Show 1331 in 1 I by the north american story of the A newspaper world right ailland AIl lanc r E V gt scandinavian anred including the production in whole or la part prohibited J jessy gen J service CHAPTER continued jt as a dource of real regret to me not to command the first division in and coupled with the fact that its entry into the battle caf of considerable moment led me to speak a wor confidence and encouragement when the officers about SOO 1 assembled in the grounds of the chateau occupied division headquarters they formed 1 rare group these splendid looking men hard ened by the strenuous work of the fall and by two months in winter trenches fairly radiated the spirit of courage and gave promise that amer leas effort would prove her sons the equals of their forefathers the first division saw its first major offensive some six weeks later i brilliant counterattack at la the akiens amiens sector wanted the A E F united ahat afternoon I 1 motored to garcua to see general foch and sound him out regarding the prospects of unit ing our divisions in a sector of our own 1 told him that the secretary of var when in france had expressed an eardest desire to hasten the formation of an american army and that this wa also the wish of the president it was my opinion I 1 ald that early action would be of great importance in stimulating the morale of our troops and of our people novy that the first division was to go into line the people at home would expect toon to hear that an american army engaged on its own front I 1 sug the possibility that the corps might be assembled near the first dl as a beginning general foch agreed in principle to the suggestion but was uncertain nhen the other divisions could be spared which I 1 of course fully ap predated lie pointed out that the enemy was very aggressive and referred to the severe attack against the british on the lys between lens and which began on the oth and was still in progress but look ing beyond f insisted that the awen ty sixth and forty second divisions might be withdrawn at any time from quiet sectors to be followed by the second and the thirty second and also the third a few days later I 1 pointed out that this force of six divisions including the first would emual twelve french and gave it as my opinion that it would be better to use this american group for active operations than to detain the units in quiet sectors and send french divisions to the battle front uy understanding after this discus loa was very definite that the plan ifould soon be carried out leaving the act time and place to be determined it a immaterial to me just where it should occur the point being to get it done hard fighting on the lys the german offensive on the lys as another formold ible effort to break fhe british line the attack made to the north and south of on a front of 24 miles by 27 german divisions the exhausted british though they fought with most commendable courage and skill were forced again to ilela with heavy lossis te themselves and the portuguese consisting of two divisions who were aith them several french divisions were hur fled to the lys front but it was a eek after the attack began before abey a put into the line they en relieved british divisions at the famous kemmel hill only to be sur posed and defeated themselves april a much to their chagrin ahe battle a practically ended by the list of tte month with a gain by the ger aang of ten or eleven miles and the capture of important territory from ln british but with failure to take hazebrouck CHAPTER it was always stimulating to ones morale to visit the headquarters of t canadians where one soon caught e fine spirit of that superb body I 1 made such a visit in the spring 01 and talked with their corps meander gen sir arthur ie his chief of staff major gen weber his chief of engineers jor general lindsay and others abad tea with them the alertness and confidence of e neighbors of ours and the ex ent record they had made and e still making gave us as much as though they had been own I 1 remember this visit with awa pleasure and recall the pre of the canadians that amer is mould soon play an important part in the war beneral en eral currie deplored the fact u ane british had so easily given up daele ridge which the year he had been told must be taken 1 all costs and for which the cana alade th tremendous sacrifice nf of 16 casualties gall at british G H Q hat citation of sir douglas S british commander in alef I 1 ten the general head 1 20 to ss the training of on oops alth the british and study ons in pro gres we were always made welcome at british headquarters it so happened that on the day of our arrival lord derby who had just been relieved as minister of war by lord allner was there en route to paris as british ambassador during dinner the con vers atlon ran along freely as though we were members of the official fam lly at length lord derby and sir douglas drifted to the subject of brit ish politician it would betray no confidence to say that there was considerable criticism of some who held prominent places the coalition government came in for its share because of its attitude toward the military high command I 1 took advantage of the anity while on the british front to visit the area to inspect the advance elements of the seventy sev anth one of the divisions selected for training with the british we took luncheon with brig gen evan M johnson then temporarily in command and his staff officers he praised the soldierly qualities of the men but said they were very much behind in their training makes agreement with halg at sir douglas headquarters he and I 1 reached an understanding as to the training and administration of our troops that were to be temporarily with the british in the first place they were to be allocated by ments to british skeleton divisions under such a schedule as might be agreed upon the training staffs of british divisions were to be at the disposal of these regiments especially for instruction in the use of the rifle and machine gun and the handling of gas after that and with the approval of their american division corn mander the regiments were to be attached to a british division in line each of the three battalions of the regiment would hae the opportunity to serve with one of the three bri addes in each british division these battalions were to be commanded by their own officers as a part of the british brigade while the staff of the american regiment was to be at cached to that of the brigade in alie next stage the american regiments with their three battalions united under the regimental corn mander were to act as a brigade in a british division the final stage would find the four american mants of each division united as such under its own officers the artillery being british until the archal of its own artillery brigade in carrying out this scheme the ten dency at first was for british officers actually to assume command of our units in training our officers in most cases permitted this to be done until it was checked by my orders that units must be commanded in training by the officers and noncom officers who are to corn mand them in battle and that amer lean troops would in all cases be corn banded in bettio only by americans talks shipping in london following a suggestion by lord malner I 1 went to london april 22 1918 to consider further the ship ment of american troopers at our first conference there were present lord allner and gen sir henry H son who had succeeded general rob ertson as the chief of the general stilt ITar bord and myself the main point of difference that had developed in p evious conferences as to just how far the americans should be commit ted J serve in active operations was again considered I 1 stated that the main thing was to get our units trained and that while I 1 was opposed to amalgamation yet it during the period of instruction the units with which they were serving should be attacked or if another gre U emergency should arise of course our men would go in naturally the brit ish wanted unlimited infantry and machine gun units but I 1 would con elder nothing further than a limited extension of the six division plan during the conference a cable from lord heading to the prime minister was brought forth which stated that the president had agreed to the amal ga matlon of americans with the brit ash I 1 had nothing official at hand later than the presidents conditional approval of joint note no 18 of the supreme war council as suggested by secretary baker so I 1 promptly said that it could not be possible that any such concession had been made and that the classes of our troops to be shipped over and their disposition must be left to me agree on troop shipments As a result of these discussions we reached an agreement which provided for the in may by british and american tonnage of atie infantry machine gun engineer and signal troops together with the various unit headquarters of six divisions for training with the british army it was provided that any shipping in ex cess of the amount required for this number of troops should be utilized to transport the artillery of these dl visions also that such personnel as might be required to build up corps organizations should then follow it being understood that the artillery regiments would train with the french and join their proper divisions when this was completed to meet any emergency that might require an excess of infantry after the completion of this program it was agreed that all the american and british shipping available for the transportation of troops was to be used under such arrangement as would insure immediate aid to the al lies and thereafter as far as possible provide other units necessary to corn the organization of our divisions and corps it was further agreed that the corn balant troops mentioned in connection with may shipments should be followed by such services of supply and other contingents as we ourselves might consider necessary the ship ment of a large number 0 these troops should be utilized at my discretion except that the six divisions which the british were to transport would be trained with them washington makes concession reaching chaumont I 1 found that a dated april 28 had been received transmitting a memorandum dated april 19 that had been sent by direction of the president to the british ambassador at washington in con formley with his approval of note no 18 in this memorandum the shipment of infantry and machine gun units per month for four months was conceded with the understanding that their assignment for training and use should be left to my discretion it went on to say that the united states until the situation changed had no intention of departing from as full compliance with the becom mend atlon of the permanent military representatives as the nature of the case would permit this was the first official informs alon I 1 had received that the administration had agreed to send any specific numbers of infantry and machine gun units to france this concession went further than it was necessary to go and much fur ther than I 1 had expected realizing the complications that might arise from commitments so far in the future and the delay in forming an american army that would follow I 1 did not agree in later discussions at the su preme war council with all that the allies now felt justified in demanding I 1 was opposed to the action of the supreme war council in assuming the power under anny circumstances to ats pose 0 american troops it was lr not in any sense a prerogative of the su preme war council there can be little doubt that lord reading received the distinct imbres slon president allson that infantry and machine gun units would be sent to france at the rate of men per month for four months beginning with april eliat the president agreed to this in prin ciple Is practically certain it need not be further emphasized that such a concession een though prompted by the most generous impulse could only add to the of our task of building up an army of our own it Is probable hit lord heading skilled advocate that he was did more while ambassador at washington to influence the administration to grant allied requests than any other andl bidual CHAPTER I 1 left london april 25 1918 and crossed to france in a british destroyer colonel mott was at boulogne with a for me from general foch to come to sarcus I 1 learned then that the twenty second division at had repulsed a severe trench raid on the night of april 2021 20 21 and had suffered considerable loss arriving at general fochs head quarters I 1 found generals bliss harbord and already there and after dinner we entered into a gen eral discussion about american troop shipments the conversation ran as follows foch on march 28 you came to offer the services of american troops I 1 have a vivid recollection of the occasion As to the american divisions in what order do jou think they should be employed pershing the order would be the twenty sixth forty second second the I 1 arst had already been sent to an active front near akiens amiens the regiments of the thirty second will be ready by may 1 foch I 1 do not think they can be used before may 5 but the more we put into the line the better it will be your seventy seventh division has ar rived I 1 see what about the third and fifth pershing the Infantry of the third has arrived and that of the fifth will soon follow pershing stands firm foch what we need now Is in fantry especially the british on account of the present crisis that Is why the supreme war council at ver sallies recommended that all tonnage be devoted to that purpose tor the time being I 1 hope that america may bend over as much infantry as possible during the next three months the other arms to complete your divisions can come afterward what do you think of that plan pershing I 1 cannot commit myself to such a proposition if nothing but infantry and machine gunners are brought over to the total of it will be october or november before the artillery and auxiliary troops could arrive and we could not foresee the formation of an american army until next spring foch I 1 think your calculation Is rather pessimistic tor we could begin bringing 5 our other troops in august but without considering that point we can furnish you with arall lery and its personnel and you can have your divisions reconstituted be ginning with october what would yon propose in this connection pershing I 1 think we should limit the transportation of infantry to may and that the artillery and auxiliary troops shaula come in june they should not arrve more than a month later than the infantry under what conditions would you employ the american infantry units TO BE CONTINUED 1 |