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Show RELATES STORY OFGALLIPOLI Ian Hamilton Describes the Disastrous Landing at Suvla Bay. London, Jan. 6, 8 p. m. General Ian Hamilton's report on the British operations on the Gallipoll peninsula was published in the Official Gazette tonight. It tells the story of the fighting fight-ing on the peninsula from the beginning begin-ning of May to the middle of October. Octo-ber. The Suvla bay landing failed to accomplish ac-complish its object, the report shows, partly because the force consisted largely of untried troops under generals gen-erals Inexperienced in the new warfare, war-fare, and partly through the failure of the water supply. The sufferings of the troops for lack of water make nainful readincr. Probably no more important contribution con-tribution to the history of the present war has yet been made. The report throws light on the great landing at Anzac cove and Suvla bay, August 7, which has been the subject of strong attacks upon the military administration administra-tion of the government, the whole operations requiring the combined action ac-tion of the army and the navy. Praises His Troops. The handling of the masses of troops within a limited area probably was the most complicated ever undertaken, un-dertaken, and the military men are not surprised that some important details failed to work out as planned. General Hamilton bestows the highest high-est possible praise upon the bravery of the men. He believes that after the middle of August the Turks outnumbered out-numbered the British and had plenty of fresh soldiers and munitions, while the British government was unable to furnish him with the reinforcements reinforce-ments he wanted. The general strongly opposed the abandonment at any of the bases held by tho British troops. General Hamilton's report, which was submitted to Field Marshall Earl Kitchener, secretary of state for war, carries tho story of the Dardanelles operations up to mid-October, when he relinquished his command. Text of Report. Concerning his retirement, General Hamilton reports: "On the 11th of October, your lordship lord-ship cabled asking me for an estimate of the losses which would 'be involved in the evacuation of the peninsula. I replied In terms showing that such a step was to mc unthinkable. On the 16th of October I received" a cable recalling me to London for the reason, rea-son, as I was informed by your lordship lord-ship on my arrival, that his majesty's majes-ty's government desired fresh, unbiased un-biased opinion from a responsible commander upon the question of early evacuation." The most stirring passages of the document describe the ill-fated landing land-ing at Suvia bay and Anzac early In August, for securing command of the heights on the middle of the peninsula and cutting off from their base the Turkish forces at the lower extremity, where the entente allied armies made their first landing. Grand Attack of Turks. This operation began on August G. The climax wss reached at daybreak on the 10th, when the Turks made a grand attack from the summit of Chunnuk Bair upon a short front held bv two battalions of the Sixth North Lancashire and the Fifth Wiltshire regiments, re-giments, which General Hamilton describes de-scribes as weakened in numbers though not in spirit. "First, our men were shelled by every enemy gun," he says, "then assaulted as-saulted -by a huge column consisting of no less than a full division plus three battalions. The North Lancashire Lanca-shire men were simply overwhelmed In their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, while the Wllt-shires, Wllt-shires, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. annihila-ted. "The ponderous mass of the enemy swept over the crest and swarmed round the Hampshires and General Baldwin's brigade, which had to give ground and were only extricated with great difficultv and verv heavv losses. "Now it was our turn. The warships war-ships and the New Zealand and Australian Aus-tralian artillery, with an Indian mountain moun-tain artillery brigade and the Sixty-ninth Sixty-ninth brigade Royal Field artillery were getting the chance of a lifetime. As successive solid lines of Turks topped the crest of the ridge, gaps were torn through their formation and an Iron rain fell on them as they tried to reform in the gullies. "Not here only did the Turks pay dearly for their recapture of the vital crest. Enemy reinforcements continued contin-ued to move up under a heavv and accurate ac-curate fire from our guns. Still they kept toping the ridges and pouring down tho western slopes of Chunnuk Bair, as if determined to gain everv thing they had lost. But once they were over the crest they becamo exposed ex-posed not only to the full blast of the guns, which played upon their serried ranks at close range until their barrels bar-rels were red hot Enormous losses were inflicted, and of the swarms which had once fairly crossed the crest line, only a handful ever straggled back to their own side of Chunnuk Bair. Deadly Climax of Battle. At the same time strong forces of the enemy were hurled against the spurs to the northeast, where there arose a conflict so deadly that it may be considered the ollmax of four days fighting for the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced and the f,m0pVwfue drIven clean down the hill. At the foot of tho hill the men who were supervising the transport of food and water were rallied by Staff Captain Street Unhesitatingly they followed him back, where thev plunged again into the midst of that foulhtft TSSlX ln whlch eonerals lougnt in the ranks and men dronnpri their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat. B 'The Turks came on again and 3m1- Flsht,n raacen?ly aSd calling upon the name of God our I men stood to it and maintained by many a deed of daring the old tradi tons of their race. There Avas no flinching; they died In the ranks where they stood. Hera RpJIii Cayley, Baldwin and CoST?!! z their gallant men achieved great glory. - Two Generals Fall. "On this bloody field fell Brigadier General Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Caesnr's camp at Lady- J smith. Hero too, fell Brigadier Gen- eral Cooper, badly wounded. , "Toward this supreme struggle the ; , absolute last two battalions from the general reserve were now hurried, ; but by 10 in the morning the effort : of the enemy was spent Soon their , shattered remnants began to trickle ; bacl, leaving a track of corpses behind be-hind them. By night, except for pris- ' oners or wounded, no live Turk was left upon our side of the slope." ! ; Two lesser attacks were made by i the Turks this same day. General ' 1 Hamilton continues: '; "By evening the total casualties of fc General Birdwood's force had reached ; 12,000 and included a very large pro- f" portion of officers. The Thirteenth I division of the new army, under Ma- '- jor General Shaw, had alone lost G,l 000, out of a grand total of 10,500. Bradadier General Baldwin was gone I and all his staff men and commanding officers, thirteen, had disappeared from the fighting effectives. The i Warwicks and Worchesters had lost ) literally every single officer. German Theory Wrong. r "The old German notion that no unit could stand the loss of more . than 25 per cent has been completely ! .falsified The Thirteenth division and jj the Twenty-ninth brigade of the Tenth Irish division had lost more than ' twice that, and in spirit were game J: . for as much more fighting as might ' be required." ' The British had held all thev gain-ed gain-ed except two important salients one a hill, momentarily carried by the Gurkhas, and the position on Chunnuk Bair, which had been retained forty-eight forty-eight hours. 5 "Unfortunately," says General Ham- ? llton, "these two pieces of ground, small and worthless as thev seemed, 1 were worth, according to the ethics l "f war, ten thousand lives, for their f loss or retention just marked the dif- I ferences between an Important sue- oess and a signal victory. The grand f. coup had not come off; the Narrows f were out of sight and bej'ond field gun I4 range, but this was not the fault of ? General Birdwood or any of the offi- ' cers or men under his command." p Operations in Anzac Zone. The first operations in the Anzac m zone appeared to have been carried out with comparative success. The (? Suvla bay expedition, which has been M the subject of the greatest criticism. W suffered various misfortunes. Elabor- M ate plans were worked out by the m army staff with Vice Admiral De Ro- beck. i During the night of the 11th a dlvi- I sion consisting of the Thirty-second j and Thirty-fourth brigades was I ' . 5 (Continued on Page 7.) f ' RELATES STORY (Continued From Pago Two). brought from Imbros to Sulva. Threo brigades with three batteries were landed in the darkness. Tho Turk3 were completely surprised. The division made good its position ashore. Most of the supporting force, consisting of the Irish Tenth division, were brought from Mitylene. General Hamilton compliments highly the navy for landing the first of them at dawn from a distance of 120 miles, at tho psychological moment when they were most needed. Delay Caused By Navy. But tho navy was unable to land six battalions where the corps commander command-er considered they could act most effectively. ef-fectively. The cause of the navy's action, General Hamilton says, was for sonio reason not spocifled, but It rosultod In delay. The men were obliged ob-liged to march a considerable distance under flro and arrived fatigued. General Hamilton lays stress on tho fact that a largo proportion of tho tioops wore now men. "On tho morning of tho 8th," says the report. "Gcnoral Stopford, recollecting recol-lecting the vnst issues which hung upon his success In forestalling the enemy, urged his divisional commanders command-ers to push on; otherwise all the advantages ad-vantages of the surprise landing must be nullified. But the divisional commanders com-manders believed themselves to bo unable to move.' The weather was hot. The new troops suffered much from want of water. There was disorganization, inevitable in-evitable after a night landing, followed follow-ed by fighting here and there with an enemy scattered over a country unknown. un-known. "These pleas for delay," says General Gener-al Hamilton, "were perfectly well founded. But it seems to have been overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front of us were equally exhausted ex-hausted and disorganized and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest swift-est method of solving the water trouble and every other sOrt of trouble. Artillery Support Lacking. "Be this as it may, the objections overbore the corps commander's resolution. reso-lution. But It wojj lack of artillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in the policy of going slow, which by the time It reached tho troops became translated into a period of inaction. ' "The division generals were informed inform-ed that, In view of the Inadequate artillery ar-tillery support, General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks at-tacks on intrenched positions, but desired de-sired to try to turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this Instruction lies the root of our fnlure to mnke use of the priceless price-less daylight hours of the Sth of August." General Hamilton explains that artillery ar-tillery could not be embarked before., on account of the necessity of disembarking disem-barking mules for carrying the water supply, and argues that, while normally normal-ly infantry cannot advance, driving power and a certain ruthlessness were required. Lacked Experience. The remainder of the story of Suv-la Suv-la consists largely of -misfortunes. General Hamjlton explains that the senior commanders lacked experience in the new trench warfare and In the Turkish methods and appreciation of the paramount Importance of time. On the 15th General Stopford was relieved reliev-ed of the command of his division corns. General Delisle succeeded him. The accounts In the report of tho suffering of the soldiers from lack of water are graphic. An enormous quantity quan-tity was secretly colleoted at Anzac, where a reservoir holding 30,000 gallons, gal-lons, with distributing pipes, was builL Oil tins, with a capacity of 80.-000 80.-000 gallons, were collected and fitted with handles, but an accident to the steamer delaj'ed part of tho supply at the time of landing. Reserves Not Available. Describing the operations on August Aug-ust 10, General Hamilton explains why all the reserves were not available. "At times," he says, "I thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn stub-born central battle, where probably they would have turned the scales. But each time water troubles made me give up the idea, all ranks being reduced to a pint a day. True, thirst Is a sensation unknown to the dwellers dwell-ers in cool, well-watered England, but at Anzac. when the mules with tho water rush up to them In swarms, just to lick tho moisture that exuded through the canvas bagB. Until wells had been discovered under a freshly- won hill, the reinforcing of Anzac by ll even so much as a brigade was un- HH thinkable." Concerning the water supply for the M troops landed at Suvla on the 17th, H he says: H "As it turned out, and judging mere- 1 ly by the results,' I regret to say that H the measures actually taken for dis i IH tribution proved to be Inadequate, and 1 M suffering and disorganization ensued." H Plan Failed to Work. H The distribution of water from the IH beaches failed to work smoothly. The H soldiers cut the hose to fill their j H water bottles and lighters grounded ' H so far from the beach, that tho men j IH had to swim to them to fill their bot- IH i H In the middle of August, General H Hamilton estimates, the Turks had j H 110,000 rifles to the British 95.000. j H The Turks had plenty of ammunition j H and reserves, while the British dl- ; H visions were 45,000 below their normal H strength. General Hamilton wanted H 50,000 fresh rifles. He sent a long j H cablegram asking for reinforcements j H and munitions, believing that with H them furnished at once he underlines jH "at once" the troops could clear a j H passage for the fleet to Constantl- H nople. H "It may be judged how deep was IH my disappointment," he says, "when I H learned that essential drafts of rein- H forcements and munitions could not be H which prevented me from further in- H slstence." H The report describes fighting, partly j M successful and with heavy losses, on H the 21st of AuguBt, which was design- ) H ed to consolate tho British positions. ' H Important fighting ceased then. ' H ly trying summer, took a heavy toll of H the survlvora of so many ardous con- j IH flicts," the report continues. "But all j jH ranks were cheerful. All remained i H confident that so long as they stuck i H to their guns, the country would stick ! jH to them and see them victoriously I H through the last and greatest of cru- ' H sades." H An important feature of the docu- M ment is the description of the joint ; M army and navy plans for probably the H most difficult and complicated oper- M atlons ever attempted on so large a ! H scale. It was impossible to concen- H trate a third of the fresh troops to bo j H launched In an attack on Suvla and H Anzac within the confines where tho M British held ground. Part of the for- 1 M ces were at Imbros, part at Mudros, j H part at Mytllene, respectively 14 and j M 60 miles and 120 miles from the scene .,; H in which they were to appear simul- I M taneously with munitions, stores, ani- H raals, vehicles and particularly water. ' M In conclusion, General Hamilton i, H bids an eloquent farewell to his com- H rades. H |