

tion of the Republican Representatives in Congress. A perusal of that decision will show that the Court did not touch or allude to the vital question involved in this important matter. It switched off on to the polygamy line and devoted its attention to that, leaving the main issue unexamined and the main line untraveled.

This grave question is yet to be met, face to face, without dodging or evasion: Can an American citizen be debarred from the political rights and privileges common to all who do not violate the law, simply for belief in and the practice of religious principles against which there is no statute, local or national, and which involve no evil to the person or the community?

This is the real issue in the Idaho question. This should be understood by the press and by the country. The "polygamy" hubbub is but a ruse on the part of those who are attacking the very foundations of religious liberty in America. All lovers of true freedom should look well to this, for it will, if left unchecked, prove the beginning of the end of that guaranty which has been one of the brightest gems in the crown of principles that adorn the Constitution of our country, and one of the strongest safeguards embodied in that palladium of human rights.

THE POPE AND BRAZIL.

THE POPE has consented to recognize the Republic of Brazil, on condition that the latter shall accord to His Holiness certain recognition in respect to legislation affecting the interests of Catholicism. It may seem strange, but it is nevertheless a fact that Catholicism has a better opportunity to make advancement under a republican than under a monarchical form of government. A monarch, in his sphere, is supreme, and may, if he so determines, check the progress of Catholicism in his domain, to a greater or less extent. But in a republic, a Catholic element, when once formed, is able to exert a certain sway, and to add constantly to its strength by the patient but effective processes so well known to that church.

Hence, while republicanism and Catholicism are antipodal to each other, the former is invariable to the spread of the latter, at least in this age of the world, for it continually holds out the prospect that the Pope may in time become sufficiently strong to dictate. The Catholic religion being the dominating one in

Brazil, there exists a strong probability that, in addition to the remarkable political phenomena it has already exhibited to the world, it will soon afford the spectacle of an absolute power, that of the Pope, seizing a free government, modeled after that of the United States, and making it subservient to the interests of the great Catholic church.

"Mormonism" has been accused of an ambition in the direction of absolute rule, and of subverting the interests of the state to those of the church. What is thus falsely charged of "Mormonism" is strictly and literally true of Catholicism, which has recently defined a policy antagonistic to the religion of the Latter-day Saints. It is not surprising that the religion of the Pope should array itself against that of the Latter-day Saints, for in their essence the two systems are opposites. The former utterly repudiates the doctrines that all just government is based upon the consent of the governed, and that society should be ruled on the principle of common consent, while these tenets are vital to the latter.

When the world sees the Pope of Rome recognize and encourage republicanism, it witnesses an anomaly; but in the present case of Brazil, the anomaly admits of an easy explanation, which is sufficiently suggested by the exchange of recognition proposed by His Holiness.

Catholicism is seeking to become more and more extensively entrenched in the New World, both in the southern and northern portion of it, and while it is antagonized in parts of this vast field by an increasing spirit in favor of religious toleration and political liberty, it is encouraged in other parts, by a decadence of popular sentiment in regard to these vital features of a free government.

THE IDAHO CONSPIRACY CASES DISMISSED.

ON THURSDAY last, the 3rd inst., the noted election conspiracy cases came up for trial at Malad, Idaho. Fifty-two men were included in the same indictment, which charged them with conspiring to vote unlawfully. The defendants had tendered their resignations as members of the "Mormon" Church, under the belief that, by so resigning, they could lawfully take the registration oath and vote.

To the credit of the prosecuting officer, D. W. Standrod, Esq., it may be stated that he manifested

no ill-will towards the defendants, nor any desire to secure the infliction of a severe penalty upon them. He expressed his willingness to recommend the court to inflict only a light fine upon each of them, which, it was tacitly understood, should be \$25, on condition that the defendants should plead guilty, as charged in the indictment. The latter appreciated the leniency of the proposal, and so far as the pecuniary feature of it was concerned, would gladly have acceded to it. But in being arraigned, they had entered a plea of not guilty, and they were unwilling to change it to one of guilty. While the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the proposition that these men had committed a technical offense, they felt that they had acted conscientiously, and were unwilling to make a record which might be construed as a confession that they had done otherwise.

The prosecution then proposed that if three of the defendants would come into court and change their pleas, fines would be assessed upon those three heavy enough to cover all the rest at \$25 each, and the indictment as against all the other defendants would be dismissed. As a matter resting among themselves, each of them would pay his share. But this was objected to as having practically the same moral effect that compliance with the former proposition would have had.

While it is somewhat unusual for a prosecuting officer to enter into such negotiations as these with parties under indictment, nothing illegal was suggested in the present instance. The fact may as well be understood that the court and prosecution were in a serious dilemma. On the one hand heavy expenses had been incurred by the county, and the prosecuting officer felt it his duty to secure, at least in part, a reimbursement therefor. On the other hand he had a right to take official notice of the fact that the defendants were good citizens in the best sense of the term, whose crime was only an error of judgment and not an act involving moral turpitude. The court had a right to take judicial notice of the same fact, and in reality did so. These circumstances explain in part the reasons for negotiations which faultfinders might perhaps criticize as irregular, but which were entirely within the law. The more serious features of the dilemma in which the court and prosecuting attorney found themselves will be explained further on.