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Show uv War Office Makes Public Long Despatch on Much Discussed Dis-cussed Battles. , LONDON, Monday, March 4. Tho war offico tonight made public a long dispatch from Field Marshal Sir Douglas Doug-las Haig covering the much -discussed battles on the Cambrai front last November. No-vember. It relates how the operations were carried out, tells of tho successes suc-cesses at first achieved, and alludes quite as frankly to the subsequent reverses re-verses which compelled a withdrawal from territory that had been .captured, no blame being imputed to any one for this latter occurrence. Discussing the reasons for tho decision deci-sion to attack on the Cambrai front, Field Marshal Haig says that tho repeated re-peated assaults in Flanders had caused a weakening of the enemy's line elsewhere else-where and that of these weakened sectors that of Cambrai was deemed tho most suitable for the surpriso operation oper-ation contemplated, the ground being favorable for tho employment of tanks, the plan boing to dispense with previous prev-ious artillery preparation, which would have prevented secrecy, and depend instead on the tanks to smash their way through the enoray's wire. "Tho enemy," writes the field marshal, mar-shal, "was laying out fresh lines of be-fense be-fense behind those which he had already al-ready completed on the Cambrai front, and it was to be expected his troops would be redistributed as soon as our pressure in Flanders rolaxed. Ho had already brought large forces from Russia in exchange for divisions exhausted ex-hausted in the struggle in the western theaters and it was practically certain cer-tain that heavy reinforcements would be brought fx-om tho east to the west during tho winter. Troops Battle-weary. "Against the argument in favor of immediate action I had to weigh tho fact that my own troops had been engaged en-gaged many months in heavy fighting. Tho conditions of tho struggle had greatly taxed their strength. Only a part of tho losses of my division had been replaced and many of the re- - cently arrived dr.aft were still far from being fully trained and included in the ranks of the armies." Eventually the British commander decided in favor of immediate action. "The Infantry, tho tanks and the artillery, working in combination," he continues, "were to endeavor to break through all the enemy's line of defense de-fense on the first day. If this were successfully accomplished and the situation sit-uation developed favorably, cavalry were then to be passed through to raid the enemy's communications, disorganize disor-ganize his system of command, damage dam-age his railways and Interfere as much as possible with the arrival of reinforcements. rein-forcements. "It was explained to all the commanders com-manders that everything depended upon secrecy up to the moment of starting and after that on bold, determined, deter-mined, rapid action. Unless the opposition oppo-sition could be beaten down quickly, no great results could be looked for." The attack, the field marshal note3, was started at 6:30 o'clock on the morning of November 20. The spectacular spec-tacular successes which first attended it have been, told in the correspondent's correspond-ent's reports written at the lime. It was on tho last day of November that the triumph began to give way to disaster. dis-aster. Enemy Follows Shells. "At tho northorn end of tho Bonavis ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector," the commander relates, "tho swiftness with which the enemy followed his bombardment appears to have overwhelmed over-whelmed our troops, both in the line and in the immediate support, almost before they had realized the attack had begun. The nature of tho bombardment, bom-bardment, which seems to have been heavy enough to keep our men under cover without at first seriously alarming alarm-ing them, contributed to the successes suc-cesses of the enemy's plans. "No steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the German Ger-man assault columns, whose secret assembly as-sembly was assisted by the many deep folds and hollows typical of the chalk formation, and was shielded from observation ob-servation from the air by the early morning mist. It was only when tho attack was upon them that great numbers of low-lying German airplanes air-planes rained machine gunfire on our infantry, while the extensive use of smoke shells and bombs made it extremely ex-tremely difficult for our troops to see what was happening on othor parts of the battlefield or to follow the movements move-ments of tho enemy. "In short, there is little doubt that although an attack was expected generally, gen-erally, yet in those areas of the battle, at the moment of Its delivery, the assault as-sault effected a local surprise." Troops Meet Crisis. How the advance was stemmed and tho heroism displayed by the bodies of British troops, who sacrificed themselves them-selves to give time for the organization organiza-tion of the defense behind them, has been already told. Field Marshal Haig does full justice to tho courage and skill displayed in this crisis. He continued: con-tinued: "Tho strength the enemy had shown himself able to develop in his attacks mado it evident that only by prolonged and sovere fighting could I hope to reestablish re-establish my right, flank on Bonavis ridge. Unless this was done the situation situa-tion of my troops in the salient north of Flesquieros would be difficult and dangerous, even if our hold on Bour-lon Bour-lon hill were extended. I had, therefore, there-fore, to decide either to embark on another an-other offensive battle on a large scale or to withdraw to a more compact line on Flesquleres ridge. "Although this decision involved tho giving up of important positions most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under the conditions." Field Marshal Haig notes that the withdrawal was completed successfully, successful-ly, without interference from the enemy, on tho morning of December 7. Summarizing tho results of the threo weeks' fighting, tho flold marshal says: "There is little doubt that our operations op-erations wero of considerable indirect assistance to tho allied forces in Italy. Large demands were made upon the available Gorman reserves at a time when a great concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in Flanders. German Troops Diverted. "Thero is evidence that Gorman divisions di-visions intended for the Italian theater were diverted to tho Cambrai front, and it is probable that a further concentration con-centration of German forces against Italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period when our allies wore making their first stand on the Piaye line." Had Field Marshal Haig not met with a check which, compelled him to abandon part of the captured territory, what he might have accomplished he thus discloses: "My intentions as regards subsequent subse-quent exploitation were to push westward west-ward and northeastward, taking the Hlndenburg line in tho reverse from Meuvres to the river Scarpa and capturing cap-turing all the enemy defenses and probably most of his garrisons lying west of a -lino from Cambrai north-J, ward to tho Senseo and south, of Uiat river and tho Scarpo. "Time would havo been required to enable us to dovolop and complete tho oporaUou, but Uae prospects of gaming the necessary timo wore, in my opinion, opin-ion, good enough to justify the attempt to executo tho plan.. I am of the opinion opin-ion that on Uio 20th and 21st of November No-vember wo went very near to success sufficiently complete to bring the realization real-ization of our full programme Avithin. our..power." |