

we have clipped is a falsehood. If, as the utterer claimed, he has been "a resident of Salt Lake for several years," he must know this beyond question. The principles of government have formed a part of school tuition from the beginning, in this Territory, and were taught before a sectarian teacher showed his face or could make a living here. Books and papers and periodicals of all kinds have been brought into this Territory by the ton. And the necessity of knowledge and intelligence has been so impressed upon the "Mormon" people, that they understand "a man cannot be saved in ignorance," and that "the glory of God is intelligence." "Boys and girls driven from the Territory for daring to think," is a piece of sheer fiction and ranks the "Rev" Abiel Leonard with the rest of the mercenary crew that lust after Mormonism, and seek to gain their object by bearing false witness against their neighbors. The report concludes with these significant words:

"At the close the public was given an opportunity of contributing to the cause of the missionaries."

That tells the whole story. It is the same old scheme. Commence with lying about the Saints, continue by praising the missionary work among them—which the candid "Christians" here admit is a complete failure, and conclude by taking up contributions. If there is a punishment deeper and darker and more prolonged than any other, it will surely be reserved for these pious defamers who, after being well treated by a people whom they cannot convert, go out to the world and spread falsehoods concerning them, partly to foster prejudice and breed trouble, and chiefly to deceive the unsophisticated and coax money out of their pockets. Of all frauds and counterfeits of this age of deceit, they are certainly the most despicable and contemptible.

A POINTED "AMENDMENT."

"In his report to the Secretary of the Interior Governor Thomas says: 'The non-Mormons of Utah urge that they should have the benefit of a law similar to that passed by Congress for Idaho, which, in the bill providing for the admission of the State, made what is known as the Idaho test oath part of the election law of the new State. They ask for the passage of the Cullom or Struble bill, and also the bill reported from the Judiciary Committee of the Senate by Edmunds.' This is not an absolutely true statement. It should be qualified so as to read: 'A few of the office-seeking non-Mormons,' etc. With this amendment the Governor's report would be true."

The foregoing is from the Ogden

Union. It is an anti-Mormon paper, though recently, we believe, it has passed into hands more conservative than those that manipulated its affairs some time ago. The Union's amendment to the Governor's report is correct.

Of course this is denied by the rabid "Liberal" organ. But it is a fact that a large number of respectable and influential non-Mormons in Utah were and are opposed to the disfranchisement scheme, and have used their influence, which is considerable, to prevent its consummation.

If the disgruntled "Liberal" organ cannot understand this, we have only to point to the verdict of the people at the late Delegate election, when the miserable failure of the "Liberal" candidate was certainly due to his championship of the disfranchisement infamy.

We do not say he would have been elected but for that. We do say that it was the cause of his being so terribly snowed under and snubbed by hosts of his own party. But some people will never learn nor tear from their eyes the scales of prejudice, nor from their hearts the black clots of the blood of bigotry.

THE SCIENCE OF WAR.

WAR at the best is a great evil. Sometimes, however, it becomes "a necessary evil." It is interesting to read the views of a great leader in the science of warfare and we therefore reproduce the following from a work by Moltke, the greatest living German general:

"Politics," says Moltke, "use war as a means to their end. They exercise a decisive influence on it from first to last, in that, as circumstances change, they raise or lower their demands. In view of this uncertainty, strategy must follow the vacillating goal of gaining every possible advantage. Thus, while quite independent of politics in its means, it best works toward harmony with politics in its ends. The next duty is the placing in the field of the military force, that is, the first advance of the army. In this the manifold geographical, political and national considerations must be most painstakingly studied. One mistake in the assembling of the troops can hardly be corrected in a whole campaign.

"The first advance, however, can usually be planned well beforehand, and be carried out with the desired results. Entirely different the next problem of strategy—the operations with the forces of war. Here our purpose is met by the entirely independent purpose of the enemy. This inimical purpose may be confined within the limits when we are able, ready, and determined, but cannot be broken otherwise than through the power of battle. The material and

moral effects of a great battle are so comprehensive, however, that they usually create a wholly new situation, a new basis of new operations. No plan of operations can reach with any degree of certainty beyond the first meeting with the enemy. Only laymen have the conception of a campaign planned in detail beforehand and carried to the end in a logical sequence from the original thought of the commander.

"Of course, the commander must have his great and definite aims, and follow them unswerving by the incidents of the hour; but the way in which these aims are to be realized can never be determined with certainty long in advance. In the course of a campaign the commander is constantly required to make decisions on the bases of situations that could not have been foretold or foreseen. All the consecutive acts in a war are, therefore, not premeditated operations, but spontaneous ones. It is a matter of seeing through the clouded and uncertain situation at a given time and place, of estimating the importance of the known quantity, of guessing closely the unknown quantity, of resolving promptly on a line of action, and of carrying out energetically and unswervingly this line of action. In the problem of calculating the relations of the two great factors, one's own purpose and the enemy's purpose, it must not be forgotten that there are other factors which are fully beyond all powers of estimation, as, for instance, weather, illness, and railway accidents, misunderstandings and deceptions; in short, all the occurrences which are attributed to fate, accident or Divine Providence, and which man neither creates nor controls. Yet war is not a matter of blind chance even in these respects.

"There is a calculation of probabilities possible in these details, that the bad luck of the one will be balanced by the bad luck of the other in most cases, and so the commander, who in each event does what is good, if not the best, has a fair chance of reaching his goal. It is self-evident that for such affairs more theoretical knowledge is insufficient, that here come to free, practical, artistic development the great qualities of mind and character, schooled, of course, by military education and guided by experience gathered from the history of war or real life. Decisive above all for the reputation of a commander is naturally the result. How much of the result is due directly to him can be determined only with the greatest difficulty. The best man often is wrecked on the irresistible power of circumstances; the man of mediocre ability is often lifted high by the same power. On the whole, however, fortune favors only the competent commander. As everything in war is uncertain, excepting the energy and strength of the commander, universal premises, conclusions, and systems are quite valueless to strategy. The Archduke Karl once called strategy a science, and tactics an art. He ascribed to the commander-in-chief the science that determined the course of the warlike undertakings. The art, he said, had only to execute the plans of strategy. On the contrary, General von Clausewitz says: 'Strategy is the use of battle for the ends of war.' In fact, strategy gives tactics the means to strike and the probability of victory through the direction of the armies and their meeting on the battlefield. On the other hand, she adapts herself to the result and builds on it. In the presence of the tactical victory, strategy suppresses