Show enral pers hinds hin qs stora of III A E F w imeln all countr lei by th north aberion Nw naper per world n GetierS 1 riger including tha t j j service CHAPTER continued in making our dispositions tor bat tie our older divisions the first second and I 1 orty second had received positions on the southern face appo site the open spaces to enable them to flank the wooded ares quickly thus aiding the advance of less experienced units assigned to these areas hie whole line pivoting as planned on the I 1 eighty second division on the right advanced resolutely to the at tack the entire operation was car aled through with dash and precision by afternoon the troops had pushed beyond their scheduled objectives and by evening had reached the second jay s objective on most of the south ern front I 1 he division of the fourth corps dackman and those on the left of the first corps laggett overwhelmed the hostile garrisons and quickly over ran their positions carrying the fight ing into the open the german resist on this part of the front was als organized organised sed by the rapidity of our ad vance and was soon overcome al though the enemy was expecting an attack be did not think it would take place so soon and it therefore came as a surprise when the first division ou the marching flank of the southern attack bad broken through the hostile for ward positions the squadron of caa airy attached to the fourth corps was passed through the breach at 1 45 p m it pushed forward to reconnoiter recon the roads toward but en countering machine guns tn position was forced to retire western attack slower on the western face of the salient progress was not so satisfactory the twenty sixth division in its attempt to make a deep advance toward met considerable resist ance and except for a battalion of the division reserve nad cot reached the days objective the french at the tip of the salient had attempted to follow up the flanks of our successful penetrations but made only small advances upon the request of gen E J Blond lat corn manding the french second colonial corps a regiment of the eightieth dl vision cronkhite in reserve was lent to his assistance on the afternoon of the twelfth earning that the roads leading out of the salient between the two attacks were filled with retreating enemy troops with their trains and artillery 1 gave orders to the commanders of the fourth and fifth corps to push forward without delay using the telephone myself I 1 directed the commander of the fifth corps to send at least one regiment of the twenty sixth division toward alg with all possible speed that evening a strong force from the fifty first brigade pushed boldly forward and reached at 2 15 a m the it immediately made dispositions that effectively closed the roads leading out of the ballent west of that point in the fourth corps the second brigade of the first division advanced in force about dawn of the its leading elements reaching by 0 a m the salient was closed and our troops were masters of the field could have passed hindenburg line the troops continued to advance on the when the line was lashed approximately along the final objectives set for this offensive in view of alie favorable situation created just west of the moselle river by our successes farther to the left a limited attack was made on eliat pirt of the front by elements of the t eighty second and ninetieth divisions with good results during the night our troops all aang the line were engaged in oran zing their new positions foi defense preparatory to the withdrawal of dl visions and corps troops for in the meuse battle september 14 15 and ag local opera alons continued consisting of strong and occupation of better ground tor defensive purposes beginning the several counter attacks were repulsed the line as finally established was fresnel fresnes en doncourt saulny jaulny Vand leres received the and indicated that the enemy was retreat ing in considerable disorder without doubt an immediate continuation of the advance would have carried us well beyond the hindenburg line and possibly into metz and the tempha alon to press on was very great but we would probably have become deeply involved and delayed the greater meuse argonne operation to which we were wholly committed during the fighting from september 12 to ag the german one hundred and twenty fifth eighth eighty eighth and divisions re enforced the enemy s line and several other divisions arrived in positions sit ions september 10 in front of the 1 arst amy here were ten german divisions and two brigades lu line and seven divisions in reserve french overjoyed by release birly 10 were taken ana some enemy guns ama fallen into our hands our casualties num bared about As alie enemy retreated he set fire to many large sup ply dumps and several sei eral villages the few remaining I 1 rench inhabitants who found themselves within our lines were overjoyed to be released from the domination of the enemy hut many were left destitute by the burning of their homes at the ery moment of deliverance on the general cime by my headquarters and we went together to st where the people including children carrying french flags gave us a welcome which may well be imagined when one realizes rei lizes that they had been held as prisoners entirely out of touch with thear own countrymen for four years though al ways within of the t reach lines 1 on my visit to leeral corps and dl vision headquarters the following day I 1 found all jubilant over the victory and overflowing with incidents of the fighting reciting many cases of andl bidual heroism among the troops CHAPTER la accordance with the understand ing of september 2 we were now amov ing rapidly toward our second great offensive questions concerning the concentration and supply of the elements of the first army in the battle areas were being worked out by ohp staff of that army who were given every possible assistance by the staff at G D Q the general plan of action of the allied armies as agreed upon at the conference of commanders in chief tuly 24 was to state it simply and briefly that the offensive should con each army driving forward a rapidly as possible the allied and american operations during the summer had resulted in the reduction of the chateau thierry Th lerry akiens amiens and st salientes and the great offensive was now under way immediately west of the mouse river the battle line had remained practically unchanged since 1917 it was front the american army was to play its great part the disposition of the belgian brit ish I 1 rench and american armies on the wide front between the north sea and verdun was such that they would naturally converge as they advanced so long as the enemy could hold his ground on the east of athla battle line frontal attacks farther west might arlve him back on his successive completely covered the entire german front the terrain over which the attach was to be ando formed a defile blocked by three successive barriers the of montfaucon Mont faucon then those ol 01 bunel cunel lind domange om ange and farther back the of the bola de and of ahe bois de bourgoine goine the adeuse river was alie alre arl er fordable only in places in adal afon to the heavy forest of the ar gonne there were numerous woods with heavy undergrowth which were serious obstacles these natural defenses were strength enad by every artificial means able A dense network of wire entangle ments coerced aery position it wai small wonder the enemy had rested four year on this front without being molested hindenburg position Is objective in accordance with alie principal mission which remained the same throughout this great offensive th main attack of the first army was to be west of the river its right to he coerced by the aher and by the operations of the I 1 rench seventeenth corps on the east of tin aher that corps being a part of our army our left was to be supported by a simultaneous attack by the french fourth army our attack to include the argonne forest was to be driven with all possible strength in the gen era direction of the first operation of our army was to am e for its objective the burg position on tre front sur lieue romagne sous montfaucon grand e a following development in the direction of buzancy Mez leres in order to force the enemy beyond the meuse and outflank his position on the rethel line from the east in conjunction with our advance which would outflank the enemy s alon south of the aasne the french fourth army by attacking successively the positions between the aasne and the rivers would be able to occupy the line rethel after that it would operate in the direction of the plateau cast of the rethel alg road aim at tactical surprise our purpose was to effect tactical surprise if possible overcome the enemy s first and second positions in the area of montfaucon Mont faucon and cote dame marle of his third position before the enemy could bring up strong re enforce ments at was an ambitious ahn and 01 e hat would require a rapid advance of ten miles through a densely fortified zone from an estimate of the enemy s reserves and location it was realized that we must capture montfaucon Mont faucon and ilze cote dame marle by the end of the second day it was thought reasonable to count on the vigor and aggressive spirit of our troops to make up in a measure for their inexperience but at the haiie time the fact was not overlooked that a m at the an roe time to divert the elsewhere local enemy a attention raids and demonstrations made moselle front the on the meuse french fourth aminy gouraud to our ifft on the west of the argonne forest began its attack half an hour later the battle opened favorably our attack at that particular place and at that time evidently came as a sur prise to the enemy and our troops were quickly to overrun his forward positions the vast network of undestroyed barbed wire the deep ravines dense woods and heavy fog made it difficult to co the movements of the assaulting infantry especially of some divisions in battle for the first time yet the advance throughout was ei trembly vigorous third corps reaches second line the corps bullard nearest the mouse carried the enemy a sec ond position before dark the thirty third division bell wheeling to the right as it advanced occupied the west bank of the mouse to protect the flank of the army the gols dp borges lorges with its difficult terrain and strong machine gun defenses was car aled in splendid fashion the right of the eightieth division cronkite had by noon cleared the kols jure in the face of heavy ma chine gun fire and established its line north of on its left after an all day fight the division forced its way through the strong positions on hill and reached the northern slopes of that hill the fourth nines on the left of the eightieth took Sept arges and firmly established itself in the woods to the north it was abreast of and its left was more than a mile beyond montfaucon Mont faucon but through some misinterpretation of the orders by the third corps the to capture montfaucon Mont faucon that day was lost three counter attacks against the division during the after noon were broken up fifth corps falls shorty in the center the fifth corps eron with the exception of the amne ty first division johnston on its left fell short of its objectives the seventy ninth division kuhn on the right of the corps took malan court but in the open ground beyond encountered considerable opposition and the advanced elements were not in position before montfaucon Mont faucon until late afternoon the attack of the dl vision launched against this strong point early in the evening was met by the fire of artillery and machine guns from the southern elopes of the hill which held up further progress the thirty seventh division farnsworth in the center of the fifth corps after overcoming heavy ma chine gun fire pushed through the the bots de montfaucon Mont faucon and its at tacks in the afternoon carried the line up to and west of montfaucon Mont faucon the left of its line facing stiff opposition cleaned up the woods in its front and established itself just south of ivoury lions yet a decision would be long delayed yanks face strong position ills main line of communication and supply ran through carignan Carl gnan sedan and Mez leres if that should be in before he could withdraw his armies from france and belgium the co in the narrow avenue which lay between the ardennia Arden nea forest ina the dutch frontier were BO limited that he would oe unable adequately to supply his forces or to evaluate them before his ruin would be accomplished As our objective was the aedan railroad II 11 was evident that the sector assigned to the american army was opposite the most sensitive pan of the german front then being attacked the danger confronting he enem made it imperative that he should hold on in front of the american army to the limit of his resources germans strongly fortified the area between the river and the argonne forest waa ideal for defensive fighting on the cast the helg lits of alie mouse commanded that river valley and on the west ahe rugged hills of the argonne for est dominated the valley of the aire river in the center the watershed shed between the lre and the macuse rivers commanded bogli allays all cys with ohp heights of lunel llo mange and of the auls de standing out as natural strong points from these heights observation points lack of technical skill might considerably reduce the chances of complete success against well defenders general petain had already given it as his opinion that we should not be able to get farther than mont faucon before winter CHAPTER the sietse argonne offensive opened the morning of september 26 to call it a battle may be a misnomer yet it was a battle the greatest most prolonged in american history through 47 days we were engaged in n per struggle with the enemy to smash through his defenses the attack started on a front of 24 miles which gradually extended until the enemy was being actively assailed from the Arf conne forest to the moselle alier W miles in nil more than 1 were em aloyed and the attack was driven 32 miles to the north and 14 miles to the northeast before the armistice bated hostilities the outstanding fact that 1 desire to emphasize Is that once started athe battle was maintained continuously and relentlessly to the end all difficulties were overridden in one doua sustained ettori to terminate the war then anil there in n victorious manner after three hours dolent i oration the attack at J the finety first division johnston overcame strong initial resistance and advanced rapidly to which it entered but did not hold crossing into the sector of the thirty fifth dl vision during the daiy diy it occupied varv first corps makes progress on the left of the army the first corps laggett made excellent ress the thirty fifth division traub cleverly captured the strong position of and took chappy cheppy against stubborn opposition elements of the division reached the corps objective east of charpentry Char pentry but were soon withdrawn to a line west of very on the left the division captured that part of varennes east of the aire river but was held up between varennes and chappy cheppy at this time a fresh regiment took the lead giving a new impetus to the attack and pushed the line forward to the high ground south of charpentry Char pentry in the twenty eighth division melr the right brigade captured the western half of varennes Va and con tinned about a mile farther the left brigade facing the eastern spurs of the argonne which constituted the enemy s thief defense of tint forest nai unable to overcome the intense machine gun fire from the vicinity of mahant the seventy seventh alexander in the difficult terrain of the argonne made bomi progress inq BS |