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GOD HOLDS US ALL.

"Take me, papa," said my darling,
As we stood within the hall;
So I bore him up the stairway,
Scarcely felt the burden small.

In my other hand I carried
Books I wished to scan that night,
And the elfin begged me let him
Take them in his arms so light.

Step by step to top we mounted;
Then he said with childish pride,
Baby carried books for papa—
Didn't he?" "Yes," I replied.

Little innocent! ne'er dreaming,
As he bore the asked-for load,
That his father's strength upheld him,
Double-burdened on the road.

God is sometimes pleased to give us
Work for wondrous skill and thought;
Gladly we don the laurels,
When His hand the triumph wrought.

▲ FREE CONSTITUTION.

The House having under consideration the bill (H. R. 4562) to provide for the admission of the State of Idaho into the Union—

Mr. Chipman said:

Mr. Speaker: I agree entirely with the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Smith] that it would have been better if all four of the territories mentioned by him had been put into one bill and submitted to our consideration. I can see no reason—I never have, since I have been in Congress, seen any reason—why either New Mexico or Arizona should not be admitted to the sisterhood of States. As compared with the territory of Wyoming and with the territory of Idaho, they have all the elements which entitle them to admission. If there is any objection to New Mexico, it is an objection which applies to it in common, as it would seem, with the territory of Idaho.

What has been urged against New Mexico is the character of her population. If the extraordinary provision concerning suffrage in the sixth article of the Constitution now before us is justified by the facts, it shows that there is an improper population in Idaho—a population in numbers so great as to be a menace to the prosperity of the State—a population which, upon the hypothesis

of this clause in the Constitution is hostile to our institutions and unfit to take part in the government. This is the argument that has been urged against New Mexico. It is the only argument which I have ever heard against it, and it now stands, if I am correctly informed, as a barrier against a bill being reported to the House for the admission of that territory.

But, sir, I would not upon any political ground oppose the admission of any Territory into the Union. My political brethren will bear me witness that in the last Congress I was an advocate for the admission of all the Territories, and that in our party councils I asserted, what I now repeat, that it is impossible to exact any pledge of party fealty from a State prior to its admission—not only impossible, but wrong and unpatriotic in every way in which you can view it. I believe that it is best—best for the country—to get rid of these Territorial governments, and it is infinitely best for the people of a Territory themselves to enjoy the rights and privileges of statehood.

Yet while I feel in this way I can not forget that the Constitution of the United States imposes upon us the duty of guarantying a republican form of government to the States which constitute the members of the Union. "What is a republican form of government?" would open a wide range of discussion. There are republics and there are republics—republics which in our view utterly fall short of the true definition of a commonwealth of that nature. And our own Republic, even in the estimation of many of the best thinkers, does not contain that popular freedom which constitutes the ideal of a truly democratic state.

But I think I may say safely, that no government is republican in form which makes oppressive distinctions between the citizens of a State. A government which in its policy, in its constitutions and laws, distinguishes oppressively against one class of citizens and in favor of another falls far short of the model which was set before us as the true one of republican institutions.

This is especially true of distinctions which impair in any way a proper enjoyment of the elective

franchise. That franchise is the very breath of republican institutions. Manhood suffrage is the very body of liberty.

The American people have adopted this as a faith, and though nowhere expressed in so many words in any of our constitutions, I think I am fully justified in saying that it may be considered as a sort of natural right, because it is the only method which the world has yet discovered by which a full and perfect liberty may be maintained for the people.

The report of the majority on this bill seems to treat manhood suffrage as a mere political right. It undoubtedly is such a right; but it bears the same relation to freedom as the right to pray and to preach bears to the full exercise of the religion in which we believe. And just so far as men are unjustly debarred from exercising it, just so far are they debarred from a full enjoyment of self-government.

I admit, Mr. Speaker, that there ought to be disabilities to vote. It is not wise to permit every one to exercise this great right. I know of no State in the Union, I can conceive of no civilized State, which would allow every one to exercise it. I certainly have no particular objection to the disqualifications prescribed in section 3 of article 6 of this constitution proposed for the State of Idaho. Almost all the States in the Union have disabilities of this kind; but in almost every one of them they are clearly defined, and not only are they clearly defined, but the method of ascertaining them and of applying them as a barrier to the exercise of the elective franchise is explicitly set forth.

This constitution prescribes two classes of disabilities; and in my judgment it prescribes two different ways of ascertaining whether a citizen is subject to them. First, there are those disabilities which arise from conviction in a court of justice; and the ascertainment of such a disability is, by the very nature of the language, referred to the action of a court, making it dependent upon the prior action of a judicial tribunal, as in the case of persons under guardianship and persons convicted of certain offenses.

As to the second class, no method of ascertainment is prescribed eo