Show beneral ad e n nth I 1 mi AM 41 e 7 as 0 0 0 X X t 4 r ah a h it ae 1170 4 X X ciet CI ht 1931 in 1 11 II ly the North airm amerl ri by y general X cn can alliance world rights mermod including the reproduction in john ossa J pershing 0 derric X er la in part prohibited na CHAPTER LIV continued the thirty division all bell was still hlll with the british when tile the com boned attack of the british fourth and the french first armies in n the albert sector begun began august 8 the division was waa in front line training with the british fourth army and was attached ached to tale MR tish third corps for the operation the one hundred and thirty first regiment of infantry being assigned to td the british fifty eighth division tills this regiment joined in tile the attack 0 against tho the morlancourt chipilly spur north of the comine it readied reached its objectives in splendid fashion and occupied a line on tile tho western edge of Gress alre wood extending southward along tile river august 10 it continued to progress against decided opposition gill gillming ning tho the eastern edge of the forests of lotse and marcon during tile the following three days daya tho the command con imand having been shifted the one mildred hundred and thirty first infantry under the australian fourth division attained a line just west of bray aur ur somene tile three other regiments were in reserve during the operations the one hundred and thirty first infantry was relieved august 20 having advanced over three talles miles and suffered suffer pI heavy casualties I 1 motored to the british front sunday to be present at thirty third dl vision headquarters near colliens Moll Mol lens liens acx bols on tho the occasion of the lilt of who was waa then visiting his armies general bliss hild had preceded me and wo we both spent tile the night there that evening general hell bell rc relating the details 0 of the participation of tits his troops with the sh said their services had been urgently requested quested and that they had acquitted themselves well king george bestons bestows decorations tho the king arrived august 12 to present decorations to SOL selected acted men of the thirty third division who had part participated lel inthe in the recent attacks of tile british nimy soon after tits hla tir rival tile the king invited general ge miss and me to his room where ho he presented me witt with the grand crosa of the order of the path hath anti and hc stowed tho the order of st iti michael chaet and st george on general bliss the presentations were informal as the king simply handed the decorations to us ua in turn at tile the same time expressing hla his appreciation of american assistance we then accompanied the king icing to the place where the men were assembled for the ceremony ue he was gra clousin cloua clous in ln ills as lie ho pinned the decorations on our men and the recipients were extremely proud CHAPTER LV tile find decision that the first american army would undertake the reduction of the lie st mille salient a its first operation was transmitted to army headquarters august 10 and the army start staff immediately begun began the development of plans for the concen of 0 the necessary troops for its jt execution it was certain the psychological et feet on the enemy of our success in tills first operation by the american army as well sa an on OB the allies our own troops and dour people at home would be of great importance the attack must We therefore not only succeed but a serious hostile reaction must be nindo imade impossible the headquarters of the first army were vere removed to between august 11 and 16 tile the special army troops assembled north of chateau thierry were moved eastward during the same period composition of first army the following corps and divisions placed at the disposal of tile the first army for the st millet operation and their condition may be summer ired ir ed as follows the first and second divisions were e excellent xcell ent as to training equI equipment Vinent and morale they had attil attacked eked july juif 38 in tile colsson Sols son drle drive the third fourth tw twenty enty sixth and forty second divisions were of tine fine morale and considerable experience as they kad had fought in the defense about chateau thierry ry and in tue the advance toward tile the deslo river the u kuh and ninetieth div dav islona were going through their sector training on the front between tout and the moselle river and the fifth and thirty fifth divisions were taking their sector training in the the thirty third seven seventy ty eglia eighth h eightieth and eighty second divisions had bad been training behind the british front one brigade of tile the thirty third having had bad front line alne service with the british and the ninety first flost division had bad i never been in tile the front line and had bad received less lesa than four weeks beeks training in france misleading tho the germans the considerable circulation of troops in uie the st SL mablel area naturally tile attention iod of the people aud 0 1 the amers osh ers and soldiers although cautioned against such discussion cus sion slon the probability ot an american attack in n tile the salient was dl dla cussed here lind ind there to divert the attention from our real objective it was necessary C first to create creat soiha s uncertainty tz to the minds of our own troops the C J was wa therefore started around headquarters that our arst first offensive might be in tile the direction of millhouse in the valley beyond the mountains northeast of nel bel fort ort it wits was also decided to make n diversion in that direction und and as u preliminary ate step P an officer was sent to lease buildings in at the same anine time ilmo confidential instructions were sent bent major general bundy com coin madding the irth corps corp to proceed to belfort bel fort with it Idil ted and prepare detailed plans for nil mi offensive with the alio object L seizing Mulli ouse und tile the heights to the atie and eventually establishing our linn line along the klinne in the letter vt of instructions seven divisions were as having lining been fur for tile alie and three ollI cers from 1 1 cli I of these units were detailed to report to general bundy to assist in the DIB reconnaissance ue tie was directed to expedite the lie work of us its the movement would atily begin september 8 under my personal command an attack by the french tenth army begun august ia 20 1018 wua wag undertaken der taken talen to force tho the retirement of the lie enemy from the lie vesle anil and alene rivers on its relief from the veste vesle august 7 tho the T thirty second 1 division ilynn was assigned to the tenth army and entered tile the line august augur t 11 28 immediately undertaking a series of local operations in which gains were made in the face of very heavy ire fire It avInes und and numerous eaves caves in ahe region provided cover for tile the fortresses around tout toul we anve had three divisions in line fine on nn the smith face of the sector but tile the moss mass of our battle troops would not take over the trenches until the night before tile the nten I foch surprise august au 30 the lay I 1 misu ua com coin mand of the llie sector bector marshill foell foch accompanied hy by ameril leykand Wey Kand ills chief of staff came to my resilience residence nt at il ariy riy en barholm anti and after the usual cordial P collinge ci llinge of greenim presented an all entirely ii ew plan for the bao 11 of the american urmy the marshal mars lint began by saying lii that the fernian ler nian anniles were ere in more inure or bess froin loin recent attacks by tin the and that we e inukai not nilow allow them to lo reorganize und mii that the british would continue their attack in tile the direction of kimbral and kt it quen ouen tin thi tind tile llie french toward mesnil then ihen much to my surprise he proposed that lint the lie objectives in tile st be restricted and the attack anade un on the southern face only and that upon its completion two other operations lie he undertaken by combined american and french it a number of our dIvIs divisions lons going under french command pershing insists on U S army I 1 repented what I 1 had often said that the Ameil american can government and people expected the lie army etiny to net act as a 0 unit and nil not be dispersed in this way Z 13 0 oil ot 1 I T r V M their way into a farmstead defending troops the tha gene general rat I 1 attack of the army the following day met but slight success tho the enemy resisting desperately along ills entire front but on the by it flank attack from the south the thirty second division captured ju vigny pushing a small salient into the german lines hard lighting continued august 81 31 but buk by the end of nt the day tile the thirty second had readied reached the important soissons st quentin road where it was relieved september 2 the thirty second division had advanced nearly three miles and its success contributed greatly to the forced withdrawn of the german line to the ainne aisne river I 1 pershing takes over sector As aa prearranged between general petain and myself the sector from port sur peille east of the river to watronville ville north of les Fp arges forty two miles in extent then occupied by the entire french eighth army and a part of the french second army abaiy was transferred to my command on august 10 0 tile the front included tile the st millie sal salient which was between betwee is these points and aind embraced the permanent anent I 1 pointed out that each time we were about to complete the organization organ hatlon or of our army some proposition like tills this was presented to prevent it I 1 the discussion was somewhat heated and much of it was carried oli on so rapidly that it could got not be translated lie continued to reiterate tits his deni demands ands for the adoption of his plan I 1 but I 1 had learned that it was necessary to be very firm in dealing with him and I 1 finally sold said in effect AI 11 arshal foch you have no authority as allied commander om mander in chief to cull call upon me to yield up my command of tile the american army to have it scattered among the allied forces where it will not be an american army nt at all lie ile was apparently surprised at my resentment of his attempt to confine american effort to subordinate roles and said 1 I must insist upon the arrangement ran gement to which I 1 replied as we both rose you may insist nil all you please but I 1 decline absolutely to agree to your plan while our army will will tight fight wherever hornier you may decide it will not fight except as tin an american mer army lie he said raid lie he was war disposed to do wh what a t he could toward forming forni lm an american army lie ile then picked up his maps and papera ano and left very ery v anle rile a and n d ap patently parent ly f saying baying at the door ns as lie he handed roe lue tile the memorandum of tits his proposal that he thought that thai after careful study I 1 should arrive at the same conclusion lie he had bad agreement 1 is reached my chief of staff general acan drew and chief of operations pox fox conner onner were sent to confer with annd september I 1 wid and returned to en with word that I 1 marshal hat boeti lesi ryd to see bee general teg fain and me the he following follow tv day motoring to pet aills headquarters with ll 11 doyd yd anti and de Marc enches we found Al McAndr cAndrew cw and conner had preceded us and after lunch we went to bombon opening the conference coh ference terence foch referred to alie noto lie had handed me august 30 and to my reply and ad asked my observations stating my attitude on the desirability of f carrying out vigorous offensives to 10 the me fullest umrai pos 0 vigorous me umrai 0 sible extent I 1 explained that it if it should be deemed necessary to abandon tile the st at hil lilet project in order to begin lepan tile alie larger offensive which was understood to be west of tile the menee I 1 would abline by tits decision in tile ensuing discussion while there was considerable sparring it wua was agreed agri rd lie Arneri american call army should operate as a unit under its own commander ou on the monse argonne front marshal foch concluded that the date for t the 11 e operation should be postponed so we could first carry out the limited attack at st Alili lel we anally reached the definite nite understanding that after st millet our bur first army should prepare to begin tills second of offensive not later t than han september 25 CHAPTER tile the first army attacked yesterday ay and the reduction of the st N salient Is complete reads my diary of september 13 written at bligny ligny en barrois barrels our troops behaved splendidly th the e secretary of war visited two corps headquarters returned to cilny much delighted at our success etain and I 1 went to tile the town of st mahlol today and were warmly greeted by the people pe ople tills this in 18 my birth birthday my and a pry happy one the attack of the infantry on the southern face of the st salient started at five in the morning and before that 1 I went with several staff off leers io to old fort situated ou on a commanding height overlooking the battlefield from the lie south the secondary attack on the west was launched at 8 a in as tin nn elew ent nt of surprise for artillery preparation there weather gives advantage A drizzling rain and nilst mist prevented us from getting a clear view but tile the progress of our troops could be followed by the barrage which pr preceded seceded then them notwithstanding a heavy rainfall the night of september 1112 11 12 the weather gave us fill an advantage as tile the nilst partly screened our advance from the enemy overcome entanglements Entangle ments thanks to the thorough preparation beforehand the wire entanglements entangle ments were more easily overcome than wo we had expected trained teams of pioneers plo and engineers gi with bangalore torp torpedoes eloes wire cutters and axes assisted in opening gaps in the masses of barbed wire covering the german positions the lending leading troops themselves carried along rolls of chicken wire which was thrown across entanglements entangle ments here and there forming a kind of bridge jor for the infantry in all theli offensives the allies had spent days destroying entanglements entangle ments with artillery fire or had bad used ni cd a large number ot o t heavy tanks but we had only a few light tanks ineffective for such work the fact that we had smothered the enemy artillery was an advantage vantage nd as it enabled the leading waves deliberately to do their work without serious loss the quick illicit passage through these en I 1 tangle ments by our troops excited no little surprise among the french who sent a large number of officers and noncommissioned off officers leers to st millet several days later to see how it had been done one of these officers oal vers after his reconnaissance remarked in nil all seriousness that the americans had the advant advantage fige over frenchmen because of their long iong legs and large fen feet TO BE CONTINUED verdun M of attack of first army sept ik off line morning sept biath ile front lines sept W and d sept ar my bouner boundary y y corps coro boundary arrows indicate indices e direct direction ion and weight of attack arabic numerals indicate divisions roman numerals indicate corps 0 5 Z a 14 C 11 7 0 de ro 0 A bercourt em 10 PT th iau eco aes fb no s rd 2 15 jm X pont 0 ij S 0 n imey eiChe prey |