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Show THE EASTERN WAK. When the Rusaiatf war of invasion commenced it appeared to be the general gen-eral opinion in this country that the armies of the cr.ar would quickly overrun over-run and demolish the Turks, and ere the first season wits (airly over would dictate terms ol pence in Constanti nople. When the Russians crossed the Danube almost unopposed, and ipread over Bulgaria, occupying even the principal passes of the Balkans, it nas painfully evident to most people that the Turkish government wob doomed and Mohammedan institutions institu-tions would be Bwept from the face of the earth. So inevitable did this Bwift punishment of the Muscovite by the Christian appeaf to the world that the , discussion (ter the war broke out i was mainly confined' to the question of tho partition of Turkey aud the mapping out of Europe among the consenting powers. The first rude blow which aroused theae dreamers of a triumphant Russia walking over the course with hardly a battle or a seigo to impede her progress, occurred in the events transacted in Asia Minor, where the Russians in the confidence of their mastery, had spread out their lines to ; envelop Brzeroum,. leaving the strongly tortifie'd position of Kara in their rear. In the end it was found that Mukhtar Pasha, notwithstanding notwith-standing the remorseless fire of criticism criti-cism poured upon, his head by newspaper news-paper correspondents, and his command com-mand were amply capable, with the aid of (ho Circassian's and with rite control of the Black sea coast, to cope with the Russian generals, whose armies were quickly hurled back to 1 the Armenian frontier, from which ( they have hardly since emerged.- It ia not now disputed that the Asiatic invasion of Turkey was a mistake. In the first place the movements of large armies to'and through Armenia, where railroads do not exist, are -necessarily stow tad rincertain, and there is the continual danger of the interruption of their communications in the rear. In more . than one instance in-stance Russian troops have had to be detached from the army in the field to keep open communications and ounish the insurrectionists. The TurkBhadjiot only the advantage of the interior lines, but also the superior supe-rior power of mobility afforded by their water lines of communication. Had a Russian fleet hold the Black sea this advantage would have keen sufficient to have turned the tide of war in favor of the czar. Immediately upon the ic-treat of the RilBSiaus dp, Armenia tho army of Mukhtar Pasha was available lor jervice in Europe, aud the largo roinforcements speedily sent to the relief of the various grand pashas appear to havo enabled !h.e Turks to confront the enemy Vuh a force, at least eoual to his. If net equal in point of numbers the defensive positions posi-tions held by the Turkish army have rendered them able to' cope successfully success-fully with the invaders. Notwith-etandin Notwith-etandin the extended Jiues. held by the Smsians-'alou'V the" Danube eaBt and west and south to the Balkans, they do nol" seem to have seriously interfered with the positions of the Turkish commanders, or to have menaced their communications. They started out with a great dash, but soon settled down to a dolcnsive position" at most points, while Suleiman Tasha and Osman Pasha have of late changed their de-iensive de-iensive position to that ol the aggressive. aggres-sive. Everywhere from along the whole line of European waifaro come reports that the Russian gains have been made only at a fearful cost, and in no instance-Uavo' they been able to hold those advantages. They now SDBcar to have been driven from Schipka pass and from Iheir ad-, vanced positions around --l'levna. ' Everywhere the tide of battle has turned against them sa overwhelmingly overwhelm-ingly that the world begins to change its preconceived" opinions and to wonder ' if lhe-"fck man" is really such an invalid as the czar would have them believe. Th campaign oj 1,377 is thus approaching ap-proaching its end. The Russians have gained nothing . commensurate with their vast and extended efforts. In reality they have lost little in comparison com-parison with their great resources. re-sources. They have certainly! reached a - better -appreciation of the task before them than they had six months ago, and if their generals gen-erals are capable of ro5ting by the experiences of this campaigD Russia will find itself stronger and better prepared pre-pared for opening the operations of next-spring, lor all ideas of peace arc now as much out of the question as tby wre in our sectional war while the south held an even band with the north. Russia will never give up the struggle until i she conquers the Turks, or is thor- 1 oughly exhausted. The winter months -will be spent on both sides in great preparations for the future. Russia will probably maintain seige operations on the Danube, with the bulk of.htr armies encamped in the higher lands of iloumania. It is likely that the next campaign will open on the part ot the Russians 1 with a moro modest programme, , tempered by the recollection of the i magnificent promises of the army of j invasion in the summer of 1877, and t the miserably defective performances i disclosed in September. |