"THE GOLDEN ERA."

In your "Golden Era" editorial some time since, you say, "There is no longer any question in the minds of the carefully thoughtful, that silver is doomed to comparative disuse, except for articles of utility or ornament."

From this opinion I beg to dissent. It is true that the goldites have for several hundred years tried by every effort, fair and unfair, legally or illegally, to keep the white metal in the list of merchantable commodities and out of circulation as a measure of values, and they are still engaged in the destructive work, not only in foreign countries, but here in the United States as well; that they will finally succeed in the work so persistently engaged in I cannot believe, at least while I retain confidence in the good sense, honesty, patriotism and loyalty to the constitution of the American people.

Here, under our constitution, gold and silver are recognized as money, and from the beginning have been treated as such, until 1873, when, under the baneful influence of dishonest lobbyists, the members of Congress passed an act by which silver was debased, and became merely like wheat and corn and other articles of trade, a commodity to be dealt in by brokers and bankers. One of the many duties devolving on the Congress of the United States is, that it shall by law provide some instrument which shall serve as a measure of values. The Constitution gives to Congress the power "To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin," and further, it has the power "to make all laws *necessary* and *proper* for carrying into execution the foregoing power."

As a measure of values is *necessary* in order to carry on the government, it therefore becomes the *duty* of Congress to "*coin* money and regulate the value thereof." This duty was recognized and provided for by Congress at a session in 1792—more than a hundred years ago—by the law establishing a mint at Philadelphia, and authorizing the coinage there of *gold and silver* into money. Since the first coinage by the mint—which occurred about the first of January, 1795—both gold and silver money have been constitutional as well as legal money, until the white metal was debased in 1873 by an act of Congress; this act was in the nature of rebellion, as well as a crime not only against the Constitution, but against its victims, the people of the United States, and was doubtless prompted by the money sharks who aim to control the country.

The sons of Israel who, instead of murdering their young brother Joseph, put him in a pit and finally sold him to the Ishmaelites for twenty pieces of silver, were somewhat different from the modern money grabbers; they were content to receive silver in payment for human flesh and blood, but these must have contracts payable in "gold coin." These have gotten their brethren—the people—in a pit, and they can only be released by the payment of gold to the modern Shylocks.

No proposition, I take it, can be more self-evident than the fact that the price of a commodity is regulated by the supply and demand for it. In all countries where commerce exists, prices and labor are high when money is abundant, and low in its absence or when it is scarce.

Looking at the vast increase in population; of the great increase of business growing out of such increase in population of the United States, and in view of the fact that such increase of population and business of the country demanded an increase in the amount of money in circulation, it is wonderful beyond conception that the representatives of the people should enact a law which, in its effects, was bound to diminish the amount of money, at a time, too, when it should have been increased rather than diminished.

The situation in this country is such that something must be done, or some day, unless silver shall be remonetized the situation will become deplorable and a financial revolution will ensue—and that day may not be very distant.

There are several things that might be done to avert the threatened calamity, but the most desirable and important thing to do is the free coinage of silver, unlimited in amount; but such silver only as shall be presented by the owner for coinage. The government ought not to buy, but merely coin and make legal tenders of gold and silver.

If it should happen that owners of such bullion would not or could not offer for coinage sufficient in amount to furnish adequate money for circulation, then the deficit should be supplied by the issue of government paper, greenbacks if you please to call them, not based upon deposits of bullion, but upon the faith of the greatest republic on earth. Yours, etc.,

HADLEY D. JOHNSON.

VARIAN'S BLOOD IS UP.

U. S. District Attorney Varian has addressed the following letter to the Ogden *Standard*:

SALT LAKE CITY, Feb. 3, 1893.

Editor the *Standard*.—In your issue of last Sunday, you devote much space to the matter of application for the pardon of Malachi Dillon, and incidentally connected therewith you furnish some information from the governor's office concerning pardons heretofore granted to offenders convicted in the Ogden district. There seems to be an organized and systematic effort to create a public sentiment in the Dillon case, to afford an apparent justification, I presume, for his pardon.

But it is not with the purpose of discussing the merits of this application that I address you on the general question involved, but to direct attention to the abuses prejudicial to the administration of justice, which result from the unrestrained use of pardoning power in this Territory? Laws are designed to regulate human conduct and to restrain the evil actions of men. Courts are created for the purpose of passing upon and determining all questions involving life, liberty and property. The rules prescribed for the determination of the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime, if not absolutely just in all particulars, are specially designed for the protection of the accused. Twelve men of a grand jury of fifteen must concur in finding an indictment. Twelve men of a trial jury of twelve must unite in finding a verdict of guilty, and each one of the twelve must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt. The verdict must then pass the inspection of the presiding judge, who is called upon to review, not only the rulings of law made during the trial, but upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. The case may then be reviewed in the supreme court. As a general rule it is safe to assume that a verdict of guilty, which shall be approved by the judges, is right and ought to stand. Upon this conviction the law itself pronounces the judgment and fixes the penalty—generally within certain limits. Under our system it was not intended that the executive, in whom is vested the power to pardon, should sit as a court of errors and appeal and review verdicts of juries or revise the judgments of courts. Nor is this great and sacred prerogative a personal one. It is a great personal trust, which should be regulated by fixed standards and governed in its application by general rules. Where a conviction is had, guilt is to be assumed, and, except in exceptional and striking cases where subsequent events demonstrate the mistake of the jury and the innocence of the accused, the pardoning power should not interfere on *this* ground. Nor, when the judgment of the law fixing the punishment is once given, should this great prerogative be invoked, except, perhaps, in cases where the severity of the punishment is so pronounced as to carry a conviction of injustice. I am speaking now, of course, of the ordinary crimes which disturb society, and not of offenses in the commission of which whole communities are concerned, and in the disposition of which other considerations are involved. It is within these lines generally, I apprehend, that the pardoning power should be exercised; the welfare of the community and the safety of society demand it. It is not perceived that petitions or requests of citizens, however exalted their stations may be, should change the application of these rules. The request of governors of other states, or of distinguished citizens of this Territory, do not change the fact that the man was guilty of violations of our laws; nor should the recommendation of jurors prevail, except in cases within the limitations hereinbefore stated. The finding of the juror upon his oath that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be outweighed by his subsequent statement or request given at the solicitation of the interested party.

It is time that the community should be aroused to a just appreciation of a necessity for the certain enforcement of the laws. No man should request the governor to pardon a convict unless he has a good substantial reason for so doing; if he does he is unjust to the governor and unjust to the community. Eighty-one pardons of territorial offenders have been granted since July 4, 1859. Many of them upon *ex parte* hearings and without the knowledge of the prosecuting officers. In some of these cases imposition was practiced upon the governor. In others the reasons were doubtless all sufficient. But in many it is probable a different result would