

we therefore do prohibit and firmly enjoin you and each of you that you do absolutely desist and refrain from any further proceedings in the premises until the further order of this court, and that you show cause on the second day of September, A. D. 1892, at 10 o'clock a.m. of said day, why you should not be absolutely restrained from any further proceedings in the premises.

Witness the Hon. F. J. Anderson, Judge, and seal of the district court of the Third Judicial District in and for the Territory of Utah, this 10th day of August, A. D. 1892.

HENRY G. McMILLAN, Clerk.

Per G. D. Loomis, Deputy Clerk.
TERRITORY OF UTAH,
County of Salt Lake, } ss.

I, Henry G. McMILLAN, Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Utah Territory, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original alternative writ of prohibition ordered by the court in the action therein entitled, filed in my office.

Witness my hand and the seal of said court, at Salt Lake City, this 10th day of August, A. D. 1892.

HENRY G. McMILLAN, Clerk.

Per Geo. D. Loomis, Deputy Clerk.

By this movement Kesler secures his place and pay for a few weeks longer. Powers' legal manoeuvres postpone eviction still further. But the event is inevitable and cannot be put off very long if the Council takes the proper course and is ably represented before the court.

The position from which the Council desires to remove Kesler is simply a place to which he has been "designated." It is not the office of Justice of the Peace to which he was elected last February, but a post to which he was assigned by resolution of the Council in April. The power of the Council to remove him can scarcely be questioned. The laws of 1888, section 1755, par. 87, provide that the City Council shall have power

"To appoint police and watchmen and to define their powers and duties, and to remove all officers of the city for misconduct, and to provide for filling such vacancies as may occur in any elective office, and to create any office that may be deemed necessary for the good government of the city; to regulate and prescribe the powers, duties and compensation of all officers of the city not herein provided for."

This evidently includes the power to remove elective as well as appointive officers, and to fill the vacancies occasioned by such removal. So that the Council may remove Kesler altogether. And if the resolution of censure passed upon him is just, he ought to be turned out forthwith. But the removal contemplated in the resolution which cannot now be carried into effect before a judicial hearing is had, simply relates to the place to which he was designated by the Council and from which that body can eject him when necessary. He was not "designated" for two years nor for any definite term. The only question of any real importance in this connection is, what is the legal mode of removal of a city officer?

The course taken in Kesler's case was this: The Mayor after hearing the evidence against the officers whom he removed, stated his lack of power to deal with others whom he thought were implicated, one of whom was City Justice Kesler. His case was re-

ferred to the Committee on Police. An investigation was had at which Kesler was permitted to appear and make his own defence. The Committee reported that there was "no excuse for his conduct" on the occasion which they had investigated, and that it was against the dignity of his position and open to censure. The Council adopted the report, and a resolution displacing him from the post to which he was assigned but not removing him from the office to which he was elected, was presented and held over for a week.

The attorney for Kesler evidently bases his case on a provision in Section Nine of the charter of 1860, which provides that "no officer shall be removed except for cause nor unless furnished with the charges; and shall have an opportunity of being heard in his defence," etc., and that a vote of two-thirds of the Council shall be necessary. But these provisions relate to "every person elected or appointed to any office under the provisions of this act." Kesler was not elected or appointed under the provisions of that act. All its provisions in relation to Justices of the Peace for the city were repealed as long ago as 1872. Since then new laws have been passed in relation to those officers and, as we have shown, the laws of 1888 give power to the City Council "to remove all officers of the city for misconduct." The mode of procedure is not given and the court will probably decide whether the Council has taken legal action in the matter.

The truth is the course of Kesler in holding on to his place is what is vulgarly called "a game of bluff." Does he want his conduct openly ventilated and his record exposed? Hardly. But he thinks he can scare off the members of the Council who detected him on the night of June 17, 1892, by implications against them. It will be seen whether they have backbone enough to do their duty and defy his insinuations. If they back down now they will be viewed by the public with suspicion and no matter how undeserved it may be, shrinking will turn to their injury.

Kesler was not a fit person for the office to which he was elected. The Council made a great blunder in appointing him Police Justice. There ought not to be another case taken before him. As soon as possible he should be removed from office entirely. His reputation and record demand this. The Council is expected to do its duty.

THE GREAT CURE.

A FRIEND wishes to know whether we think there is any feasible means of adjustment for the prevalent social disturbances—in the form of strikes, lock-outs, boycotts and their violent concomitants—and if we do, what our idea of the remedy is.

We believe there is an effective cure for every human wrong, but that the condition of the race bars its application. The essence of the remedy is genuine Christianity. What there is of that in the world is mostly spurious, being made up of pretension, unsupported by practice, and even the profession of religion is on the wane. History teaches this lesson, if it teaches anything: That in the absence of religion

morality rapidly disappears, and without morality justice takes a back seat. In the absence of justice peace is impossible.

Speaking as a whole, the world presents the aspect of a reign of selfishness. This is exhibited in every walk of life, each individual and aggregation of people, from the smallest combination to the structure of a nation, is striving, struggling and fighting for advancement over all others. The fact is that the world-speaking specially of the more civilized portions of it—is unchristian and rapidly growing more so. Hence a cure of the commotions that are afflicting the race is impossible until that situation is changed.

The essence of genuine Christianity is self-denial. "Love thy neighbor as thyself," and "Esteem thy brother above thyself." The opposite of this is embodied in an expression once used by a gentleman when testifying as a witness in one of the courts of Utah—"Of all my mother's sons I love myself the best." It needs no argument to show that if the rule among men was to seek the welfare of others rather than their own, or to labor for the general weal, conflicts would be impossible. Those whose interest is being enhanced by the actions of their neighbors have no cause to quarrel with the latter for thus contributing to their well-being. And until this disposition exists in men a millennium or era of peace is impossible.

As a matter of course, a pacific disposition is not all that is required, as ignorance as well as selfishness leads to conflict, because blunders grow out of misunderstanding. Light and sympathy combined will accomplish wonders in correcting the evils afflicting humanity. And these are embraced in genuine religion, which not only includes the love of God—which embodies the love of humanity—but also true education.

We recognize the fact that sentimental religion alone will not effect a cure of human ills. There must be regulations adjusting the relationships of the people. But intelligence and the love of God cannot be separated from the conditions and regulations necessary for the preservation of the social equilibrium of the world.

The Lord, in the early rise of the Church, revealed, in part, a system by which the Saints could work harmoniously in their temporal or business affairs. It involved the principle of co-operation, so systematized that all could labor for the benefit of the whole. A beginning was made, but the outcome was the dissolution of the organization, the cause of this result being that those associated with it were not sufficiently advanced in the understanding and practice of self-denial. Without this constituent its operation is impracticable. It might be asked why the Lord began to reveal the system under what appeared to be inopportune conditions. The answer is plain: Had He not done so the attention of the Saints would not have been forcibly directed toward the subject in a practical way. It was necessary as an educational effort, to prepare the people to accept and live according to the system when they shall be morally ready for it. They