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Show SMALL HOPES OF "PEACE IN OCTOBER" BY FORCE OF ARMS. Again one hears talk of peace in October, Oc-tober, and, as on the former occasion, from what is, alleged to be a German source. It would be indeed a hopeful hope-ful rumor Were it not coupled with the assumption that peace Is to come not by truce nor mediation nor the mutual recognition of the futility of further warfare, but by force of arms As a neutml nation, America expresses expres-ses no wish as to which side should win, but she would feel much more optimistic if the expectations of peace were based more upon the prospect ot compromise than on that of victory A vear of warfare on tho gigantic European scale has taught no other lesson so plainly as that almost every scheduled victory has either failed to mateilalize, or has been accomplished very much later than the predicted date. Warsaw, the freshest instance in mind, held out for seven months longer long-er than Germany' most confidently expected. ex-pected. A British Admiral set down Easter ns the time for forcing the Dardanelles, but the forts are still virtually intact. It is tho knowledge of these and many other prophecies which have gone astrav that causes-one to discount dis-count any predictions qf peace founded found-ed on the 'assumption of n decisive triumph. For all that, there is a great significance signi-ficance In the Amsterdam report that In the latest German order is contained con-tained the statement. "Our work is now practically finished in the East and we are about to begin in the West Peace is certain in October," If authoritative, this order can mean nothing other than the abandonment abandon-ment on the part Of Germany of the hope of completely crushing the Russian Rus-sian armies, since the only possible interpretation of beginning work in the West is the withdrawal of troops fiom the East. In saying that his task in the East is "practically finished," fin-ished," the Kaiser probably intends to convey the impression that the Czar's forces have been so demoralized demoraliz-ed 'by the drive from Galicia and the heart of Poland that they need no longer be counted on as a serious factor, fac-tor, and that they can be held back by compaVatively small numbers. There can be no disputing the fact that the triumphal march through Galicia, Poland and the Baltic proving ceg must have put great heart into tue Teuton armies, and yet it should be borne in mind tluit there is a vast difference dif-ference between conditions in the East and in the West. Fifty miles in Poland is not equal to five miles in France or Flanders, where the dead lock of almost ten months has enabled both sides to intrench themselves in such a way that neither can make any rapid or extended marches forward. for-ward. The artillery churns up the first line of the enemy's trenches, the infantry advances a few hundred yards and then comes under the dead ly hail of the opposing guns before it can be protected. Backward and forward for-ward sway the lines, as they have been doing for so many long and bitter bit-ter months. . The British advance scheduled for the first of May has not yet taken place. Many excuses have been offered, offer-ed, but the truth is probably the failure fail-ure to put in an army sufficiently large and adequately equipped with munitions, coupled with the fact as to LUC LiLIIUUl& Ul IKJIIOll UOiliim ,..v...w... Numbers and ammunition are not everything. At various stages both sides have had at certain points a marked superiority in these two essentials, es-sentials, yet wo have read of advances measured only in yards As the Germans Ger-mans are getting ready to put in more men drawn from the East, the allies are beginning to repair their deficiency defic-iency in ammunition, and so one might continue indefinitely setting off factor against factor to the end of proving the improbability of either the allies or the Teutons reaching H their goal by October. H Peace talk will sound more encour- H aging when It comes in terms of com- H promise or mediation. H Far more imporLint than these spec- H illations as to what may happen in H France or Belgium are the exciting H negotiations between the opposing H powers of Bulgaria. This Balkan H state has never attempted to disguise H the fact that it Is actuated solely by LMU self interest and that it is ready to bo H pro-Teuton or pro-ally or willing to H remain neutral in accordance with the H market value of the situation. Sofia M is frankly playing off one side against kjm the other, and that she Is being offer- H ed much by Germany js seen in the H fact that she is now asking for morp H than her original demands upon H Greece and Serbia. il It would be absurd to talk of a sprd- H idly mercenary spirit in connection H with Bulgaria. She had no part in H the making of the present dispute and MLW Is therefore free, but it is only natur- M al that she should seek to repair her iH enormous losses in the second Balkan H war The end of the first war saw H one Bulgar army before the Chatalja H lines, another investing Adrianople, a LWm third beginning to occupy Seres and :B Kavala, a fourth held Istlp. These H were her share of the prizes due to H the Balkan alliance, but no sooner did H the victors come to divide the Bpolls LMm than they fell out, with the result MM mat uuigarni was tuv uwuwi """ h The peace of Bucharest 'saw her sur H rendering nearly all of Northern Mace- Bm donia to Serbia. 'H What more natural than that sbe 'LMm should try to get even? Yet upon 'JLMM her decision depends either the safety Mkm or the end of Turkey in Europe. With MM the Teutons, she will prevent the LMm allies taking Constantinople and re- LMm Moving Russia; against them, the Dar- JLMM dandles might be forced in a mattei 'MM |
