Show AFTER SURRENDER No Need for Haste on a Single Department o aF Nali National nai Defense se By MAJ MM GEORGE FIELDING ELI ELIOT T There There here Is Js a great deal of pressure pressure pres pre sure mum these days tending tending- toward the creation of a a. single department department department depart depart- ment of national defense to combine the present functions of the war and navy depart depart- men ments There is even a considerable considerable considerable con con- sentiment in some quarters for the unification of the armed services that is i for forthe forthe forthe the member of the army navy navy- and marine corps into a single ingle service As to these matters we would I II think do better to proceed l slowly There is no need fo for haste Th There re is r rather ther thera a a. need for calm caIrn and dispassionate study of the lessons of the last war and the lessons of all our military history before any reaching far-reaching decisions are made On the face of them these Ulese suggestions seem sound they appeal to the efficiency expert mentality which comes so naturally to many Americans But are they really what they seem For example let u us look at atthe atthe atthe the proposed department of national national national na na- na- na defense There are various schemes for its organization most of its proponents seem to desire that there shall shaH be a secretary secretary secretary sec sec- of national defense at the head of or the department with under undersecretaries for army navy air forces and a combined supply service The real effect of this would simply limply be to impose an additional additional additional ad ad- echelon of administration tion between the functioning heads of departments and the const constitutional In commender-In- chief the chief the president Inevitably the under-secretaries under for army and ana navy navy- would come to occupy much th the same status with respect re respect respect re- re to the two services 8 as es f the tho present secretaries of war and navy Over them would be a bigger bigger bigger big big- ger boss who would alone have havethe havethe havethe the right of or direct access to the president X It cannot believe that administration administration administration ad ad- ministration would be simpler and easier under such a system rather It would tend to duplication duplication cation of effort lost motion constant Interplay of forces force tryIng trying trying try try- ing to get some edge of advantage advantage advantage tage in the office of the secre secre- tary The secretary would be required to perform many of the I functions now performed by th the president without the presidents president's dents dent's st pre prestige without his authority authority au au- oV over r other dep departments rt and without the constitutional I position and standing st which the presidential office carries with I it it- Since the president must still sun bear the responsibility imp Imposed sed on him by the constitution tion of being the in commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States it seems virtually certain certain certain tain to this writer that under the proposed system he would be less Jess well informed would have less direct contact with the services and in consequence should be less able to discharge his functions efficiently and Inthe in inthe inthe the best beet interests of the tha country One thing this proposed set up would do is to provide an independent independent independent inde inde- pendent air force The statements statements statements state state- ments of those who support it should be examined very carefully carefully carefully care care- fully as many of them support the unified unWed department of defense de defense defense de- de Just In order lorder to get the separate air force which has been so 50 long desired by many air officers and by many civilian air enthusiasts But If this war has taught us urn anything It is 13 that air power cannot be divorced from sur cur surface surface face power it 1 is part and parcel parcel parcel par par- cel of the same military effort efort the one being intrinsically dependent de dependent dependent de- de pendent on the other It is as Gen Eisenhower says not air aJr power nor ground power nor sea power but integrated power all aU three together that wins in modern modem war To create a separate separate separate separ separ- ate air force torce now would in the Judgment of many students of ct war beta be a retrograde step a step away from instead of toward unity of command W It may seem that I am arguing arg arguing ing against what I said at the beginning of this article I am arguing for unity of command whereas I began by pointing out some Borne of the difficulties inherent in a combined department of national defense defence Actually the problem is just to find a away way to insure the principle with the constitutional st structure of ot our republic But In doing so 50 it to I me that we should hesitate for fora a 8 long time before creating creating- a 8 single office with as much power as the proposed ed secretary of national defense w would uld have We should Mould avoid the easy ea solution solution solution tion which assumes that mere increase In size of itself increases increases in in- creases creases efficiency y and we Bho should reflect upon the fact that the history of this war and the thelast thelast last demonstrates that when armies and nd navies have been combined under a single Bingle governmental governmental governmental gov gov- control combined at t atthe the t top p not in the field one or orthe orthe orthe the other usually the navy has hu suffered eclipse and disaster |