Show STORIES 9 AMP AA GENERAL MEADE AT MINE RUN Highly Promising Plan Ruined by Blunders of Subordinates Subordinate 6 Thereby Preventing Concentration In response to a query asking for tor an account of the tho Mine Run campaign I the National Tribune makes the following following fol fol- fol lowing reply The rhe Mine Run campaign was one of ot the conceived best-conceived movements o othe ot the war but utterly failed on account of or the mismanagement of th the tho corps commanders November 1863 s saw w I what was virtually the end of the Gettysburg campaign with Its se se- of back and forth from Alexandria to Orange Court House Bouse Gen Meade saw that he ho had hadL L Lee at a great disadvantage Lee had sent Longstreet's Corps Corp to East Bast Tennessee Tennessee Ten Ten- Teni i and had left only Ewells Ewell's and Hills Hill's Corps E Ewells Ewell's eUs eU's Corps was was was' watching tho the Rapidan In the neighborhood neighborhood neigh neigh- of Culpeper Court House while Hills Hill's Corps was a days day's march away up the river Gen Cen Meade had the Army of the Potomac well in hand only 20 miles away around Culpeper and Stevens Stevensburg burg He conceived that he could throw his army across the river and overwhelm Ewells Ewell's Corps before Hill could go to his assistance It was only a short days day's march to td reach Ewell and he could have been thrashed In a few hours Meade carefully carefully care care- fully worked out his plans and If it his hla orders had been carried can out a 0 great victory would have havo resulted The movement was to begin at dawn of Nov 26 26 by the Fifth Corps followed by the First Corps crossing the Rappahannock Rappahannock Rappahannock Rappa- Rappa hannock at Culpeper Mine Ford Fprd and marching to Parkers Parker's Store on the Plank Road The Second Corps was to cross at Ford and march to Robertson's Tavern where It was to be Joined by the Third and Sixth Corps crossing at Jacobs Jacob's Mill Ford Meade expected his whole army to b be united across the Rapidan and cut the flank of Lees Lee's on Mine Run by noon of Nov 27 and the plan had every prospect of success The first blunder was In the movement of ot the Third Corps which having a greater distance to march should should have started earliest but as a matter of fact was much behind its time and delayed the wl whole ole army The next was that the engineers had not correctly measured measured meas meas- the width of the Rapidan and the pontoon bridges were too short The banks of the Rapidan were so so high and precipitous that they delayed the march of the artillery and cavalry so that the whole of Nov 27 passed with less than half of the distance having been bee traversed In the meanwhile meanwhile mean mean- while Lees Lee's signal officers looking down from Clarks Clark's Mountain had detected detected detected de de- de- de the movement and Hills Hill's Corps was summoned back In haste baste to meet It In the meantime the corps officers were mistaking the roads and making other blunders which prevented the concentration and and when the army was at last gotten together Nov 28 it was found that the whole rebel army was in front and fortified along the crest of a range of hills hUls which made a natural fortification in themselves themselves themselves them them- selves for six or eight miles The Confederates had their artillery so placed as to enfilade every line of approach The corps commanders each examined their fronts for possible possible ble points of or attack and made strong which cost a great many mens men's lives As all the trains had been left on the north side of the Rapidan in anticipation of a quick sharp movement the army was now out of rations and Meade saw frustrated frustrated frus- frus trims frus his hopes of ending the Gettysburg Gettysburg Gettysburg Get Get- campaign by a decisive vic vIe tory He therefore ordered the army to return to Its camps around C Cul Cul- l- l peper He wanted to move his army to Fredericksburg which would have been an excellent r and placed Lee Iee at a disadvantage but he he was prevented by Hallecks Halleck's orders n notto not notto t tto to make any change of base without authority from Washington |