state, and it was rather the common law of the state than the English common law. In some the English statutes had been received as common law, in others not.

These diversities make it impossible to assume that any specific body of the common law was transplanted to the Territory by the fact of emigration. But one course was open, and that was for the whole body of the people to agree expressly or tacitly upon a common measure. It was to be expected that the emigrants would not be contented with the loose and alien institutions of an outlying Mexican department, and they have not been.

They have tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles of the common law suited to their conditions and consistent with the constitution and laws of the United States. And these only wait recognition by the courts to become the common law of the Territory. When so recognized they are laws as certainly as if expressly adopted by the law making power.

The judgement of the court below is affirmed, and a remittiter ordered to issue forthwith to the Third District Court, the defendant to have ten days after notice served upon him or his attorney of the filing of the remittiter in that court to answer the complaint.

MCKEAN AND BOREMAN, J. J., concurred.