

Looking Backward at Early Events in Utah

Ninth Anniversary of the Arrival of the Pioneers Celebrated in Big Cottonwood Canyon—How the Booming of Cannon Reverberated from Pines and Peaks and Glens and Dells.

(From the files of the Deseret News of July and August, 1856.)

From the files of the Deseret News of July and August, 1856. On the morning of the 23rd, Presidents Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball and Jedediah M. Grant, their wives, and many citizens of Salt Lake City and surrounding country, entered the mouth of Big Cottonwood canyon, on their way to the headwaters of that stream, to spend the ninth anniversary of the entrance of the pioneers into the valley of the Great Salt Lake. All who passed up the canyon were requested to show their tickets at the gate close by the first mill. Invitation tickets—Picnic party at the headwaters of Big Cottonwood, Pres. Brigham Young respectfully invites you and family to attend a Pic-Nic party at the lake in Big Cottonwood Canyon, Thursday, the 24th of July. You will be required to start from the city very early on Wednesday morning, as no one will be permitted after 2 o'clock p. m. on the 23rd to pass the first mill, above four miles up the canyon. All persons are forbidden to make or kindle fires at any place in the canyon, except on the camp ground, G. S. L. City, July 18, 1856.

reverberated from peaks, glens and dells, announcing to a world that freedom was celebrating the blessings which make life valuable. The emigration all reached the twenty-ninth inst. at half-past 5. Too late for use in this number. Watermelons were selling on the streets on the 29th inst. Elder John Paek arrived in the city on the 29th inst., 13 days from Carson county. The emigration all reached there before the 4th, well and in good spirits. Their cattle looked well and they probably lost a smaller proportion of stock than any company that ever crossed the desert at the sink of Mary's river. Elder John D. Chase gave birth to a daughter on the journey.

Elder Hyde writes from Wagon country that the people are generally well, and most of the new settlers have arrived. Flour is selling at from 15 to 20 cents a pound, and Elder Hyde is very busy erecting a saw mill.

Bishop Warren S. Snow of Mantel valley that rain is falling in Sanpete county. The wheat was considerably injured by smut and worms were damaging the potatoes.

About 450 persons, with 71 carriages and 201 horses and mules, participated in the ever memorable trip to the headwaters of Big Cottonwood. GEORGE D. WATT, Reporter.

During the ascent from the canyon on the twenty-fourth, one of Pres. Kimball's wives described a bear sitting upon a rock not far from the roadside, and apparently looking with amazement upon the strange spectacle of a long line of carriages in a wild and desolate region. The bear, the second of the kind, was shot by Brother Charles Decker with a Remington's rifle. Three shots were fired before the bear succumbed. The first passed through the hind legs, the second grazed the heart and the third pierced the brain. All returned without accident to man or beast.

Notice—Ice will be delivered daily at any house in G. S. L. City for three cents per pound. Leave your orders in Deseret Drug store. Also lead soda water from a fountain—only one in Utah! Champagne, cider, etc.

Farm for Sale—In G. S. L. City, one and a half miles from Temple, on the bank of Jordan river, 35 acres of land with a house and well attached. Apply to G. B. Wallace, seventh ward.

How Japan Lost Her Greatest Chance.

Russians Had Only 50,000 Troops in Manchuria When the War Began, and Were Kept Busy Doing Theatrical Tricks to Hide Their Weakness.

LONDON.—At last we have a clear, authentic statement of the Russian military position in the far east, set forth in terms which make the situation understandable by everybody, says the New York Sun.

It comes in a long letter from Mukden, written by H. J. Whigham, one of the ablest war correspondents, who gives the result of two months' observations of the Russian forces.

He demonstrates how desperate was the Russian situation from the outbreak of the war until almost the date of his writing, in the middle of June, and points out that, however great were the Japanese successes, they had been for greater than 10,000 had to garrison Kai-Chow, Tash-Chow, Hai-Cheng and Newchwang.

The letter is so illuminating that the extracts which follow deserve careful attention. If we exclude the men necessary for guarding the railway and the small garrisons at places like Harbin and Kirin, there were not more than 50,000 troops in southern Manchuria when the war broke out.

Of this force some 30,000 were between Feng-Wang-Cheng and Taku-Shan and the Yalu; 10,000 in the vicinity of Kin-Chow and Port Arthur; the remainder 10,000 had to garrison Kai-Chow, Tash-Chow, Hai-Cheng and Newchwang.

The latter point, fortunately for the Russians, was protected by ice in the river.

The garrison actually consisted of 300 troops and a few military police.

It is freely asserted by the Russians themselves that such being the strength of the Russian army in the far east, the first Japanese attack on Feb. 8 could have landed a single army corps on the shores of Taku-Shan bay, or at Pit-Se-We, as they did later, and Port Arthur must have fallen immediately.

There is a great deal to be said for this theory. Thirty thousand men could have the coup long before the Russian troops at the Yalu could have marched to its relief, and the effect of the blow would have been terrific.

The sole good excuse for such a lost opportunity seems to be that the Japanese were always intent before anything else, in securing Korea, and they made plans for throwing a first army across the Yalu long before they declared war.

The success of the torpedo attack and the consequent demoralization of the Russian fleet were conditions which could not be foreseen and therefore could not be fully utilized when they occurred.

A sudden change of plans might have caused confusion, and nothing could be left to hazard at the beginning of the campaign.

During February the small army in southern Manchuria was reinforced slowly, so slowly that the gravest fears about the carrying capacity of the railway began to be entertained.

Troops were landed at Harbin at a rate of less than 500 a day, and there were days when no men came through. In reality the railroad was not so much to blame as the military organization.

The simple fact was that no preparation had been made for the war, and it took weeks to mobilize even regiments in eastern Siberia which were supposed to be always on a war footing.

Not until the end of March did a steady flow of reinforcements begin.

Even then it was necessary to bring more artillery to the front, and for the reason the infantry were considerably delayed.

It was during this period of great uncertainty that Gen. Kuropatkin arrived at Liao-Yang.

He found himself in command of an army of 60,000 men with less than 200 guns, strung out along a single line of railway from Liao-Yang to Port Arthur, with one wing thrown out 150 miles to the Yalu and the right flank absolutely unprotected except by a few guns in the old fort at Newchwang.

The enemy had complete mastery of the sea. It could certainly land anywhere between Port Arthur and the Yalu, and so cut off the left wing while by risking the passage of transports past Port Arthur they could seize Newchwang and threaten not only the right flank, but the rear.

All sorts of expedients were resorted to in order that the weakness should not be too apparent at Newchwang, where an attack was daily apprehended.

Sixty field guns were detained at the railway station, but only two batteries had horses. The rest were there for show purposes only.

Nearly every day the troops marched through the foreign settlement to the fort and back again in order to give the impression that there was a large force in the neighborhood.

When Gen. Kuropatkin came to visit the port he was received by 5,000 men near the fort, of which 3,000 came with him from Tash-Chow and returned with him the same afternoon.

Unfortunately, about the end of April delay was caused by the breaking of a bridge near Chailor.

There was a new hindrance when the ice in Lake Baikal began to thaw, so there were two weeks when no troops arrived at Liao-Yang.

This was exactly the period which the Japanese chose to force the issue. Gen. Kuropatkin did not have 55,000 men of all arms, but he was better supplied with artillery, having thirty batteries of field guns besides a number of three-pounders.

Still, he could not risk a serious battle at the Yalu because with the army distributed on so large a front he was running a serious danger of being cut to pieces.

The Japanese all this time never divulged their plan of campaign, so though the Russian commander had only to face 70,000 at the Yalu he was continually threatened at every point along the coast between Wifu and Newchwang.

The second and third armies of Japan, though still in the nebulous offing, had a far greater moral effect than they would have had if they had landed anywhere in Manchuria.

Gen. Kuropatkin, with 30,000 between Feng-Wang-Cheng and the Yalu, and another 30,000 at the southern end of the Liao-Tung peninsula was left with only 25,000 at his own disposal, with which he had to face all emergencies and especially to ward off the threatened attack on his right flank.

By this time the Petropavlovsk disaster had so far crippled the already damaged fleet that the Japanese were free to come past Port Arthur and land anywhere on the coast of the Liao-Tung gulf.

With the addition of more than an army corps to protect his right flank, Gen. Kuropatkin might have held the Yalu position, which for tactical purposes was immensely strong, but desperately weak as he was in the center.

He had no intention but to retire from the Yalu and concentrate at Hai-Cheng and Liao-Cheng.

The retirement was badly executed. Gen. Sassulitch not only made no proper use of the advantage of his position, but actually threw away two regiments and four batteries.

The Japanese crossing could have been made very expensive with any sort of generalship.

Still, the loss was not the fault of the commander-in-chief, nor can his strategy be blamed.

After the battle of Kiu-Lien-Cheng the Japanese landed at last on the Liao-Tung peninsula and Port Arthur was cut off.

It is hard to say exactly how many men were left under Gen. Stoessel. The Russians say there were 40,000, exclusive of the navy and the garrison of Port Arthur.

The number is more likely to be 70,000, of whom 2,000 were put out of action at Kin-Chow.

That left Gen. Kuropatkin with an army concentrated between Liao-Yang and Kai-Chow of only 3,000 men and not more than 140 guns.

So weak was the Russian army at this moment that the Japanese had once more an opportunity for attempting a great coup.

There were several days after the Yalu fight when it seemed highly probable that the enemy, instead of marching on Liao-Yang, would advance back roads in the mountains directly on Mukden, where there was no fortification of any sort and few troops.

Gen. Kuropatkin was not prepared to resist such an onslaught. His sole line of retreat was threatened, and there was danger of Liao-Yang becoming a second Sedan.

Accordingly, he decided to fall back on Tiel-King, and everything was made ready for the retreat.

Viceroy Alexieff was to transfer his quarters from Mukden to Harbin, while Gen. Kuropatkin was to await the assault at Tien-Ling, which was the strongest strategic position in the whole Liao basin.

This was on the 11th day of May. Suddenly on the 12th the orders were reversed.

The Japanese, who had come with a tremendous rush from the Yalu, halted and actually fell back.

Liao-Yang and Mukden were both safe for the moment and the viceroy's train did not go to Harbin.

To one sitting in Mukden and knowing the weakness of the Russian forces it would seem more that the Japanese had had a great opportunity. If they could have pushed toward Mukden it is quite certain that there would have been a very rapid retreat, degenerating into a debacle in the salt of the Russians.

The Japanese had only to keep pushing toward Liao-Yang and Gen. Kuropatkin would not have given battle. It is probable that both in this case and in the case of the "Attack on Port Arthur" the Japanese, in spite of their boasted secret service, had no idea how terribly weak and demoralized the Russians were.

had been delayed by the opening of Lake Baikal, began to pour in at a tremendous rate, and by the beginning of June Gen. Kuropatkin had received 35,000 men and 10 batteries.

In 20 days nearly 40,000 men, 50 guns and 8,000 horses came through the station at Mukden.

I have no doubt that an average of 2,000 a day with guns and horses in proportion, can be kept up and even exceeded.

I know that on June 2 Gen. Kuropatkin had in his immediate command, exclusive of the troops at Port Arthur and those at Mukden, which now number 6,000, exactly 104 battalions of infantry, which mustered 80,000 rifles.

He also had Gen. Bennigsen's mounted force of 10,000 Cossacks and 240 guns.

With an army of 90,000 men and Port Arthur in jeopardy, it seemed necessary to do something for its relief.

Unfortunately for the Russians, it is practically impossible for even a much larger army to relieve Port Arthur so long as the Japanese command the sea, for any force advancing southward must leave both flanks and rear open to attack from the sea.

That is why the Japanese had no need to hold the Liao-Tung peninsula in force north of Kin-Chow.

When Gen. Kuropatkin sent Gen. Stakelberg with the First Siberian army corps to attempt its relief he was simply acting under instruction from St. Petersburg and not because he expected to help Port Arthur.

As soon as we heard that Gen. Stakelberg had gone to Wai-Fang Tien we expected disaster, and this morning a telegram came that the disaster had taken place.

Gen. Stakelberg, while endeavoring to turn the Japanese right flank, was suddenly hit on his own right and badly routed.

The Japanese were apparently not greatly superior in numbers, but their artillery was infinitely better both in numbers and in effectiveness, and their tactics, as usual, were perfect examples of how battles should be fought.

Now the army of Gen. Oku is advancing from the south and Gen. Kuroki is coming from the southeast.

When they effect a junction they will form a fighting unit of at least 100,000, and there is still the army of Gen. Nodda to come.

Gen. Kuropatkin has advanced to extricate Gen. Stakelberg, who has lost, officially, 3,000, but probably 6,000, while the rest of his men are badly shaken.

On the other hand the railway is every day making good the gaps in the ranks and although the record for June is not so good as in May, troops are still arriving at the rate of 1,500 a day, with a large quantity of artillery; so, at the time of writing, Gen. Kuropatkin must have 110,000 men and not less than 250 guns.

Considering that two more army corps are already on the way, he may be considered quite safe at Liao-Yang so long as he does not risk another attempt to leave Port Arthur.

So far I have dealt only with the numerical problem, and I hope I have made clear that Gen. Kuropatkin's strategy has been largely determined by the paucity of the troops.

As regards the guns the Russians have now lost five batteries of field artillery and some smaller pieces and about 80 guns which joined Gen. Stoessel at Port Arthur.

Consequently at the beginning of June Gen. Kuropatkin was so short of artillery that he telegraphed to China for four batteries which were just being mobilized.

They came with men and horses only half trained.

Five more batteries were hurried through Hong Kong with the fittings of another type of gun, so that they were temporarily useless.

Meantime the railway is working well.

Thirty-first division is beginning to arrive, and by early in August the Manchurian army will be increased by two fresh army corps and at least 200 guns.

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DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF NEW YORK.



William Travers Jerome wants to be the Democratic candidate for governor of New York and Mr. Jerome is well convinced that he is the only man who can really be elected. He is also confident his nomination would add strength to the national ticket.

NAPOLEON, As Seen by His Associates

THE SMALLNESS OF THE MAN

NUMEROUS instances of Napoleon's smallness and even pettiness of mind are found in the reminiscences of the men and women who shared his daily life. He was a "bad loser" in any enterprise whatsoever, and if luck was against him he invariably resorted to sulks or trickery. Says the Duchesse d'Angoulême: "Even at chess he always managed to regain possession of his two bishops. He did not like any one to remark upon it seriously and was always the first to laugh at it himself, but he was clearly annoyed if too much stress were laid upon it."



NAPOLÉON IN 1799. (After a painting by Guérin.)

Upon it, and, after all, as he never played for money, there was more reason to laugh than to be annoyed at it."

He was haunted by mean suspicions. His minister of police, Fouché, writing of his system of surveillance, declares: "This odious and secret militia was inherent in a system raised and maintained by the most suspicious and mistrustful man that perhaps ever existed."

And also: "The tragic death of Paul F. of Russia inspired Bonaparte with melancholy ideas and made his disposition still more suspicious and mistrustful. He dreamed nothing but conspiracies in the army and caused several general officers to be arrested, among others Humbert, whom I had some difficulty in saving from his inflexible severity."

He was incredibly sensitive on the point of social and political conspiracies which kept up a fire in the rear while he was abroad winning victories. Says Fouché:

"He owned to me that in battle, in the greatest dangers and even in the midst of deserts he had always in view the good opinion of Paris, and especially of the Faubourg St. Germain. He was Alexander the Great constantly directing his thoughts toward Athens."

He interfered in the most arbitrary manner with the costumes of his empress and the court ladies. "You are aware that I am very knowing in matters of dress," he once wrote to the French ambassador to Russia. Mlle. Avillion, an attendant of Josephine, says:

"It was a most extraordinary thing for us to see the man whose head was filled with such vast affairs enter into the most minute details of the female toilet, and of what dresses, what robes and what jewels the empress should wear on such and such an occasion. One day he dabbed his dress with ink because he did not like it and wanted her to put on another. Whenever he looked into her wardrobe he was sure to throw everything topsy-turvy."

On the occasion of his marriage with Maria Louise he went out of his way to make a lady of the court, saying to her rudely: "This is the same gown you wore the day before yesterday! What's the meaning of this, madame? This is not right, madame."

"He was unable to endure the domination even of his own institutions," says Mme. de Remusat, who lived so long as the companion of Josephine that she became a part of the household and court.

"All about him suffered from ennui. He did so himself and frequently complained of the fact, resenting to others the dull and constrained silence which was in reality imposed by him. I have heard him say: 'It is a singular thing I have brought together a lot of people to amuse themselves. I have arranged every sort of pleasure for them, and here they are with long faces, looking tired.'"

"That," replied Talleyrand, is because pleasure cannot be summoned by the beat of the drum, and here, just as when you are with the army, you always seem to say to us all, 'Come, ladies and gentlemen, forward, march!'"

When the court was at Fontainebleau, thirty-seven miles from Paris, Napoleon insisted upon having two plays a week in the palace theater. Only the best actors of the Comédie Française at Paris performed in these plays, and the emperor personally supervised the entire arrangements, sometimes demanding another play and other actors on the morning of the day the piece was to be acted. "I wish it to be so. It is your business to find the means," he would say to the grand chamberlain, M. de Remusat, who was the director of court theatricals. Then messengers would be dispatched posthaste for the requisite "property" and persons, the whole day passing in excitement and suspense for the principals involved. Finally, after infinite trouble and worry on all sides, the play would be produced, and Napoleon, sitting preoccupied in his box, would fall into a reverie or go to sleep. Said Talleyrand to M. de Remusat, "ours is an impossible task—amusing the Unamusable."

"If anybody had been conscious of real superiority of any kind he must needs have endeavored to hide it, and it is probable that, warned by a sense of danger, everybody affected dullness or vacuity when those qualities were not real."

"I occasionally heard him speak of Mme. de Stael. The hatred he bore her was, undoubtedly, founded in some degree upon that jealousy with which he was inspired by any superiority which he could not control, and his words were often characterized by a bitterness which elevated her in spite of himself and lowered him in the estimation of those who listened to him."

Cheap ridicule made Napoleon wine, and cheap flattery was not wanted on him. He rebuked his minister of police for not suppressing the witty sayings and contemptuous remarks current in Paris and aimed at him, which circulated in camp through the mail.


"He loved praise from no matter what lips, and more than once he was duped by it," says Mme. de Remusat. "There were men who had influence over him because their compliments were inexhaustible. Unfailing admiration, no matter how foolishly expressed, never failed to please him."

He delighted in making kings wait his pleasure in the antechamber and at St. Helena kept up a petty court, with the people stiffly posing before him as they stood in the presence of a monarch on the throne.

GEORGE L. KILMER.

Next week's letter will deal with Napoleon as a tireless worker.

HEAD OF COMBINE.



J. OGDEN ARMOUR.

J. Ogden Armour, the head of the great packing house of Armour & Co., is also the leader of the packing house interests arrayed against Mr. Armour is a fighter and the strike in progress is apt to rival the great coal strike in its length and bitterness.

Brutally Tortured.

A case came to light that for persistent and unmerciful torture has perhaps never been equaled. Joe Golobick of Colusa, Calif., writes: "For 15 years I endured insufferable pain from Rheumatism and nothing relieved me though I tried everything known. I came across Electric Bitters and it's the greatest medicine on earth for that trouble. A few bottles of it completely relieved and cured me. It is good for Liver and Kidney troubles and general debility. Only 50c. Satisfaction guaranteed by Z. C. M. I. Drug Store."

FRAISSOULT'S PLUCK.

"At Tangier," said a Chiboguan, "I saw Fraissoult. He looked as magnificent as an Indian rajah, and a Frenchman told me that he had a foolhardy reckless valor."

"This Frenchman said that Fraissoult had entered the shooting gallery of Tangier one day while a Tunisian was trying a little pistol practice."

"The Tunisian was an excellent shot. He broke glass balls, rang bells, split pipe stems, and penetrated bull's eyes without number. At each shot a polite murmur of applause arose. The man was all puffed up with triumph."

"Fraissoult looked on with a sneer, and finally he said in a loud voice: 'In a duel this gentleman wouldn't shoot so well.'"

"We'll see about that," yelled the Tunisian, and he challenged Fraissoult, and ten minutes later they were on the field.

Each to fire one shot. Louis were drawn as to who should shoot first, and Fraissoult lost. He took his stand before the Tunisian calmly, and the latter lifted up his weapon, took careful aim, and fired.

"Fraissoult smiled. 'What did I tell you,' he said. 'And he thrust his pistol in his belt, and strode away humming a French song.'"

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