either a lack of understanding or a desire to misinterpret.

The power of Congress to disapprove any act of the Territorial Legislature is not interfered with or disputed in this bill. It is common, and always has been, to designate in an act of the Legislature when it shall go into effect. Nothing unusual is attempted in this bill in that respect. The Governor's intimation to the contrary is childish and insincere. He knows better, and should have been ashamed to put his name to the mass of puerile generalities, by whomsoever prepared, with which his veto of this bill is accompanied.

In stating what the bill contains, he does not point out a single thing that is not requisite and proper. In one sentence he complains of changes in the law, without showing they are wrong; in the next he complains that the change is not sweeping enough without showing that would be right.

The "double set of registration officers" to which he alludes is an arrangement of the Utah Commission's. The Legislature did not wish to interfere with it. The election law provides that the Assessor shall be the registration officer and that his deputies, for whom he is responsible, may assist. When the Commission came into power they appointed a registration officer and a number of deputy registrars and put the responsible work upon the latter, leaving the former office a sinecure. That was not the fault of the law but of the Commission. This bill was framed so as not to interfere with the authority of the Commission, rightly or wrongly exercised, because it was well known that the Governor would have seized such an interference as a pretext for killing the bill.

The provision for a board of three persons to act judicially on objections to voters, was designed to prevent a repetition of the infamies perpetrated at the recent city election by the deputy registrars sitting in judgment on their own acts. The law under which the Commission are required to act makes no provision for such a tribunal as they arbitrarily appointed. The registration officers were not to act in this judicial capacity. The justices of the peace, being judicial officers, under bonds for the faithful performance of their duties, and from whose judgments there is always an appeal, were the officers to hear objections. The Commission appointed deputy registrars to act in this judicial capacity who are not judicial officers, who are not under bonds, and from whose dicta there is no appeal. To put the blame of this outrage upon the law of which it is a plain violation, is worthy of the other misrepresentations which characterize the Governor's veto.

We do not believe any fair-minded citizen would object to the change of a board of three responsible persons, not all of the same political party, to hear and decide objections to voters, in lieu of one irresponsible individual who has already acted on some at least of the questions brought before him, and who has a personal or partizan interest in the whole matter at issue. We can understand why the manipulators of the late election deviltries do not want such a change. The reasons that actuated the Governor may be imagined, since he has given no explanation of them in his veto message.

The power of the Legislature to amend the election laws, on which the Governor casts a doubt, saying nothing positive however, is not disputed even by the Utah Commission. And it has been admitted by the astute and subtle attorney for the "Liberal" central committee. That the words "under existing laws" were not intended to mean that no other election laws should be passed by the Legislature, is clear from the fact that they apply equally to the laws of Congress as to the acts of the Legislature. If the latter are limited thereby, so are the former. If those words forbid any amendment of the election laws by the Utah Legislature, they also forbid any similar action by Congress. The Governor gives his implied objection away when he says, "the words would not of course prevent Congress from making any desired change."

The bill referred to by the Governor in the closing paragraphs of his veto message was designed to cover broader ground than the measure now under consideration. If it had been considered probable that the Governor would sign the greater bill, this amending bill would not have been passed. Knowing that the Governor, under the influences that control him, would not dare to pass the more comprehensive measure, the bill we now publish was prepared, as one that he could sign without fear, unless he was afraid of those who desire to perpetuate the condition of affairs by which the fraud and injustice of the late municipal registration and election were possible.

Again we invite a careful perusal of the bill and of the veto. If the former is in the interest of fairness, justice, and the purity of elections, what shall be said of the latter? If the signature of the Governor would have completed a barrier in the way of fraud, corruption and villainy, what are the natural effects of his refusal to subscribe it? If at another election, partizan officials, without conscience and without honor, deprive hundreds of legal voters of the franchise and open the way for hundreds of illegal voters to exercise it, where will the blame lie? It will not be upon the shoulders of the Legislature, and if the Governor can afford to carry it he is perfectly welcome to the load.

WHEN THE SESSION ENDS.

A DECISION of the Supreme Court of the United States rendered March 17 is of peculiar interest in Utah at the present time.

It will be remembered that some extraordinary proceedings occurred during the closing hours of the fifteenth session of the Idaho legislature. Trouble arose between the two houses and their respective presiding officers. The president of the council and the speaker of the house, at the hour of midnight which closed the sixtieth day of the session, peremptorily declared the bodies over which they presided to be adjourned without day. But the members would not have it so. They forthwith elected new presiding officers and prolonged the work of legislation until seventeen bills had passed. It was contended that these seventeen acts were invalid, and suit was brought to have them stricken from the statute book.

The courts of Idaho refused to do this, and the Supreme Court of the United States affirms the decision. The latter holds that it is not the function of the courts to inquire into the records of a legislative body, which must be taken according to their tenor. It is thus left to the legislature to make its own record, and to exercise its own judgment in so doing; and if the record shows an act to have been passed within the limit of the session as fixed by Congressional act, the court will not question the validity of the act on the ground that it was passed too late.

MADRID, March 22.—Forged notes to the amount of 500,000 pesetas have been discovered in a package of funds brought here from Seville.