

EVENING NEWS

Published Daily, Sundays excepted
AT FOUR O'CLOCK.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE
DESERET NEWS COMPANY.

CHARLES W. PENROSE, EDITOR.

Monday, September 29, 1884.

SEMI-ANNUAL CONFERENCE.

To the Officers and Members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints:

Conference meetings will commence
at 10 o'clock on Saturday morning,
October 4th, 1884, in the Large Taber-
nacle in this city.

The presence of all the officers and
members who can possibly attend is
earnestly desired.

Judge Zane.

George C. Conner.

Josephine Smith.

First Presidency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

SALT LAKE CITY, Sept. 24, 1884.

ANOTHER "JUDGE WITH A MISSION."

The decision of Judge Zane allowing
the motion for an open venue for eight
grand juries appeared in full in the
Evening News of Saturday. It was
delivered in the afternoon and we had
not time to comment upon it except
very briefly.

On careful examination it exhibits a
"powerful weakness." It assumes
that a Court has power to supplement
a statute with measures entirely foreign
to its text; if a statute is not broad
enough for the purposes of the Court.
It ignores the principle that a statute
on any subject supersedes the common
law in relation to that subject. It
seeks to justify a departure from the
practice of the Utah courts for over
ten years, by a violation of a generally
established rule. Its sole excuse for
all this is a condition of affairs not
contemplated in the law, and brought
about by the Court's own error in
permitting proceedings unwarranted
by the law.

The facts are these: The jury practice
in this Territory is regulated by the
laws of Utah and by the United States
statute commonly called the Poland
law, which was approved June 23, 1874.
It provides that, annually in the month
of January, the Probate Judge of the
County and the Clerk of the District
Court shall each select one hundred
names of male citizens of the United
States to serve as jurors for the year;
that these names shall be written on
separate slips of paper which are to be
placed in a covered box and thoroughly
mixed and mingled; that the
Marshal or his deputy shall draw from
this box such number of names as the
Judge has decided to be necessary for
grand and petit juries for the term;
that the persons whose names are
drawn shall be summoned and their
names shall not be returned to the box;
until a new jury is selected. This
was the procedure in the state of
Utah. At the present time the
Territory has a new statute which
permits the selection of a grand
jury by drawing lots. The new
statute provides that the names of
jurors shall be drawn from a box
and the names of the persons
selected shall be returned to the
box until a new jury is selected.
The new statute also provides that
the names of the persons selected
shall be drawn from a box and
the names of the persons selected
shall be returned to the box until
a new jury is selected.

The territorial law provides that a
grand jury shall be composed of fifteen
eligible male citizens of the United
States summoned and impaneled as
provided by law, twelve of whom may
constitute a quorum to do business.
At the present term of the Third
District Court, names were drawn and
jurors summoned as provided by law,
but the Prosecuting Attorney challenged
the grand jury, so that the practice
of polygamy and adultery was
continued. In some instances the challenge
was to a single juror, and in others
to the entire panel. The challenge
was to the entire panel, and the
challenge was to the entire panel.

The Prosecuting Attorney moved for
an open trial, but it was denied by the
district court having been denied as
provided by law, so as to become
the required number. After hearing
arguments from the leading members
of the bar, all of whom declared
against the motion, with the exception
of one firm, noted for its adherence to
the people of this Territory and for its
sophisms and fallacies, Judge
Zane decided to allow the motion, and
the writ was issued, returning to the
court with the result that the
jurors were dismissed.

The effect of this decision is that by
similar or other means, to those em-
ployed in this instance, the box may be
exhausted at the first term of court in
the year, and then both grand and petit
juries must be selected by the Marshal,
Prosecuting Attorney, or Judge, and
thus none but "Gentiles" and
those of a hostile class be put upon
the juries to indict and try "Mormons"
for any charge that may be trumped up
against them. The intention of Con-
gress in passing the Poland law is evident
on the face of the statute. It was
to give the two classes of the com-
munity equal opportunities on
juries. The small minority of
Gentiles were placed on, as candidates
for the large majority of Mormons.

This was indeed true, but the new
method of Judge Zane excludes all
"Mormons" from making juries to in-
dict and try the least, composed of their
enemies. The manifest intent of
the law is perverted, shorted by the
Court's decision.

The Judge asks, "Did Congress intend
that this district should be without
grand juries for fifteen months?" The
answer is, No; for Congress did not intend that
service should be excluded from jury service
in any such manner. The Judge has
permitted the Marshal, notwithstanding
the express provisions of the law, which
has created the difficulty for which he has
sought a remedy and resorted to so
desperate an expedient. And this is
the answer to most of the queries set
forth in his argument. He con-
tends that the law is unconstitutional
as an essential clause of the constitution
of the trial of criminal cases, and that,
therefore, when the statute provides
for a grand jury it becomes void by
the mere creation of difficulty.

On the same rule of reasoning
as a grand jury is part of the court
when there is no grand jury, a grand
jury may be waived. Juries are
waived by the statute, and the
Court's decision creates a difficulty
which causes accused persons to submit to
a speedy and impartial trial.

A Marshal and a Prosecuting Attorney
are each as necessary to a

criminal court as a grand jury. Does
Judge Zane mean to say, then, that
if roughly you cause a marshal and
a prosecuting attorney to act, it would
be the best method of the court to
join one man to the same in the case
of the absence of a District Attorney? What
can the court do where he has ob-
tained his authority to make grand
juries by means not authorized in the
statute which creates them?

It was argued that because the Po-
land law does not in terms exclude
the power to provide a method for
summoning more jurors than are
provided for in the law, therefore
the Legislature or the Court
may properly make such provision. Is
not this the boldest kind of nonsense?
If our Legislature had added to the

Poland law provisions for the re-
leaving of additional names, would it
not be declared an impudent attempt
to supersede an act of Congress? And
if the Legislature might assume to
make it lawful for a Court to as-
sume legislative functions and such
and does not every tyro in the
study of law know that a statute
which provides for the selection
of a jury, or any other thing, excludes
every other method that that
statute is thus provided? Is it necessary
to tack on to every enactment a
provision that every other than the
one thus prescribed is excluded? Does
not the very fact that a statute is made
for given purposes carry with it the
impossibility of anything contrary to its
objectives? And is it not absurd to
argue for parity upon the basis of
such a provision?

Third District Court.—Proceedings
before Chief Justice Zane, Saturday
evening, September 24, 1884.

John Green vs. the County et al.
Green vs. the County et al.,

Green vs. the County et al.

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