

[Correspondence of the New York World.]
BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

FULL PARTICULARS OF THE CONFLICTS OF SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, THE 19TH AND 20TH OF SEPTEMBER.

CINCINNATI, September 25.

MASSING OF THE TWO ARMIES.

In the course of the 17th already unmistakable signs indicated that the enemy had discovered the weak points of our position, and were massing their forces in front of our left center and left, for the manifest purpose of crushing these parts of our lines or getting between them and Chattanooga. A corresponding movement by the left flank was then made by the whole army further down the West Chickamauga, so that on Friday morning our extreme left rested at Gordon's Mill, at the crossing of the Chickamauga by the Lafayette Pike, about twelve miles southwest of Chattanooga. On the morning of the 18th (Friday,) a portion of the expected reinforcements, consisting of two brigades of the reserve corps, respectively commanded by Colonels McCook and Mitchell, made their appearance near Chattanooga, and were immediately ordered to make a reconnaissance toward Ringgold, and develop the intentions of the enemy from that quarter.

They came upon the advance of Longstreet's corps, pushed it back for some distance, took a number of prisoners from it, and fully established the anticipated concentration of the enemy in front of our left. All day Friday the cavalry, covering our front, skirmished with different bodies of the enemy, issuing from the various gaps of the Pigeon Mountains, and advancing upon and again retiring from our line. No serious collision, however, occurred. It was evident the rebel generals meant to create a false impression as to the points of our line against which they proposed to strike a blow with concentrated power. But General Rosecrans was not deceived. The reports from the front all tended to confirm his previous impression that an onset in overwhelming numbers was contemplated upon our left flank, and that it had to be met by a still further shifting line toward Chattanooga.

Accordingly on Friday night the divisions of Brannan and Baird, formerly commanded by Generals Rousseau and Reynolds, of Thomas's corps, together with Johnson's of McCook's corps, moved from the center to the left of Crittenden's corps. They were in their new position at daybreak. The two other divisions of McCook's corps, Davis's and Sheridan's, were to move into the position abandoned by Thomas's corps, but had not time to assume it fully before the commencement of the action on the next morning. On the morning of Saturday our line then appeared as follows: On the extreme left Brannan, next Baird and Reynolds, with Johnson in reserve in the center, Palmer on the right of Reynolds, and Van Cleve on his left. This line, as already stated, was to be completed by Davis's and Sheridan's divisions, faced a little east of south. The scene of all the movements on the 17th and 18th was McLamores Cave, previously described as the valley formed by the Missionary and Pigeon mountains. The valley is washed for its greater part by the West Chickamauga, and traversed by two roads, one leading from Rossville, and the other from Chattanooga direct to Lafayette. The two roads run about two miles apart, and west of the Chickamauga, where the battle of Saturday was fought.

The section of the valley bordered by the two roads is almost a plain, covered with thick woods, which rendered the field unfavorable for the effective use of artillery. The line proper, as given above, rested nearly at the base of the Missionary Mountains, some distance in advance of its right. Gordon's Mills, the point of intersection of the road from Chattanooga to Lafayette and the Chickamauga aforementioned, was still held on Saturday morning by Wood's division of Crittenden's corps, supported by Negley's and Thomas's. Their position was a strong one; but, at an angle with the line proper, appeared like a dangerous extension of the latter, and was proved such by subsequent events. It was meant to secure our right against turning maneuvers, but officers of good judgment entertained the belief that both greater compactness from closer contraction and perfect security of the right might have been obtained by posting the latter on the eastern abutments of Missionary Ridge. The brigades of McCook and Mitchell of the reserve corps were ordered back to Rossville, on Friday afternoon, for the protection of our communication with Chattanooga, and hence were not to participate in the struggle of Saturday. The night had been frosty, and the troops not being permitted to kindle bivouac fires, the discomfort they experienced, together with the fatigue from marching and want of sleep, put them in a physical condition by no means as vigorous as it should have been for the severe work before them. Fortunately the sun rose clear, and, with its cheering rays, did much to revive the spirits of the army.

THE BATTLE OF SATURDAY.

The early forenoon passed away without forewarning of the approaching conflict; but shortly before 11 o'clock the storm that had been brewing all the morning on the rebel side burst forth in the expected direction. At that time a long mass of rebel infantry was seen advancing upon Brannan's division on the extreme left. It first came upon the

second brigade, Colonel Croxton commanding, and soon forced it back despite its determined resistance. The two other brigades of the division at once came to its assistance, and succeeded in checking the progress of the rebels and driving them back; but their column being in turn strongly reinforced, they advanced again with wild yells. So powerful was this assault that they pushed Brannan back to and beyond his position in the line, and thus uncovered the left of Baird's division. Making prompt use of their advantage, they changed their course to the left, and speedily enveloped Scribner's and King's brigades—the latter of regulars. They were almost surrounded but managed to disentangle themselves after fearful loss.

The crushing rebel masses next came upon Johnson's division, and rolled it upon Reynolds's, which also became speedily involved in the desperate struggle. The stubborn resistance of these divisions, however, and the sweeping fire of some batteries posted under the personal supervision of General Rosecrans, arrested at last their sweeping advance.

The divisions of Brannan and Baird having been rallied, General Thomas ordered a general advance of the right, and soon the tide of battle was decidedly turned in our favor. With cheers our line advanced, halting only at times to shatter the enemy with musketry. Several times the latter's retreating line stopped and vainly tried to retain their gained ground, but steadily they were driven from position to position, and by 4 o'clock all the ground lost was nearly recovered. Several batteries belonging to General Baird's and Brannan's divisions, whose horses had been killed and supports were swept away, were retaken, and several hundred prisoners captured. The enemy left all their dead and nearly all their wounded on the field. There were at least 300 of the former. The rebel troops engaging Thomas belonged to Buckner's and Longstreet's commands.

At the time the struggle was turning in our favor on the left, Bragg's army proper, consisting of the corps of Polk and Hill, (formerly Hardee's,) moved to a most determined and well-executed attack upon Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions in the center. Its object was obviously to relieve the defeated rebel right. Palmer and Van Cleve soon found themselves overpowered and their divisions breaking. Their complete rout was imminent, when Davis's division came to their support on Van Cleve's right. The timely reinforcements at first had the effect of checking the enemy and restoring our line; but the rebel attack was speedily renewed with greater numbers, and the center again compelled to yield. Davis was forced to the right and Van Cleve to the left, and the enemy advanced through the opening made in our line, threatening to take the center and right by their flanks, as they had done on the left. At this critical juncture Sheridan's division appeared, and was at once thrown upon the enemy. It stood its ground gallantly for a while, but becoming soon exposed to a destructive flank fire, was also compelled to fall back. Fortunately, the divisions of Generals Wood and Negley, that had been easily withdrawn from Gordon's Mills when the rebel attack on the left threatened to be successful, now came to the rescue. After a brief contest, the rebels found themselves at last matched, and commenced giving way in their turn, Reynolds having also been sent to the assistance of the center.

After the repulse of the rebel right, an advance was ordered, and the original position regained about sunset.

About dark the enemy made another demonstration, with a heavy artillery and musketry fire, upon the center, but eliciting a lively response they soon abandoned this last effort of the day. Thus ended the battle of the 19th. It had been a defensive one on our part, and although we lost no ground, and probably less men and material than the enemy, its result could hardly be claimed as a triumph of Union arms. No substantial advantage had been won, and a large portion of the army was badly shattered. That the enemy, with his numerical superiority, would be able to offer again battle on the following day, could well be supposed. General Rosecrans anticipated a renewal of the struggle, and prepared for it.

CHANGE OF POSITION.

During the night the disposition of our forces was changed. The line was made to rest along a cross-road running north-east and south-west, and connecting the Rossville and Lafayette roads. By this disposition our extreme right was made to rest on Missionary Ridge. The new line was a mile shorter than that of the day before. The different divisions were disposed in this order: From right to left, one brigade of Negley's, Johnson's, Baird's, Palmer's, Reynolds's, two brigades of Negley's, Wood's, Sheridan's and Davis's, Brannan's and Van Cleve's formed the reserve. The mounted brigades of Wilder and Minty covered the right flank.

Sunday morning broke upon the hostile armies as fair as that of the preceding day. Contrary to the universal expectation on our side, the enemy again allowed the early hours, so well suited to offensive maneuvers, to pass away undisturbed by the sounds of battle. The adaptation of their plan of attack to our new line doubtless necessitated this. About 9 o'clock a few shots were heard at various points of our front, but it was only at a little before ten that the report of whole volleys announced the resumption of the fight in good earnest. The firing that had begun upon the left at once assumed the

fiercest character. The enemy repeated the tactics of the previous day by throwing themselves first upon our extreme left, formed by General Beatty's brigade of Negley's division. I stood the onset for some time, but finally retired.

Desiring to unite the two portions of General Negley's command and General Rosecrans ordered General Wood's division to take the position of the two brigades stationed further to the right. The rebels perceiving the withdrawal of Negley, and believing it to be a retreat in good earnest, quickly also moved upon the center, and the action speedily became general. Finding themselves unable to make an impression on Wood, the enemy, at the lapse of an hour or so, seemed to concentrate their main strength upon the center, now again commanded by Thomas.

During the night our troops had constructed along the line barriers of logs and fence rails, and thus comparatively sheltered they kept a continuous murderous musketry fire upon the enemy. Our artillery was planted upon higher ground in the rear, and fired over the infantry. Destructive as our fire from small arms and cannon was, it did not stay the advance of the rebels. At times they staggered, but only to rally and push again forward toward our line. With frantic yells, Longstreet's and Hill's corps both came rolling steadily on, in columns by battalions. Our center, weakened to the extent of almost one third, was not strong enough for success in this unequal contest. Closer and closer approached the shouting hostile masses, and at last forced Brannan's division to yield its position.

Meantime, as General Reynolds was severely pressed, General Wood was ordered to march instantly by the left flank, pass Brannan, and go to his relief. Davis and Sheridan were to shift over to the left, and thus close up the line. As the occasion was urgent, General Wood drew in his skirmishers with considerable haste, and the rebels, for the second time, mistaking a withdrawal for a flight, pressed forward like a torrent, and poured musketry, canister and grap into the flank of the division, moving upon the double-quick. The men endeavored for a time to keep their files in order, but as the pitiless storm of lead and iron continued to be hurled against them, the regiments began to spread out, line a fan, wider and wider, until finally they were torn to shreds. This was especially the case with the brigade commanded by Colonel Buell. Parker's brigade alone passed on to its destination comparatively intact.

The battle now extended upon its most critical phase. The breaks, temporarily caused by the shiftings of divisions from one point of the line to another, were so promptly perceived and turned to advantage by the enemy, that they proved fatal, and cost the loss of the day. Davis's division, coming up to take Wood's position on the extreme left, was taken with great suddenness and fury by the left flank, and pushed to the right in utter disorder. Simultaneously the weak remnants of Van Cleve's and Palmer's divisions exposed by the withdrawal of Davis's, were attacked with equal vehemence on the right, and forced back in great confusion. The rout of the left and the right was now complete, and even the exertions of General Rosecrans and his staff, who, with drawn swords, attempted to restore order, were of no avail. Streams of demoralized, uncontrollable men, fleeing toward the rear, were all that remained of a large portion of the army.

After that fatal break, our line of battle was not again reformed during the day. The army was, in fact, cut in two, McCook, with Davis, Sheridan and Wilder, being thrown off to the right; Crittenden, except one brigade of Wood's, being broken in pieces, and Thomas, with his indomitable corps, and Johnson's division of McCook's, remaining alone upon the left. Thomas's divisions, Negley's, Brannan's, and Baird's had been fearfully shaken and much scattered by the flight over the log works, and Reynolds's was the only one that retired in tolerable order. Retreat was now the only resort left, and the whole disorganized mass of our troops fell back over the road to Rossville. Crowds of stragglers, in mob-like disorder, made good speed toward Chattanooga, with the exception of Sheridan, Davis and Wilder, who, cut off from the center, still straggled as best they could.

On the right, the divisions of Baird, Reynolds, Negley and Brannan, and Harker's brigade of Wood's division, alone retained cohesiveness, and took a position along the base of Missionary Mountains, where the Rossville road debouches from them, for another fight. The line was formed so that the left rested upon the Lafayette road, and the right at the gap represented an arc of a circle, and a southeast hill about its center formed the key to the position. Between two and three o'clock the enemy appeared on the Lafayette road, and, moving by the left flank, soon formed for another attack.

At first they directed a heavy fire of musketry and artillery upon our position, as though menacing to dispirit its defenders before coming to an assault; but the 10,000 or 12,000 men that confronted them felt that the fate of the Army of the Cumberland, and in a great measure, that of the Union, depended upon the repulse of the enemy, and when the rebel lines finally came repeatedly to the attack, they advanced but to recoil with severe loss. Our troops were formed in two lines upon the crest, and, firing one after the other, they kept up an unbroken fusillade with telling effect. The enemy, consisting of

Polk's corps, were not only repelled, but thrown into such disorder that Turchin's brigade and other portions of the line followed, and took a veral hundred prisoners. Toward sunset the enemy were driven back to the position they took when filing out of the Lafayette road, and abandoned the contest.

When Thomas's division were most sorely pressed during the afternoon, and it looked at one time as though they would again have to succumb to superior numbers they were gaden and encouraged by the advent, on the right, of Mitchell's and Whitaker's brigades, of the reserve corps under the command of Gen. Gordon Granger himself. With the accession of strength our ability to maintain our position was no longer doubted. Soon after General Granger had reported to General Thomas, his two brigades were sent out on the road, under command of General Steadman, to retake an ammunition train that had fallen into the hands of the enemy. They came upon a large rebel force, and after a severe conflict, drove them away.

While General Thomas was making his gallant fight, Sheridan and Davis had managed, after being much cut up, to work the way to the Rossville road with the remnants of their divisions, and fallen back in the direction of Chattanooga. At night General Thomas fell back to Rossville, four miles from Chattanooga, after bringing away all the wounded, transportation, and other materials within reach.

While the struggle of Saturday ended in a drawn battle, that of Sunday resulted in a disastrous defeat. The failure of the first day was partly due to the greater numerical strength of the enemy, and partly to the deficient formation of our line of battle. That of the second is justly ascribed to improper tactics on the battle-field, and above all to the absence of command. The inspiring example set and influence exercised by the commander-in-chief at Stone River were wanting—being having been compelled to leave the field and return to Chattanooga before the action was over.

The early disappearance of two corps commanders from the field also made a demoralizing impression. The loyal people certainly have cause for self-congratulation that the Army of the Cumberland was not destroyed, and owes profound gratitude to General Thomas and those under him that saved it. Our losses are great. That in killed, wounded and missing will probably reach 10,000. Of artillery, we are less some fifty pieces, mostly lost on Sunday. Of wagons, loaded with ammunition and supplies, ambulances, etc., we have also lost a great number. They were abandoned in the retreat on Sunday.

General Rosecrans and his Lieutenants were busily engaged on Monday in strengthening their position by field works, and reorganizing their commands. While the army itself may be considered safe enough, it is most certain that if the enemy have the advantage of greater numbers, flanking movements will compel Rosecrans to retreat across the Tennessee, in case reinforcements should not promptly reach him.

THE FRENCH ARMY.

The French Emperor commands the finest army in the world. There are other admirable armies, but in completeness of organization, in perfection of details, in resources and reserves, the army of France surpasses all others. The exposition of the state of the Empire at the beginning of this year, presented an array of facts and figures with regard to the offensive and defensive power of the Empire, at once suggestive and interesting. Notwithstanding the Mexican movement, the French army last January was on a peace footing, and numbered only 421,000 men, nearly 28,000 of whom were then in Mexico. The war footing supposes a force of from 750,000 to 800,000 men—at the rate of 2 per cent. of the entire population.

The government of the army centres in the Emperor, who confides the management to the Minister of War, whose cabinet, presided over by a chief, comprises the specialties of the Personnel, Cavalry, and Gendarmerie, Artillery, Engineers, Administration, Military Depot and Accountant-General. In addition, there is a directory of the Algerine service, consulative committees of the General staff, of the Gendarmerie, of Infantry, of Cavalry, of Artillery, of Fortifications, a permanent Committee of Administration, a Sanitary Counsel, Commission on Army Pay, Veterinarian Commission and Commission on Coast Defenses. The General Staff in war time includes 11 marshals, 90 generals of division, 180 generals of brigades, 580 captains of the general staff and 781 officers of the local staffs. The war footing of the military train is 33,365 men and 12,000 horses. The administration, including heads of departments, officers of administration, chaplains, surgeons, veterinary surgeons, staff of the artillery, military train, workmen of construction and of administration, and hospital attendants, comprises in time of peace more than 15,000 men, and in war 33,365 men.

The Imperial Guard—a complete corps d'armee and distinct from the army of the line—includes 8 regiments and 31 battalions, 192 companies of infantry; 6 regiments, 37 squadrons of cavalry; 2 regiments, 16 battalions and squadrons, 3 companies of artillery; engineers 1 division, 2 companies; gendarmerie, foot and horse, 1 regiment, 2 battalions, 1 squadron, 16 companies.

The line comprises 107 regiments, 345 battalions, 2,761 companies of infantry; 58 regiments, 348 squadrons, 9 companies of caval-