

SAMPSON VERSUS SCHLEY

A PLAIN STATEMENT OF THE CASE.




TO UNDERSTAND correctly the origin of the famous dispute between Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley, of the American navy, it is absolutely necessary that the environment of the two men prior to the Spanish-American war, and their personal and mental characteristics should be well understood. When these are understood, it can be appreciated why the board of inquiry, which met at Washington Sept. 12, will ultimately have a decision to make certain years ago. This board of inquiry will be composed of Admiral Dewey, Rear Admiral Kimberly, and one other member not yet selected. The prosecutor will be Captain Lewis, judge advocate of the navy, counsel for the defense, probably Mr. M. Wilson.

Since the close of the civil war in 1865, or rather the end of the famous naval attack on Fort Fisher, there has been slowly developing in the national navy two classes of advocates or theories. Various titles have been applied to these classes, but the two which seem to apply the best are those of "sea-dogs" and "tacticians." The first class has been composed of naval officers who prefer sea to land duty; who will meet the exigencies of battle as well as sound judgment and coolness on the part of the commanding officer, who believe naval power is for the action and not for inaction, and who think the English course the right one—shoot first and explain afterward. Paul Jones, Truxton, Sterrett, and others were of this stamp. Schley, Dewey, Robley D. Evans, Clark have been so classified. The "sea-dog" class is popularly supposed to be composed of those who know much more of fighting than politics.

The second class has been made up of naval instructors, officers long on land duty, and students. It has been given the name of "tacticians" because of the last 50 years; that is, extending attacks or making defenses on paper, and demonstrating theoretically



REAR-ADMIRAL KIMBERLY, RETIRED.



REAR-ADMIRAL BENHAM, RETIRED.

It was perhaps the irony of fate or something else equally unexplainable that on the morning of July 3, 1898, Admiral Schley should have been the ranking officer of the fleet at the moment when the first Spanish vessel poked her nose out of Santiago harbor and started on the dash for freedom.

When the Spanish fleet came out the flagship New York, having Admiral Sampson on board, was four miles east of her blockading station and seven miles from the harbor entrance. The New York was steaming rapidly for Siboney, where Admiral Sampson was to have a conference with General Shafter. The Indiana was at her blockading station, to the east of the harbor and a mile and a half from land. The Oregon, Iowa, Texas and Brooklyn were two miles from shore and west of the harbor. The Gloucester was just east of the harbor entrance.

The Spanish vessels came out at a speed ranging from eight to ten knots an hour, the Maria Teresa leading. They began firing as soon as they sighted the American vessels. As their course was directed they were most directly headed for where the Brooklyn, with Admiral Schley on board, lay, and as Admiral Cervera afterward stated, they intended to sink the Brooklyn if possible.

The Brooklyn and the Iowa were the first two American vessels to discover the oncoming of the Spanish fleet. The Brooklyn lay west of the Texas. Her first move after starting to engage the Spanish vessels was to describe a loop from left to right, which loop enabled her to use her guns on both sides and which also returned her to her original position and on a parallel course with the one taken by the Spaniards during their flight.

It has been claimed that Admiral Schley in taking this loop exposed the Texas to great danger of being rammed by him, that he told his own captain and the navigator of his vessel that the Texas must take care of herself when his attention was called to her danger, and that, tactically at least, it was a dangerous and uncalculated proceeding.

This may be true. It does not, however, account for the fact that the Brooklyn was hit oftener than any other American vessel, that she suffered the only loss of life that she was

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ACCUSED ADMIRAL AND ALL THE PRINCIPALS IN THE BIG WORLD-FAMED NAVAL TRIAL.

The case of Rear Admiral Schley bids fair to become the most celebrated of its kind in military or naval history. The whole world is breathlessly watching the movements of the court of inquiry appointed to investigate the charges made against the naval officer. The above picture of Schley is his very latest. Above will also be found portraits of Admiral Dewey, president of the court; Admirals Benham and Kimberly, members of the court; Edgar S. Maclay, Schley's denouncer, and Admiral Sampson, Schley's chief opposing witness.


SECRETARY ROOT ON INSPECTION TOUR.



SECRETARY OF WAR ELIHU ROOT AT HIS DESK IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

Elihu Root, the indefatigable Secretary of War, is spending his vacation at the same time performing an important duty in making a thorough inspection of Western forts.

EXPERT EXAMINING BIG BRIDGE.



Edwin Duryea, Jr., the nationally famous civil engineer has been retained by New York District Attorney to make a thorough examination of the Brooklyn bridge. Should he report that in his opinion negligence was the cause of the recent alarming break in the structure, legal measures will be immediately brought against the bridge officials.

AT THE HEAD OF THE NAVY IN ATLANTIC WATERS.

There the first trouble in the Sampson-Schley controversy started. The naval cabal, or clique, in Washington, fully as strong as the army cabal, allied itself with the administration, in the position that the advancement of Captain Sampson at a moment of great peril to the country was a recognition of the "tactician" class of officers. Offense was taken by the "sea dog" class of which Captain Schley was a typical member. The sinking of the Maine and the failure of this nation to instantly attack Havana from the sea had more or less angered the men of the navy who believed less in diplomacy and more in fighting, who felt that Washington, with its cabals, rumors and politics, could not appreciate a situation one-half as well as a commander on a quarter deck at sea and lying the Stars and Stripes.

The "sea dog" men of the navy took the selection of Captain Sampson for their superior as a direct political slap at themselves; an intimation that no matter how many years a man remained at sea, nor how many battles he fought, he could be deprived of his honors at any time by a landman who had political influence. Of course the "tacticians" resented this sort of talk, but long before Cervera sailed for Cuba a wide breach had opened in the national navy—a navy breach, broadened every day by gossip, recriminations, petty jealousies and all the other bad things that go with human nature. It should be written in justice to both Captains Sampson and Schley that at this time neither of them personally appeared to have engaged in the squabble.

Captain Schley was of southern birth, of gentle blood and fighting stock. He was a favorite son of Maryland, an impulsive, generous man and a born commander. By nature he is dominant, even at times to brutality. He is a fierce opponent of shams, hypocrisy and false pretensions. He is a fighter and not a student; a much stronger believer in national dignity than the average congressman, and a good tactician. It was a physical impossibility for Captain Sampson and Schley to ever be personal friends. Discreet and wise superiors would never have brought them into as close conjunction as they were in the spring and summer of 1898, there was another source of trouble.

The declaration of the war with Spain did not come until April 25th, but prior to that time the navy department assembled two squadrons for active naval duty—one called the Key West squadron, having for its purpose the blockading of Havana, and the other a flying squadron. The first was commanded by Sampson and the second by Schley. Neither squadron entered upon active duty until after the declaration of war, nor in reality until after May 1, when Dewey's victory far east was known.

On May 2nd the Key West squadron sailed for Cuba under command of Rear Admiral Sampson. Following this was the naval fighting at Cardenas, the bombardment of San Juan by Sampson. On May 13th the navy department received word that the Spanish squadron of Admiral Cervera was west of Matanzas, the windward islands. Later Sampson was advised that it was off Curacao. He was ordered to proceed to Key West at once, to which point Schley's flying squadron had also been ordered. Both squadrons reached Key West, coasted, and awaited orders.

The flying squadron, under Schley, was the first to be ordered out. Commanded by Schley, it was directed to proceed to Cienfuegos, a Cuban port near Havana, and to blockade the same. The Spanish squadron was supposed to be headed for that port, and Schley was clearly intended to intercept it. So confident was Washington that he would find Cervera at Cienfuegos that the Iowa, Carolina and the collier Merrimac were sent to join him there after he had left his battleships on their course.

But after he had left Key West the navy department was informed that Cervera was at Santiago and advised Sampson to instruct Schley. The Merrimac was sent to Schley advising him that the Spanish squadron was probably at Santiago, and directing him, if he were satisfied that it was there, to proceed to proceed with all dispatch to Santiago, and upon arrival there to establish communications with some of the inhabitants and ascertain definitely whether the ships were in

port or not. Schley received these dispatches May 23rd.

According to the official records at Washington on May 23rd Sampson received advice from Key West that Cervera was at Santiago on May 21. Sampson, therefore, on May 23rd left off his Havana blockade and sailed for St. Nicholas Channel, intending to occupy that in such a manner as to prevent the approach of the Spanish squadron in that direction. There he received information on the 24th that Cervera was still at Santiago.

On May 26th he heard from Schley to the effect that the latter was not satisfied that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos harbor, and that he would therefore remain off that port. The Wasp was sent on the 27th to Schley and from Sampson advising him that daily confidential reports stated that Cervera had been in Santiago from May 18th to May 25th. He was ordered to proceed to that port at once.

Before Schley could reply to these orders two dispatches from him to Sampson, dated May 25th were received by the latter. Schley stated in these that Cervera was not there, and that he would at once go eastward, but that the account of short coal supply in his ships he could not blockade the Spanish squadron if it was at Santiago, but would proceed to the vicinity of the Mole St. Nicholas, on the western coast of Haiti, from which point he would communicate.

Sampson, on learning this, put in to Key West for coal himself, but before doing so he sent a dispatch to Schley to "remain on the blockade at Santiago at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are at that port." Sampson arrived at Key West on May 28th, and then cabled Schley to ascertain definitely if Cervera was at Santiago.

In the meantime Schley left Cienfuegos on the evening of the 24th, and on the 26th was within twenty miles of Santiago, where the squadron stopped for repairs to the Merrimac. That night he signalled the squadrons: "Destination, Key West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan channel, as soon as collier is ready. Speed nine knots."

The squadron was under way by 9 o'clock and steamed two hours, when it was compelled to stop and make repairs on the Yale. The next morning Schley was met by a dispatch boat and given the dispatch from the secretary of the navy.

"All department's information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The department looks to you to ascertain the facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that there are landing places five or six nautical miles west from the mouth of the harbor, and that there insurgents will be found and not Spaniards. From the surrounding heights one can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained notify department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron and also the Harvard coal from the Merrimac leave off Cape Cruz, Gonaves channel, or Mole Haiti? The department will send coal immediately to Mole. Report without delay situation at Santiago de Cuba."

Here arises the first great query of the opponents of Admiral Schley as to the wisdom of his course after the receipt of this dispatch. He was in bad shape for coal, his squadron was not in the best of condition. His opponents say he should have obeyed orders even if he lost every vessel he had. He contends that the safety of his squadron was his first consideration, and that a commander at sea must necessarily know better what he ought to do than a bureau chief on dry land at Washington.

However this may be, he sent this message to Washington: "Merrimac engines disabled; sea is heavy; am obliged to tow to Key West. Have been absolutely unable to coal the Texas, Marlborough, Vixen, Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key West. Cannot remain off Santiago in present state squadron coal account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz. Much to be regretted cannot obey orders of department. Have striven earnestly to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot ascertain anything re-

specting enemy positive. Very difficult to tow collier, to get cable to hold."

Schley steamed westward that day toward Key West until a calm sea being reached he signalled the flying squadron to stop, and the Texas and Marlborough were coaled from the Merrimac. At this time Schley was forty miles southward and westward from Santiago. He remained there until the afternoon of the 25th, when he gave the signal to return to Santiago. On the morning of the 26th he sighted the Cristobal Colon in the mouth of Santiago harbor and cabled Washington that Cervera was "bottled up." On May 31 he exchanged fire with the ships inside the harbor. June 1 he was joined by Admiral Sampson, and the blockade of the port commenced and did not end until the destruction of the Spanish fleet on July 3.

The charge that Admiral Schley disobeyed orders after leaving Cienfuegos in not going direct to Santiago, has been hotly pressed by his opponents. His official report as to his actions at that time states:

"On the 23rd the Hawk arrived with dispatches from Admiral Sampson, directing me to move eastward with the squadron to Santiago, if satisfied that the enemy's vessels were not in Cienfuegos. Not being satisfied at this time that they were not there, I held my position, being further strengthened in my opinion by the fact that I was informed by the captain of the British steamer Adula that when he left Kingston a cablegram had been received on the Thursday preceding my arrival off Cienfuegos, stating that the Spanish squadron had sailed from Santiago."

The admiral then continues, after relating how he ascertained that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, detailing his run to Santiago:

"The run to Santiago was marked by rain and rough weather. On arriving off Santiago the collier Merrimac was disabled by the breaking of her intermediate pressure valve stem and the cracking of the stuffing box. This served as a further embarrassment to the squadron and a source of considerable anxiety. With the weather conditions that had prevailed since leaving Cienfuegos, it appeared absolutely necessary to abandon the position off Santiago and seek a place where the vessels could be coaled and the collier's machinery repaired."

"Off Santiago the St. Paul, Yale and Minneapolis were sighted and communicated with. Arrangements were at once made whereby the Yale was to tow the collier, and as the possibility did not seem favorable for replenishing the meager coal supply of the other vessels the squadron stood to the westward towing the collier. After standing to the westward for about three hours or about twenty-five miles the conditions became less unfavorable and the squadron stopped."


"He coaled after stopping, and adds: "Inasmuch as it was known that in case the Spanish squadron had reached Santiago Admiral Sampson was able to block any movement of the enemy through the Bahama channel, my intention in standing to the westward was, should it become necessary, to bar effort of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the Yucatan passage."

The department at Washington did not accept the explanation, nor has it ever. Schley was not interfered with in his command, but he was given to understand that his delay at Cienfuegos was unaccountable, that his leaving Santiago after once arriving there was strange, and that his failure to turn back until he was not ready to was a practical disobedience of orders.

His critics were busy at Washington and elsewhere while he remained off Santiago. They found fresh material for attack when, on May 31, with the Massachusetts, Iowa and New Orleans, he engaged the Colon in the entrance to the harbor and the shore batteries. The engagement lasted about an hour, with the loss of eight men on the Reina Mercedes and no damage to the American vessels. Schley asserted that this was but a reconnaissance, but Washington asked why the Colon was not destroyed.

Admiral Schley was very much in disfavor at Washington all during the month of June and throughout the blockading of Cervera at Santiago. Admiral Sampson was in charge of the blockade, and devised all the plans for it, and gave the orders indicating how the vessels should act in the event of Cervera's coming out.

COLONEL HARVEY MAY TRY AGAIN.



Col. Geo. B. M. Harvey, manager of Harper's Publishing House, who almost attained the glory of leading the big steel strike, may be selected by Morgan a second time to represent him in peace overtures.

IS WU TING FANG RECALLED?



WU TING FANG. CHINESE MINISTER.

A rumor is current that Minister Wu Ting Fang has been or is shortly about to be recalled. Minister Wu says the information is news to him.