

leading. In this case, however, it cannot but be felt that the suggestions made command thoughtful consideration. People here have, years ago, been led to look forward to just such an eventuality as that by the president of the British association stated to be a near possibility. To them the announcement seems like an echo of a prophecy. It suggests that while science is busy finding a remedy, proper preparations should be made in years of bounty to meet an emergency.

COST OF THE WAR.

The cost of the Spanish-American war is a subject which has been receiving no little attention of late, albeit in one sense such expenses are still running on. Granted that the war proper has concluded, it still remains that an immense military and naval establishment is being maintained as an outgrowth of the struggle. Even when confined to the period of actual hostilities, it does not seem practicable to compile a statement of expenses that would be more than approximately correct. There was continual destruction as well as consumption and loss that cannot all have been located and figured in; and the conquests and prizes of all kinds should of course appear in the opposite column as so much of an offset to the expenditures.

An article appeared in a recent number of McClure's Magazine from the pen of F. A. Vanderlip, assistant secretary of the treasury, in which he says the cost of war is not merely to be reckoned by the loss of men and the expenditure of money. We must consider also the less apparent but greater loss which is represented by the destruction of capital. It is comparatively easy, when the strife is over and the accounts are rendered, to determine with some degree of accuracy the loss of life and the outlay of treasure. The Spanish-American war was begun with an appropriation of \$50,000,000. On the day the appropriation was made the treasury held as an available cash balance the sum of \$224,541,637, of which \$168,863,179 was in gold. The President at once proceeded to distribute to the several executive departments such portions of the appropriation as he deemed were required by the necessities of their services. The allotments thus made were as follows: Navy department, \$29,973,274.22; war department, \$19,811,647.95; treasury department, \$55,000; and state department, \$53,860.80; a total of \$49,893,783.06, leaving \$106,216,94 unallotted.

The writer then proceeds with an exhaustive review of the items of each case, arranging them systematically and handily. He shows in conclusion that the actual treasury outlay was not more than \$361,000,000, but admits there are other items that may properly be charged up as a war expense, among them some \$10,000,000 incurred by the states. The actual expense per diem is put at an average of \$860,000.

WHAT WILL THE HARVEST BE?

Paradoxical as it may appear, it is possible for a man or men to be quite conspicuous and yet obscure. Take the Spanish-American peace commission for example. Here we have a body of distinguished people, ten of them, upon whom the eyes of the civilized world are more intently fixed than upon any other aggregation or any person at the present time; and yet they are but little seen and where they are now are perhaps unnoticed when seen unless they should appear en masse, which must necessarily be very seldom. But as suggested, attention from the four quarters of the globe is turned their way with interest everywhere, anxiety in places. The question that is upper-

most in most minds regarding the commission is that which forms the heading of this article.

The chief question, perhaps the only one since the others seem to have been tacitly if not directly assented to is that of the disposition of the Philippine Islands. This involves some international issues which are by no means one-sided or easy of adjustment. By virtue of conquest only, and this conquest not an object at first but purely an incident of the war, the United States is in actual possession of Manila and its surroundings and in constructive possession of the entire archipelago. Now come the other parties to the transaction and plead several things in opposition to such possession so acquired amounting to a title. They are by no means destitute of authority to bolster up their cause nor of ability to present it. Which has the stronger position and which will make the better showing? These are the things regarding which the world generally and the United States and Spain particularly are taking so much concern.

Our nine points of law may perhaps be dissipated in favor of the other people's one, as relates to some of the islands, but at the present juncture such a turning of the tide of events seems highly improbable. It is not very consequential that the Americans did not set out to carry on war in Asiatic waters. Neither did they expect to capture one of the Ladroneas, nor to bottle up and finally demolish Cervera, nor to gather in Porto Rico, nor many other things that might be named that came our way and had to receive attention. It ought to be known where it is not that wars inevitably drift from the original designs as to details; that these cannot always, if at all, be foreseen but are not necessarily the less consequential on that account. The likening of a war to a game of chess is, in a vague sort of way, a happy one. Each side expects to win from the other and has similar means to do it with. The general characteristics of the playing and the outcome are all that are, all that can be determined upon with anything like accuracy. The moves, the routine, the detail of the game depend upon unfoldings, developments, opportunities, which may not be anticipated but which must be met and disposed of as effectively as though foreseen from the first. It is a work involving brains, foresight, prescience, patience, determination and skill, armies and navies in one case, mute but expressive figures in the other, being the agencies with which the playing is done.

The tocsin of war with Spain was no sooner sounded than it became apparent that instead of forcing Spain's hand we had allowed our own to be forced. We were in more or less confusion for a little while, or, to use that awkward coinage, in a state of "unpreparedness." It behooved us to look about us and beyond and locate places and circumstances where and by means of which the enemy could be struck at a disadvantage. Wherever his flag floated, wherever he exercised sovereignty, there were we at liberty to strike and destroy if he would not surrender without destruction, for he had received full notice through the formal declaration of war and the cessation of diplomatic relations. At this juncture the Providential circumstance of our having just previously sent a capable fleet in charge of a competent commander to look after American interests in Chinese waters, occurred to those in charge; also that the enemy held as his own an insular empire bordering on those waters, the gates to which possessions were guarded by a greater fleet in point of numbers at least. Now, if our ships could move

quietly over there and either capture or destroy the enemy's, it would not only utterly overthrow his prestige but be the means of weakening him financially and diplomatically while perhaps affording us a spoil of war greater than any we had ever counted on. This was decided on, the order was sent and Dewey was on his way to Manila between two Sundays. The reader knows the rest.

Undoubtedly this line of argument has been thought of by the United States commissioners and will be presented and pressed. If accepted, as it should be because in strict line with the articles of war, it is difficult to understand by what process of reason the Spanish can expect to get any more than what the Americans are willing to grant. If our people deem it inadvisable from whatever reason to make all the Philippines territory of the United States, of course they will let such portions as are not wanted go, not to please the opposition but to accommodate ourselves. On the other hand, if all that was played for and won shall be deemed ours already and that there is no sufficient reason shown why any part of the territory should be surrendered, there would seem to be but two things for Spain to do—resume fighting or abide by the legitimate results of the fighting she has already done. It is not difficult to determine in advance what she will do; the question is as to what our commissioners will do—all or a part of the Philippines?

VALUABLE ARCHAEOLOGICAL FIND.

Another tablet containing an account of the flood has been discovered, and the announcement is said to have aroused considerable interest in Biblical and archaeological circles. The date of the tablet is believed to be about the time of Abraham, and it is supposed to be a copy of an earlier account.

The following is from Public Opinion of September 29th:

"Father Scheil, a distinguished French Assyriologist, has been the happy discoverer of this valuable 'find,' the contents of which he made public at a meeting of the oriental congress in Paris. It is natural that a comparison of the first text of the flood found by George Smith on the famous tablet now in the British museum and the recent discovery of the new version of the flood-legend by the French explorer, should be made, and not, it appears, without advantage to the increasing credibility of the Pentateuchal record. Owing to the fragmentary and imperfect nature of the text, the French tablet, which consists of the left-hand portion of a table of eight columns, gives little fresh knowledge concerning the deluge. It would be more correct to describe it as an introduction to another version of the story of the flood, which may yet be buried.

"One of the differences from George Smith's tablet, for instance, is the mention of a swallow, and, on other even more important points, the recent discovered text on the Babylonian deluge represents the recension differing from that published by George Smith in the seventies. Apart, however, from the fact that Scheil's tablet as far as can be made out, bears a distinct resemblance to the more complete text deciphered by Smith over twenty years ago, particularly the patriarch, Pir-Napstlm, or the Babylonian Noah, appearing in both texts, as the favored of the God 'Aa,' who warns and instructs him to build a ship, yet the great value of Father Scheil's discovery is in the striking indication the time-worn and mutilated tablet supplies as to its date. Together with the inscriptions of the scribe's name, the date itself was fixed with trustworthy accuracy, about 2000 B. C. Mr. Pinches does not think it could be less than 2000 B. C., and might