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Show U. S. Awaits Russian Game at Foreign Ministers' Parley By BAUKIIAGE News Analyst and Commentator. WNU Service, lf!1 Eye Street.N.W., Washington, D. C. UNITED NATIONS, N. Y. Of course this dateline isn't official. But, since the brand new station sta-tion where I got off had a nice "United Nations" sign on it in bright Pennsylvania Pennsyl-vania red and gold, I can call it that. The United Nations is really meeting in two different places: The assembly, where I happen i j I J r i diately blocked. The question now remains as to what line of approach the Russians have decided upon, If any. In the meeting of the assembly assem-bly they tried to continue their obstructionist tactics. The real test will come in the foreign for-eign ministers' conclave at New York. There is a considerable element in the United States, by no means entirely composed of convinced 1 Communists or their more hesitant fellow-travelers, which believes with former Secretary of Commerce 1 Wallace that the United States can I pursue some middle-of-the-road pol- I icy and that East and West can thus i move together without friction. There j is no question, however, that the ! task that Secretary Byrnes has set out for himself admits of no appeasement. ap-peasement. Draw Line on Soviet Expansion There have been a long series ot books by experts and others, telling just what is wrong with our foreign policy and what might have been done or might be done to improve it. William Bullitt tried in a book (already mentioned in these columns) col-umns) to show that Russia's dreams of empire are nothing new, that the Soviets are merely taking up where the Czars left off. More recently Louis Fischer has come along with his "Great Challenge." Edgar Ansel Mowrer, reviewing this book in the Saturday Review of Literature, says that "if Henry Wallace Wal-lace had read and understood this book, he would not . . . "push a completely unrealistic policy of appeasement ap-peasement of Soviet Russia." Mowrer Mow-rer probably would be the last person per-son to claim that he was prejudiced in favor of the Soviet rule but he is certainly familiar with his subject sub-ject and his comment is worth consideration. con-sideration. As for Fischer, he laughs to be at this writ- hn.faiji.titlaflMl ing, at Flushing, Baukhage N. Y., and the headquarters of the security council, coun-cil, miles away at Lake Success. The broadcasting booth in which I sit looks right down on the first row of delegates, the United Kingdom King-dom under my chin, United States next, then Uruguay, then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Senator Austin, the white-haired and dignified digni-fied head of our delegation, sits on the end seat. Foreign Minister Mo-lotov, Mo-lotov, who has deputy delegate Vi-shinsky Vi-shinsky on his right, the translator, transla-tor, then Ambassador Gromyko on his left, sits about in the middle of his crowd. The two groups represent clashing clash-ing ideologies, conflicting ideas. But neither wears a steel helmet or carries car-ries a tommy gun. They are in peaceful conflict to avoid conflict. Force Reds' Hand at Paris Even the most cynical now admit that the Paris meetings served to reveal what the Russian objective was and temporarily, at least, Byrnes was able to block that objective. ob-jective. It was plain from the be- V. M. Molotov (left) and Andrei Vishinsky, Russia's two top diplomats, dip-lomats, lead Soviet delegation at U. N. parley. ginning that Russia had one negative nega-tive purpose and that was to prevent pre-vent any conclusive action regarding regard-ing the situation in Europe which she could not dictate. Chaos, if not time, fought on her side. As the negotiations continued, however, slowly out of the mists along the Volga another shape became be-came visible. It was the materialization materiali-zation of one phase of the divide and conquer principle. In this case it was the open bid for German sympathy sym-pathy which Russia hoped would turn the Germans in the American, British and French zones away from those countries and toward Russia. Although it was Russia itself it-self which prevented the economic unification of Germany (plus Communistic Com-munistic influences in France and French fears) it was Russia which suddenly offered the grandiose plan of a unified Germany with a hint at a rectification of the eastern frontier fron-tier at the expense of Poland. This sensational suggestion burst over Europe and the conference like a thunderbolt, but thanks to the quick action of Byrnes it proved a boomerang. boom-erang. Byrnes knew what to shoot at and he shot. The Wallace incident which for 24 hours threatened to cut Byrnes' support from under him fortunately fortu-nately had just the opposite effect. Byrnes insisted on repudiation of Wallace by the President and got it. Then Byrnes took the stump, showed that American policy would give Germany everything that the Russian plan would give her and made it clear that the question of the eastern frontier might well be opened with the United States sympathetic sym-pathetic toward a revision of the boundary to the advantage of Germany. Ger-many. Thus, In a lightning flash Russia's policy was illuminated and tame st the idea put forth by the Russo-philes Russo-philes that all we have to do is to assure Russia of her security, remove re-move her suspicions and fears of democracy, and then she will march shoulder to shoulder with the rest of us. Fischer says Russia's behavior be-havior is explained not by fear of attack but by certainty that she will not be attacked. This belief seems to be back of the American action here today. It is to be hoped that during the negotiations at Lake Success, Suc-cess, Russia's more specific objectives objec-tives will be revealed as they were in Paris. Fischer claims that "Russia is not afraid and not suspicious sus-picious for two clear reasons: The British empire is in decline and on the defensive; America rushed from victory to headlong psychological and military demobilization." If that is true then it must be made very clear to the Soviets that regardless re-gardless of what we may think about the decline of the British empire em-pire and America's sharp reaction against military activity, there is nevertheless a line beyond which Russian expansion will not be allowed al-lowed to go. It is to be hoped that line already has been reached. The necessity, however, is to make it very clear to both the American public and the Russian government that this point has been reached. Since it is admitted that Russia cannot can-not and does not want to fight, it is not a question of war. It is expected that the pin-pricking policy by Yugoslavia will continue. con-tinue. At this writing further efforts ef-forts to obtain control of the Dardanelles Dar-danelles are limited to name-calling in the Russian press. It must also be remembered that when the United States put its foot down and Russia saw that it would not pay to go farther, Tito could go into reverse. |