Show i HINDENBURG B BY Y FRANK FRANl H. H I. SIMONDS Military men the the tho world over will not share the popular emotion excited by bythe bythe bythe the promotion of Field Marshal Hin Ilin- Hindenburg denburg to replace Fal Fal as chief of the great general staff of Ger Ger- many The truth is that Hindenburg is one of the familiar but thoroughly ly dangerous men about whom there he fulfils ful fulfils ful- ful grows up a legend In fact fils M. M Clemenceau's definition of a symbol a man about whom the people peo peo- plo pIe still believe what was never trues trueNo true No one will deny the greatness o or of I first victory and only in Germany German has the tho value of Tannenberg Tannenberg Tannenberg Tannen- Tannen berg been accurately appraised Had Hindenburg failed where he succeeded Germany in the second week of Sep- Sep 1914 1014 would have been faced with a wholly y desperate situation The defeat of the Marne l the rout of the Austrians at Lemberg followed by the temporary temporal y collapse of their military establishment the brilliant victory victory of off the Serbs at the together with witha a a. lost battle at t Tannenberg would have presented a problem that would have taxed a Napoleon It was the victory of Tannenberg that enabled the Germans to continue their campaign in the West to make malte their second great bid for a decision at Ypres and the and defeated In this to dig in and hold the lines that they have held ever since Had Hindenburg failed the German retreat from the Marne l would not have ha stopped stopped stopped stop stop- I ped at the Aisne or the Meuse and it I would have ha been necessary at once to send many corps to the East to save the Prussian frontier Warsaw Failure But despite his second success at atthe atthe atthe the l lakes Hindenburg never realized the promise that his first successes successes successes suc suc- held out His attempts to taKe Warsaw were dismal failures costing enormous losses and ending in complete complete complete com com- deadlock on the Rawa Bzura-Rawa lines Nor was his effort to penetrate the Bobr Bobr Dobr line north of Warsaw 1 more successful At his third great victory he came within an ace of a a. terrible disaster and was saved by the supreme courage de devotion devotion devotion de- de and discipline of German troops rather than by any skill of a commander commander commander com com- mander in chief The real military reputation of the Eastern front is that of Mackensen His Isis was the first and successful thrust in the opening phase of He lie Hewon Hewon won the battle of and it was his operation that finally turned the Russians out of Warsaw more than I ten months after Hindenburg had be begun begun be be- gun his campaigns for the Polish cap cap- ital But Dut there is is no Mackensen legend and Hindenburg the savior of of East Prussia as he actually was became became became be be- came in the eyes of the German people a soldier not less successful than Napoleon Napoleon Napoleon Na Na- the Great and J not less gifted as a staff director thai the he elder Moltke l Failure at Verdun The retirement of the younger and leS lesser r Moltke who was chief of the gre gret t general staff when the war op opened ed was inevitable when th the de decision decision decision de- de of the Marne had been made absolute by the battles of Flanders and the whole original German conceptIon conception conception con con- of a quick terrible decisive thrust at France had been parried He had failed he had failed in the greatest greatest greatest great great- est crisis of the whole war and his failure had resulted in the collapse of the main strategy by which Germany had for forty years veal's expected ed to win her next war against France We shall probably find hereafter that Falkenhayn's retirement was the direct result of the failure at Verdun This was the second and only less ambitious ambitious am am- effort to abolish the decision of the Marne and put France out of the war But it seems certain that history will do full credit to the very great achievements of the man who now gives way to the victor of Tan- Tan enberg When he took the reins the German situation without being desperate desperate des des- was certainly unpromising In less than six months he had organized forces and prepared plans that led to the amazing cycle of victories which carried German lines from the East Prussian frontier and the Austrian Austrian I provinces of the East to the I the Beresina the and to Con Con- I How France Endured It is true that all these victories failed to win the war The rhe decision escaped the victors of a score of fields But it is hardly too much to say that there was no longer a real chance for fora a decision when Falkenhayn took hold Germany had for for forty y years planned a war var on certain lines the he had bent every effort concentrated every energy harnessed the genius I anil anU the resources of the race to the campaign which began at t Liege and for the next six weeks dazzled all the world sav save the French portion which was engaged in meeting that thrust with supreme skill courage and inthe inthe in inthe the end avith higher generalship The chance for victory was gone when Falkenhayn came carne unless the victory could be won by relatively minor effort and by exhausting France and Russia before Britain was ready Russia escaped by retreat France endured by the magnificent resistance at the Meuse And if the Marne was a victory of generalship Verdun was a triumph of the soldiers whose commanders had for a moment at least failed them But Verdun was an absolute failure After eighteen months Falkenhayn failed at the task set for him when he took command He did not succeed in disposing of either Russia or France and now not only is Britain in the field but Italy has long been fighting and amI Rumania has just enlisted Task Is Colossal If It If Hindenburg were the supreme I. I genius the German people believe him to be it would be a good sign this i change in command But as it stands I it is impossible not to believe that the change has been made for political reasons and an Inferior commander has replaced an able strategist who has failed at an impossible task I simply because the change will have havea a momentary effect upon the German I peoples whose can no I longer be doubted It may even be 1 conjectured that tha the kaiser made the change w with th great reluctance for Falkenhayn Falkenhayn Falkenhayn Fal Fal- I is his and his personal personal per per- peri i selection Hindenburg's task is colossal He has at once to decide whether he willI will 1 I shorten his lines If he does not do doj doi j i this he will presently find himself In Inthe inI I the same situation as that of Napoleon in 1813 when the emperor obeyed I political rather than military dictates and kept his army so long in Eastern Germany that it was practically de destroyed destroyed destroyed de- de I and he brought back to the thel Rhine a tattered remnant of that l splendid force in the main bythe by bythe bythe the famous graduation of Marie Mane Louise the boys s of the class of 1813 I who performed miracles for a failing cause But to shorten the lines is to confess defeat Rumor has long insisted that I Hindenburg advocated the withdrawal of the German armies behind the and the la Such a retreat re retreat retreat re- re treat would give Germany German a strong line in the East and release some corps for service in the South but it would mean the surrender of all the Russian conquests save a small portion of Poland it would mean a second re resigning resigning resigning re- re signing of all Galicia and Bukovina cast of the and it would mean the the complete destruction of Hollwegs Hollweg's map of Europe Hindenburg can decide to abandon the Balkans but this means the collapse collapse collapse col col- lapse of Turkey and the opening of the Dardanelles to Russian It means the arrival at the Danube of the Balkan armies of the allies and anda a new peril to Hungary It means the final collapse of the German dream of a road to the Near East It means closing the iron circle about the centrals powers not merel merely for the war but for as long as men can now see in the future Again there is the option of retiring in the West Vest A retreat to the Meuse or to the German frontier would re release release release re- re lease enough corps to hold the Eastern and the Balkan conquests for many months But it would be the gre greatest test of all confessions because It would be a long retreat in the portion of the battleground most familiar to the world and the effect in France could not be exaggerated If there is no retreat at any point there will be disaster at one and perhaps perhaps perhaps per per- I haps at many points before another year vear Germany has not inexhaustible I resources in man power S1 mobilized more men p I and suffered greater losses than any anyone one of lr h has long ago passed the maxi mart the regular formations ns which I maintain Her Hp entire 1 taxed to keep up the number I she has in the field In th thella lla I months she and rd her Austria have had a to find more re than I men to to replace losses reSit of of the he then Sit SitI t f Germany May Hold jH The real value of the Rumania on the allied sid ig instantly brings bring in new to formal first line troops which c cant canji met b by the transfer of German GermanI trian troops from some some othe I or from the reserves mar marked mediate use on some this respect it has the value familiar last straw No done jone mistake the fact that we wear areTi areTia e ea a great crisis in m the war war- warth th the F since the Marne German by her military policy confess confes confessor confesor or court it She must behind her present line Q o al too long for her man power power an an pay the penalty as Lee Richmond and Napoleon And it is reasonable to conch in calling Hindenburg wh S u for the position he must t German emperor has prepa prep 4 Q feat He has given the Germar the commander they trust l given the commander an art an imi ml m task and he has given 1 one of the really great generatE generals present war has failed miracle after a supreme and 1 effort aid Germany may mav still be a able ably e all her present lines for many i ifor for the greater part of the ne conceivably but the longer theIne shon sh shon on this too extended front th tb complete and the more terril be the ultimate disaster tt |