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Show 1 WAR IN FAR L EAST CERTAIN, 1 SiMONDS SAYS 1 Outbreak to Occur When I Russia or China Gains in 1 Strength I JAPAN IS BLAMED I Nippon's Refusal to Move f Out of Occupied Territory I Insures Strife 'ff n.v FRANK H. SIMONDS WASHINGTON. Feb. R- Although It is not ct permitted to draw final conclusions from the Washington con-ference. con-ference. one fcn stands forth dear r ,eyond all peradventure At thc close of the seend Hague conference the world ae left in no touhtsato $J purpose of Germany. Men might still differ as to the ultima..- ...urse ... German action, but thoy could no longer question that Germany was SSSSU a Path whisn "Jwre steadily, straight to war. N ow ' we are boWo to Me after the hlnjJon conference that Japan has declined Ito resign policies which similarly lead nut to ono but to two wars, whon Die Washington conference opened there w. re I ' l" pcsslblli-u pcsslblli-u ,s. so f..r as th- J.,..m- er- .-on-corned. They might us a C fWs-rast fWs-rast end many more hoped meet he western world with the frank acknowledgement ac-knowledgement that recent ' apa n i policies in China and Siberia had been Both unwise and pexlloua to world peace Such a declaration would -r -ast a change of Japanese polio to- ward both weak slates. By contrast they might meet the western nations t an vl unshakable deb rmln-atlon rmln-atlon tO pursue their eastern police) without regard to western opinion. JAPAN'S INTENTION. Now no one. it seems to me can , gf , ,, . . lpd.ii did a - ally choose to do The whole hi., tory of the conference, so far as it re-S re-S to th- mainland ot Asm. Indl-, Indl-, S that Japan has not be n.alles , ,, ntion of retiring fit h-. from Manchuria or from Siberia, except . hen such a retirement th.ill .-ult ner , oSl policy, a..d judged bj n ei -m rtk it Snnounceineni she now . " pect of Siberia, th'.s time is hardij , ! i:S,.r;m,-P f. the moment or; -s?;'n shrhTdorni 'III" things so far as China was con- -he had on y done what Gri.it L.ri i Vin .,.-. Germany and Russia had , s?it rA5 K it be noted, thta w:u one of th hi. f indictment, of Germany, who was able to find In a pMt: mors or lesj remote parallels for all she did in the Whence oonfience began at least uoSopean countries were camped Chinese territories. U.i-. U.i-. Z and Prana Bnw TuStl recognise that Japan did not lacR eastern example tor her PggJgj," HVO,nce 0ff red to .int U.uii h.iu win and Britain declared herself. , c:ulv to aland,.n W lie! W el. P " Sed Japan would quit shantung. BrH L !hrouh Mr Balfour promptfy announced that she meant to s 1. , In Kowioon. where her presence restcd upon an invasion of Chinese integrity QUite as recent as any Japanese l VRGE IRKAS OOI I PIED on the larger side, however speak-Ins speak-Ins territdTlally. only Japan occupied huge areas of Chin-e territories, or J .UU Unclosed l.v atlon a purpose to make still further advances. hat (VOfl Of Utmost Importance, what everyone ev-eryone walled for. was B sign that j pftn came to Waalilngton ready to! renounce hor policy of occupation and invasion In China. ,, thl- rested all real hope of making the Washington, conference a far shinknjr episode In Chinese history- and. ih- beginning of i he c reation of stable conditions on i he Asiatic malnlund. It is true that not :i fev. Americans I , vpfl-ted of their I . pres. Ill it l e III til C , I ..inference that they would ! able to provement, some actual liberation ol territory on a large scale. Hut this ... is to misunderstand the true situs-Lion situs-Lion in the conference, to mleunder-stand mleunder-stand it as fully and complete! as it was misunderstood later In the case of the Anglo-French dispute over the submarine The DOttOm fact of every International conferencr Is and must remain the circumstance that all ar-i ar-i tlon must be by unanimous consent. Unless we were prepared to tuke up arms for China, we could only obtain for her that measure of relief which was voluntarily agreed to l- all con-I con-I cerned. ol T OF B IKMONY. I If. as Mr. Ralfour Insisted. Britain r was resolved to hold on to Kowioon I then, despite th- fact thai this w as a I rejolve out of harmony With Amerl-I Amerl-I i an i oneeptlons, our delegates were I bound to bow before IJrltish purpose. I If. In the same way. Japan was de-I de-I termined to Stay In Manchuria and In I Fiboria, then there was no remedy. If (Continued on Page Throe.) PWUIN - m WAR IN FAR EAST CERTAIN WHEN K CHINA OR RUSSIA IS STRONGER V J Br Fraqk H. Simonds Declares Japanese Ref usal to j Move From Occupied Districts Makes Strife l: Inescapable; Public Sentiment in ; U. S. Opposed to Helping IT I J Either Side mT - from Page ,,nc-) I ml nothing that could be done but to paM B li. if wfcal it wrai vitsl to know ni lfjgfB wh'th'r fM'.ir. ii, the far cast could H 1 ), f-tabllshod upon a eolld basis. Ob- . xiouslv 1 Japan stayed jn Manchuria. . V au( BtU f ni' mat. a b debuU-d. N man could nay or can tav nhfn that wnr vMll COme, out th ' -.ire thlnp WmM and I, that BWIf , hlr,a or RuwU feels herself strong kM enough tojlrlve the Invader out. war iiB In China hV the altuatlon ,,,-cr.ll... which uo had ... i n ttm d ti WmM many departments of France and most IH ,f Belgium- At certain stages of the mM Conflict It seemed possible that there rm gn) , . ,.. ice, without th- lib. ,,f itelgnim Northern France, peace I MM following allied defeat and made up- German terms. But the whole L i'r' 1 J. Aj-' 0t endure beyond the moment when in Belgium, aided perhaps by MWm other countries vulfl cek to expel B the Invader. C VRMU S ON I OREIGN " K- L J includes th work of the Whshing- WMaM ton conference In duly signed and fcB ratified, for that matter Japan will Wtrnm ntill have armies on Chinese and Bl- glaaaBl v ... Thf armies will be Ii r I 1 1 1 r, . , . -There because Japan is strong and Ruaala and China weak. But their presence Will be an ever patent promise prom-ise of ultimate ivar Therefore and this fact eoems to m all essential, .ho Washington conference will run establish a condition of stable equilibrium equili-brium In the far east. Again, I say. this Is not to be charged against our delegate?, "who could only have promoted pro-moted f-uch an end by war. As between the United States and Great Britain tho Washington conference confer-ence has promoted peace. No one be-ees be-ees war between the two countries was at oil likely, but. a competition In naval armaments was Imminent and n competition in armament is always a dangerous thing. AM between the United States and Japun, naval com-I com-I petition has been averted, war has " ) "en at leat postponed, Indefinitely since we have given hostages in the shape of a renunciation of the sovereign sover-eign rluht to fortify Guam and the Philippines. Fnle.su Japan should be . ontemplating attacking u. which is absurd, there is no chance of war, for we have resigned all the actual power pow-er to attack her. both by consenting ' to a limitation of our fleet and to a mm f renunciation of the right to fortify ; , , naval bases n it hour w hi H B fleet could not be use,i against Japan. 1)11 I KI M IN EAST mAs, But as between Japan and China. I w Japan and Russia., the Washington H I is not succeeded In mak- HJ iUK an contribution of a similar r.a- Hf tore, im tho contrary, and this fact LW deserves all emphasis, the failure of; fjiwj Che Washington conference, or mnro i af exactly the refusal of Japan at the J Conference, to consent to withdraw her forces from China and Siberia, has served notice on Chines and Rue- slans alike, that .there is. for them both, no remedy outside of themselves. The western nations hao undertaken undertak-en to do what they could for them, th 1 have, perhaps done something In certain directions, but they have not - been able to do anything In the mainl lJ-a' line. China, Young China, now knows that its reliance upon the United States to protect it against Japan was' an Illusion. It always was an Ulu-j Ulu-j alon because the United States was i never hi any time ready to go to war. I to defend ,nP Integrity of China, there never WSS any such duty Imposed up-I I on tho Fnlted States. But In China I there has survived, even after the. Tails conference, the notion that th I nlted St.itis would save Uhina In ' lK)lnt of fact nations cannot bo saved, if they are totally unable to help themselves, and China Is in this posture pos-ture today and Russia as well so far ns Siberia Is concerned. THI N WAR in .Is But tho lesson cannot he lost. Some day, this decade, next decade, time gOSfl for very little, Russia will become be-come a nation again, perhaps sooner than anyone thinks. And on that day when she regains her national strength she will find Japan camped upon all of her Pacific seaboard and perhaps by that time having advanced to Lake Baikal. On that day will begin a war of deliverance No one doubts 'bis. all history supports the .thesis. In the same way China, sooner or later will make head BgaifUt an even j more odious Infringement of her national na-tional integrity No one can hem tin I growing numbers of th- rolOCS of the Voung China without believing this. I And when that day comes w e shall have another Slno-Jupaneae war, we may have a whole series of them, like I the hundred years war which marked 'the long and ultimately successful cf-' cf-' forts of the French to expel the Brit-I Brit-I ish kings from French soil. If you l wat.t an engaging parallel In past hls-1 hls-1 tory for the present Slno-Japanese slt-J slt-J uation you can find It to hand In Ad-Klo-French hltrtor. It Is wrong to say that the Washington Washing-ton conference has directly promoted .war in the far east. This la not true, tho situation was that unless Japan. In the conference, renounced her predatory pre-datory policy, war was bound to re-suit. re-suit. She has not renounced It. on j the contrary she has maintained it I consistent ly, one does not say B11C-i B11C-i eesaf ully. because she had only to hold j ber ground, there was no one and I there cou(d bt no one ready to turn 1 her out. since this meant war. AH that the conference has done Is to demonstrate that there is no hope for the t.'hlnese or tho Russians in conference. con-ference. The method Is not a substitute substi-tute for war. because Japan has demonstrated dem-onstrated that she Is not ready to retire re-tire save under pressure. A hope has been extinguished, yes. The extinction extinc-tion of the hope throws China back upon herself and leads Inalnetablv I to war, but war was always Inevit-jable Inevit-jable unless Japan retired, tho confer- - nee has not changed this situation. After tho conference passes, then, wo shall have In the lar east a situation situa-tion which cannot endure, which can only bo temporarily maintained while Japan Is strong and China and Russia j both too weak to challenge tho ln-I ln-I vader. If is the old story of the Balkans Bal-kans over again. Europe had man conferences over the Balkans, but no -onference could succeed because In no conference were the rights of the peoples of iho Balkans recognized It i was always certain that when they wer.- strong enough the Balkan states j wo. ild find for themsehes LEADS INTO WAR. j When that day came, we hud two j Balkan wars and those two Balkan , wars led straight to the world war. I But 1 am not attempting to prove here :that the fur eastei n conditions will I lead to another world war. I think We are done with world wars lor t.'ilv generation at least. What is to be seen la that the conditions existing in the fur east, as in the Balkans a decade de-cade ago, are Intolerable and that, solution by conference, bv peaceful negotiation, through the aid of outside out-side nations haing failed we must expect In the end that tho people most concerned will undenaice to save themselves as the Serbs, the Greeks and the Bulgars did just ten years ago In my judgment then, and for the reasons I have .set fn-th. we have hereafter to accept the fact thai Japanese Jap-anese policy In the far east makes war presently unavoidable. Japan is an aggressor. She has defended here in Washington her right to hold largo portions of Chinese territory and aha Will keep her soldiers there, as she has kept them In the past. sho came to Washington determined to stay In China, to evade any attempt to turn her out and she has pursued her policy pol-icy to tho end But If one accepts the assumption that war in the far cast now becomes certain, what then shall one say of the other circumstances of the Washington Washing-ton conference, of the several treaties and agreements? What shall one aay of the limitation of naval armament's and of the treaty of association which we have made with Japan. In company com-pany with Franco and Britain" Does the fart that the condition In the , far east remain unstable have a bear- ! Ing upon American opinion Jn the matter of the several treaties'' Ql FSTION op POMC y Insofar as the agreement limiting naval strength tho question Is fuirly debatable, It Is a question of national policy pure and simple. We have to answer a single question Do we desire de-sire to use our fleet to aid China or Russia or both In war aguinst Japan" Ja-pan" if we do then it is the height of folly to consent to the terms of the five-power treaty, which so reduces Qlir fleet and so abolishes our navfll 1 bases that we cannot make any naval eff.. it on behalf of these two countries. coun-tries. Jn effect this treaty represents a retreat from the Western Pacific, we deprive ourselves of tlje power to protect China or threaten Japan. But our representatives In the peace conference, probably with perfect ac- I curacy. have interpreted American sentiment as absolutely opposed to any war iu the Pacific on behalf of any nation or against any nation, precisely precise-ly as long as no nation directly assails as-sails us in our own homelands or insular in-sular possessions. And Japan is undertaking, un-dertaking, in return for our disarmament disarma-ment and I think In perfect good I faith, to guarantee not to attack us. I not to attack us in our insular possessions, pos-sessions, where, alone she could attack at-tack US. We aro resigning tho power to attack her. she Is renouncing all Intention of attacking us, and. since the British remain a Pacific naval power, no one can believe she will venture to attack us. Your army and navy, after all. although al-though it is terribly hard to make this elementary truth understood, must be proportioned to your policy, if we j mean to protect China against Japan, then we must not limit our navy or 1,-ave ;nam ami tin I'htlippiriea Bn-fortifled. Bn-fortifled. Rather we must redouble our paco in construction and fortify both bases. But wo do not want to do anything of the sort. Wc want simply to have the ships to defend OUT own Pacific coast and we are pre- i pared to rely upon our arrangements With the British und the Japanese, iulte reasonably, 1 think, to insure our security in Guam and in the Philippines. si.VIJMl M 1 M.I IIVKJOI). In view of tnls American sentiment, correctly gauged by Mr. Hughes and his associates, 1 think, there Is small I reason for criticising the treaty linnt-Ing linnt-Ing naval strength, deapltc the fact that war In the far east Is assured We don't want to participate In the war, wc don't believe we have inter-eats inter-eats sufficient to warrant particlpa-tion, particlpa-tion, therefore wo resign th power to participate. For myself, tho consent con-sent to waive sovereignty in the mat- 1 ter of fortification is humiliating, It j has heretofore been the concomitant of defeat, invariably. To argue that ! wo have renounced the right to fortify i tho Great Bakes by fleet or our Canadian Can-adian border by forts Is not to cite a I parallel, tor that agreement was reel- I prt.ral. while in the present case neither Japan nor Britain renounces the right to fortify any island which has tho rclatlvo strategic value of Guam. But If we are retiring from the Pa- and we are. if we are renouncing the power to participate in an Asiatic quarrel and we are. and if tho American Amer-ican people In largo majority advocate advo-cate such a retreat and it is fair to assume that they do. then thero Is small ground for protest. Wc shall not bo attacked, I feel certain, either by the Japanese or by the British, as a result of not fortifying Guam or the Philippines and wo do not mean to attack. Therefore policy and armament arma-ment are harmonized, which after all represents the aim of wise statesmanship. statesman-ship. SIT I A liON BI.SS ( L.F 1 E When one comes to the four-power treaty. covering the regions of the Pacific, however, the situation Is a little loss clear. Insofar as that treaty pledges us not to attack any one of the three powers who are signatory sig-natory to the treaty, this document falls in quite naturally with the five-power five-power treat which logical!) and historically his-torically it precedes. We agree not to attack each other and wc get rid of a private treaty of alliance, which would hinder and complicate. And one may hope. In addition to disposing dispos-ing of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, we shall also get rid ol the similar Franco-Japanese treaty by some method and in some document. But the four-power treaty also provides pro-vides for the conference and consul-1 tation of the four nations. In case one J is threatened. To be sure the geo-graphical geo-graphical circumstances of the treaty BOem clearly defined and I assume that Old Japanese mainland will be ex. haled et supposing that in tho. fu- lure Japan Is menaced by a Chinese attack, or a Russian attack. Just what interpretation will this conference and consultation provision have then" This Is the all important Question. INsiwt IS i n i. Remember that In 1904 France and Great Britain made a regional agree- I ment, It was designed to prevent war between France and Britain, It had mainly to do with Africa and its chief provisions applied to ESgypt and Bdor-OCCO. Bdor-OCCO. Vet before the Ink on the document doc-ument was fairly dried, this agreement 1 had led to that dramatic episode of ' Tsnglers and Great Britain found herself her-self on the brink of war with Germany. Ger-many. Moreover, ten years later, when tho world war did come, the agree- ment of 1904 represented the real J claim of Krance upon Britain. Mad the agreement covering the region of the Pacific beeja open lo all parties having Pacific Interests, to China, to Russia, to Holland, as well as to Great Britain Prance, Jatfan and the United States, the .situation would have been far different. But under the four-power trcat wo are entering enter-ing Into special relations with one party to a war, which Is now almost Inovitablc. Moreover, the fact that we are bound by an agreement, however how-ever simple, to Japan and have no such agreement with Russia and China gives Japan the chance to exploit ex-ploit this agreement as she did thi Anglo-Japanese alliance In the ycai during and since the world war. IC IM SCAPAB1 I It Is the fact that Japanese polio ; makes war almost IncacaDable In the far cast, not the language or the four power pact, which seems to me to make for dancer. On of the, chief .irruments usod against the league of nations and one of the most valid arguments ar-guments w-sa that Germany and Russia Rus-sia were excluded from Its membership member-ship and therefore that it wim an alll-ance alll-ance to perpetuate victory, not to promote pro-mote peace, but in the four-power treaty wo exclude three nations, all of whom huve Islands in the i'aclflc nnd two of whom must one day soon be Involved In -war with Japan Admit that we shall escape being drapKed int.. any war. that the senate, ns it now plans, will append a reser-atlon reser-atlon like that It affixed to Article ., there is a further objection. Although Al-though wc are renouncing the power and ih lajsk of defending China, obedient, b f n- agree to national sentiment sen-timent and having regard for enlightened enlight-ened self Interest, we ptlll have Interests In-terests in China. We shall suffer much loss of prestige anyway, but w hat if China sees us entering an arrangement ar-rangement with her chief foe. while refuxlnk' i. permit her to Join in this agrrosmsnt, which ts publlclv and probably prob-ably quite accurately described as no more than a 6clf-denylng ordinance" l i ills i.LMoiUM,. Germany saw in the Anglo-Wench agreement of 1004 made chiefly to liquidate African disputes and having n' Kuropcan connotation, the first step In an encircling policy. Will not China see In the four-power pact final evidence of the association of all th. western nations to despoil her. will not our membership seem to her a final betrayal and drl lier to some nea fury against all foreigners which a11 have consequences far more serious ser-ious than the Hoxer rebellion? M.i It not Involve us in the Asiatic mesi in the one way we can be Involved, namely to protect the lives and prop-eity prop-eity f r,ur nationals? The mere presence of Holland ip this Pacific pact, since Holland like 11 les has no Interest on th- mainland main-land of Asia might hao done something some-thing to remove this suspicion. Granted Grant-ed that Russia could not now be admitted, ad-mitted, place might have been left for her. Assuming even that China nrere at the moment too divided to be available, the mere provision that When the present temporary situation pa sed. Chinese representation should be permitted, I hineso participation de possible, might have helped remcd this apparent defect NOT AN ALLIAXt I The four-power treaty Ja not in any proper sense an alliance, although as experienced Mutenninn a? Viscount Qrej of Kulloden has so named it in a recent speech. I gravel) duubt if we shall c-ver be dragged Into a Slno-Japanese Slno-Japanese or a Russo-Japanese war b. -cause we have signed It. But there remains the question of exactly what Its effect will he upon us. upon China and "ni prestige in China, If wc 'liter 'li-ter into s compact with Japan un- mlstakably the aggressor In Asia and certain in no distant time to have to I fight to maintain this position taken in defiance of all our nations of In-ternatlonal In-ternatlonal right and Justice. None of thse doubts would have ar.veo if Japan had come to Washington Wash-ington prepared to share frankly in the making of a Stable equilibrium in the far east. They arise now, not out I of tho language or the intent of th-four-power treaty itself, gut out of the conditions which must now pic-vail pic-vail in tho fa. cast often ii is more I important what kind of a nation you I make a treaty with than what kind I of a treaty ou make. The present problem Is ill liere, tho real line of criticism of the four-power treaty Seems to me to be found here. Since l ; in w ould not get out of China w.i.s , it not Important, vital that China ahOUld be permitted sooner or Inter to be a signatory to the treaty which covered Pacific questions, if only that he might not seem to be isolated and we to he even remotely associated with her oppressor? (Copyright. 1922. by Tho McClure Newspaper Syndicate.) |