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Show fin mm ii iiimi iimnr" y n in ii in miiwjjij..iji ij .1 u.nijj ' L ....... .. A . m)., . ... . , See Internal Crisis ry. 1 Affecting Russ Policies ? s f ' A I : Report Army Looms as New Power as Fac- ; tions Clash Over Broad Participation Ml In Postwar World Affairs. f sv J j By BAUKIIAGE News Analyst and Commentator. WNU Service, 1616 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. What's happening inside Russia? Where there's smoke, there's fire. Vehement denials ol the death ol Marshal Stalin were followed finally final-ly by admission that the man who ,'had more power than any czar could J boas,t of was weary. That he was well, but that he was shedding some of his responsibilities. It is interesting to note the reac-! reac-! tion in this country. The wishful thinking of those who first announced an-nounced the death rumor over the air and in print was not reflected in official Washington. The very day before the first story appeared a high government official expressed the opinion in my hearing that the hope for understanding between be-tween the United States and Russia depended largely on Stalin. This was after the long series of disagreements disagree-ments beginning with the breakup of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in London, the refusal of Russia to take active part in the United Nations Food organization meeting in Quebec, Que-bec, the objections to various moves made by the members of the United Nations Executive Council. Everywhere Every-where "Russia objects" seemed to be the one answer which Russia's representatives had to offer to the suggestions made by the American and other governments. When the real history of the international in-ternational conferences, beginning with the Moscow conference which Secretary of State Hull attended, through Yalta and Potsdam, is written, writ-ten, I think it can be shown that Stalin, frequently against the advice of his councillors, was the one who broke the deadlocks and proposed or accepted compromises which were made necessary by his own colleagues' col-leagues' stubbornness. It will be recalled that when the invitations to the meeting at San Francisco went out it was announced that Russia would not send her foreign for-eign minister as head of the delegation, delega-tion, but would leave that post to Ambassador Gromyko in Washington. Washing-ton. This made a bad impression, for it looked as if Stalin were damning damn-ing the affair with faint support. However, after the American newspapers news-papers sounded off on the subject, Stalin had a change of heart or perhaps per-haps the death of Roosevelt, whjch occurred in the interim, affected his course. Molotov was duly assigned to the job. Molotov proved no simple primrose prim-rose and more than once, it is reported, re-ported, Stalin's intervention had to be sought to grease the wheels. There was another occasion just which one is not revealed when the work was completely stymied and finally the President made a direct appeal to Stalin to accept the suggestions sug-gestions of the majority on a point that appeared to have hopelessly deadlocked the meeting. This time, against the counsel of his advisors, who were holding out, Stalin put his O.K. on the request. Isolationists Bloc Grows There is reason to believe that this "no vote" attitude of a number of the Soviet leaders who opposed what many have considered too deep entanglement in international affairs, which has been in evidence for a long time, finally wrecked the Foreign Ministers' conference. As early as the time of the San Francisco meeting there were hints of a growing "isolationist" opposition opposi-tion inside Russia. Word reached certain members of the conference by a roundabout way, but from a thoroughly reliable source, concerning concern-ing the status of former Foreign Minister Litvinov, Russia's crack diplomat, who negotiated the resumption re-sumption of relations with the United Unit-ed States after the long hiatus following fol-lowing World War I. At one time it was reported that Litvinov had been purged. This was not so. But what had happened was that the "Russia objects" element had managed to shelve him because of his more liberal lib-eral views. This apparently was the beginning of what many called a "palace revolution," revo-lution," and which some people believe be-lieve is now flaring up into full flame. - The story of the events which led up to the Litvinov affair has never been confirmed, but it is reasonable to assume that it is true. In brief, there was a split in the all-powerful "Polit-Bureau" of the Soviets. The Political Bureau is a small body chosen from the central committee of the Communist party, which is the government's policy-forming entity. This body is composed of powerful Soviet leaders and it exerts a great deal of influence. According to the reports touching on Litvinov's position, the Polit-Bureau was sharply divided into "isolationists" "isola-tionists" and those who looked upon the rest of the world with a less jaundiced view. At that time Stalin was said to be walking a tight-rope between the two and choosing carefully care-fully toward which side he would lean. Litvinov, who believed that Russia could not live by herself and who had always encouraged a sympathetic sym-pathetic attitude toward the outside world, had been completely shelved for his ideas. Little more was heard of these rumblings until after the end of the war, when the Red army became the symbol of Russian salvation. Then it appeared that the isolationist isolation-ist Russia, the big-army Russia, the Russia which wouldn't take anything off anybody, had a new and powerful power-ful backer the officers (and perhaps per-haps some of the rank and file as well) of the Red army. In any case, we know that the high , officers of the army received all sorts of perquisites, rewards and privileges, which only the highest of the high receive. Red Army Strong Factor The assumption on the part of some observers is that with the ascendancy as-cendancy of the Red army element, not only the isolationists, but the Communist party as a whole, lost influence. There has always been jealousy between the two, though, of course, their membership overlaps in many cases. You will recall that at the beginning of the war civilian commissars were attached to army units and they censored all orders issued by the officers. This proved to be not only highly unpopular with the military, but also impractical. impracti-cal. The civilian commissars were then withdrawn and only those with military training were appointed. Their authority, in effect at least, became merged with that of the military. Now the high army officers are recognized as occupying virtually the same plane as the high party officials. Just where Stalin stands as a result re-sult of this change in the fabric of Russian national policy it is impossible impos-sible to say. It has been rumored that he has relinquished his function as commander-in-chief. It has also been rumored that he is ready to drop out of- the picture completely and choose a successor. In that connection con-nection it was hinted that General Zhukov, Russia's Eisenhower, was afflicted with a "diplomatic illness" when he suddenly gave up a widely advertised trip to the United States, which it was said he had looked forward for-ward to with considerable zest. This might have been a signal that Russia was drawing further within herself. ' Some believe that it indicated that Zhukov was the chosen successor of Stalin and that, until a new regime was firmly established, the Soviets would maintain a negative policy in foreign relations. In any case, it is clear that the "Russia objects" policy was inaugurated inaugu-rated for some reason and naturally, since in the past Stalin had always been the one who was able to play' ball with the Allies, at least to the point where progress seemed to be made toward working agreements, Washington is by no means anxious to see him fade from the picture. Meanwhile, the one hopeful view which is being taken of the Russian situation is that it may be that there is some kind of a change taking place within Russia and that the present policy of stalling means nothing worse than a necessary marking time on the part of the Soviet So-viet leaders until the outcome is settled. And then there is always another ' reason which pops up as an explanation explana-tion of almost anything these days the atomic bomb. BARBS ... by Baukhage ' The Salvation army gave service to 225,000,000 servicemen during the war in their clubs, hostels and mobile mo-bile units. But I'll bet they didn't surpass those doughnuts they served us in World War I. Two hundred and seventy million dollars worth of highway projects, frozen during the war, are now start-tne. The air transport command recently re-cently took 24 queen bees from America to France. This is a record for transporting royalty. . . . Is the sun burning up your crops? There are plenty of surplus bombers bomb-ers no good for anything else which could fly in formations and squirt out enough water to make clouds so we'ri to'd. |