

ment has dealt with the enemy generously. It has simply asked that peace and a stable government be established in Cuba. This demand Spain has refused to listen to and interpreted it as a declaration of war. After that there was no course left but to accept the inevitable.

The history of Europe furnishes many instances of war similar to this. The liberation of Greece in the beginning of this century was undertaken simply because the world was sick of the constant reports of massacres in the then Turkish provinces. The atrocities in the Balkan states later drew out the Russian forces in behalf of the sufferers and resulted almost in the overthrow of Turkish rule in Europe. Undoubtedly the more recent events in Armenia and Crete would have led to concerted action in behalf of the inhabitants there, had the European powers dared to act on the demands of public opinion without fear of incurring greater risks. Cuba is the American Crete and Armenia. The American people have undertaken to do for that island what Europe, in the judgment of the civilized world, ought to have done for the sufferers at her own door. That cause is just and must prevail.

THE WORK BEFORE US.

There appears to be difference of opinion as to whether the President of the United States has a right to send the National Guard outside the country. Congress has the power to provide for calling forth the militia "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." The cases in which the services of the militia can be required are specified under title XVI of the Revised Statutes as follows:

"Sec. 1642. Whenever the United States are invaded, or are in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, or of rebellion against the authority of the government of the United States, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the state or states most convenient to the place of danger or scene of action as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, or to suppress such rebellion, and to issue orders for that purpose to such officers of the militia as he may think proper.

"Sec. 1648. Whenever the President calls forth the militia of the states, to be employed in the service of the United States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service will be required, not exceeding nine months, and the militia so called shall be mustered in and continue to serve during the term so specified, unless sooner discharged by command of the President."

The work of freeing Cuba from Spanish rule will, therefore, devolve upon the regular army and the volunteers, and provided the latter be led by experienced officers the task should not be a very difficult one.

So far Spain's generals in Cuba have shown neither skill nor courage. For three years an inferior number of insurgents have had it mostly their own way. In no case have they been compelled to engage in a decisive battle. In the beginning of the conflict, armed mostly with the machete they depended for their success chiefly on the arms and ammunition they could capture from the enemy.

Speaking of this subject an exchange remarks:

"In the battle of Perales in July, 1895, Spain's most renowned general, Martinez Campos, at the head of 1,700 well-equipped regulars, failed to defeat Antonio Maceo, whose heterogeneous

bands scarcely numbered 900 men, with fire arms of all descriptions, from the almost unserviceable shotgun to the Remington rifle. In the battle of Saratoga, in June, 1896, which lasted three days, the Spanish General Jimenez Castellano, with large columns of infantry, cavalry and artillery, was only saved from annihilation at the hands of the soldiers of Maximo Gomez, by the opportune arrival of a relief force from Puerto Principe. Military writers of repute, while recognizing the merit of Gomez and Maceo's march upon the western provinces of Cuba, have declared that whatever the boldness, shrewdness and courage of the two rebel chiefs, their famous raid could never have been carried out but for the imbecility of the Spanish commanders. As all probably remember, Martinez Campos, who had at his disposal an army of 100,000 regular soldiers and nearly as many volunteers, and who had control of all the railway and steamship lines in the island, and who knew, as well as everybody else, what the itinerary of the insurgents would be, never succeeded in placing a column ahead of them in order to check their western march. It was a fact known to all that the invading rebel forces did not have munitions other than those which they managed to secure as they advanced, and thus it was evident that they would have been forced to go back to the east if Spanish columns had been stationed at certain places through which they would necessarily have to pass. Martinez Campos was well aware of this, and he constantly tried to bar the insurgents' passage; but his columns under Garcia Navarro, Oliver, Suarez Valdes and ten other minor generals always arrived at their destination when it was too late. Every attempt of the Spaniards to head off the invading insurgents was a failure."

It will be remembered that General Weyler, in order to crush Antonio Maceo, concentrated over 80,000 soldiers in the small province of Pinar del Rio. Small battles were fought for months and much blood flowed but not a single victory—not a decisive one at least—was gained over Maceo's bands. The trocha that was considered impassable was passed by the Cuban patriot, and but for treachery and assassination, he might yet have been found among the leaders of the insurgents. It is not known that there is in Cuba a single Spanish general with the talent and courage needed for the present emergency. General Blanco himself is said to be a complete wreck owing to dissipation in former years. Spain has, in fact, not had a general of note since the death of the duke of Alba.

It is not well to underrate the strength of an enemy, but on the other hand, the long warfare in Cuba is clear proof that Spain is a weak nation.

A MODERN NAVAL BATTLE.

Mr. Randolph H. Miner, for some years connected with the bureau of naval intelligence at Washington, has prepared a paper on the battle of the Yalu river, which is of considerable interest at this time. The author says the Chinese fleet consisted of twelve vessels and the Japanese of eleven. The largest Chinese ships were 7,430 tons displacement and the Japanese 4,277. The Chinese had five heavily armored ships while the Japanese had only one completely armored vessel. The advantage was, therefore, it would appear, on the Chinese side. The description of the terrible struggle is as follows:

"The battle was fought in general at ranges of from 2,000 to 3,000 meters.

The Japanese leading ships passed around the Chinese right flank and along their rear, followed at a short distance by the heavy coast defense ships. The Chinese were thrown into great confusion, their right wing being attacked on both sides by the whole Japanese fleet, while the left was out of action altogether. Admiral Ting's flagship (Chinese) headed for the enemy's center, both sides keeping up a hot fire.

"The Japanese had three slow ships, which, being left behind, broke boldly through the enemy's line and were very badly punished. In the meantime, the center and right wing of Admiral Ting's fleet continued in hot action; Admiral Ting was wounded twenty minutes after the action began in a peculiar manner. He was standing on the bridge, but refused to move after being warned that he was in a dangerous place. One of the large guns was trained under the bridge and the blast threw the admiral in the air and severely injured him.

"Two gunboats, which occupied the right of the Chinese line received the whole fire of the Japanese fleet, caught fire and went down with all their crews on board. A coast defense vessel, the King Yuen, at this time went down with all on board. She went down slowly, stern first, her bow rose out of the water, remained a minute and a half in that position, and then disappeared forever.

"A little later a beautiful protected cruiser, the Chin Yuen, of slightly greater tonnage than the Yorktown, was struck by an enfilading shot, which pierced the protective deck and bottom and she went down, bows first—screws revolving in the air.

"The Japanese flagship in the thick of the fight was roughly handled, her commander, first lieutenant and one hundred and twenty men being killed. One of the slow Japanese ships which passed through the enemy's line was set on fire; a shell exploded in the officers' quarters, killed two surgeons, several nurses and many men already wounded.

"An armed merchant steamer which was in the action on the side of the Japanese was early disabled, her steering gear knocked out and she was chased off the field by several Chinese ships. Falling darkness ended the battle, both sides withdrawing from the field. On the Chinese side five ships were lost with all on board and two others totally disabled. The Chinese flagship was hit by no fewer than two hundred projectiles, but her armor was not seriously damaged; the deepest dents were about three inches. Her upper deck was entirely destroyed by fire, but the engines were uninjured. Of the entire fleet only three escaped without serious injury and these ran away."

The most important lesson from this fight, Mr. Miner thinks, is the fact that modern warships are liable to injury from fire. Another is that torpedoes do not play the important part some have thought they would. Their mechanism is too intricate and the conditions for success are rather exceptional. Another lesson is the importance of the proper drill. The Japanese kept their formation during the entire action while their enemies soon lost their heads and went to work singly. And finally the lesson of the Yalu is that battles are not won by ships and guns but by "cool heads, trained hands, steady nerves and brave hearts."

THE CAUSE IS JUST.

There is some difference of opinion as to the justice of the cause of the Cuban insurrection. Many have been inclined to regard the rebels as bands of banditti not deserving the sympathy of the civilized nations. In view of this