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Show Page The National Enterprise, twenty-tw- o June 1, 1977 I Open Account by Chuck Akertow d Toledaimo Jack Singlaub Calling a Spade a Spade Some of us actively involved in the Army Reserve or National Guard during the last few years came to know Major K. (Jack) Singlaub who was commander of the Armys Readiness Region located in Denver but which served to support our and Guard local Reserve units. General rcal sin was telling the Washington Post, of all newspapers, anything but his name rank and serial number). John Those who knew Jack knew that he called a spade a spade. He wasn't profane. He was, instead, persistent. times to the point of ness. Someweari- And while, like all mortals, he had his faults, stating his opinion was not one of them. To us it was not surprising that he spoke out on Korean withdrawal. In fact the timing of his remarks was not surprising, either. hot bothered by the criticism of him that he spoke out after the commander-in-chie- f had issued the order. There is some dispute as to whether he thought he was making a public statement or only providing background to the Washington Post. (His I'm THE NATIONAL The thing that bothers me is the allegation that the Pentagon is making policy decisions based upon faulty intelligence and that the Pentagon seems to be impervious to new information. Dwight Eisenhower used to say that the easiest guy in the world to blame for things was the G2 (intelligence) since he supervised a totally inexact science the collection and production of intelligence. Yet, we fought a long war in Vietnam (of which 1 was a part) in which our intelligence was anything but impeccable. Many mistakes, initiatives, withpromises, build-updrawals, etc. were made on the basis of intelligence information which told Washington what the boys in the field thought it wanted to hear, rather than what the situation was. s, which had been promulgated by the commanding general. We were told to prove the hypothesis. Well, the facts bore the opposite conclusion from the hypothesis yet the senior staff officer would not be moved. So we entered into a unique experience of shifting assumptions and details in order to prove the general right so the report he wanted to make to Saigon could be made. Deception? Yes. It was even a sophomoric game. But, it was unfortunately performed in the battlefield where decisions were being made which should have been made on the facts and not the general's hypotheses. am impressed with Jack Singlaub. I am impressed that the third guy down the ladder in Korea would speak up at a critical time when apparently the official channel would not listen. So. I Im just afraid the President wont listen and the remember as a young staff officer being given a hypothesis by a senior staff officer 1 with- drawal will go forth solidifying Communist entrenchment in Korea. Nixon and Ms friends by Ralph de Toledano Copley News Service Weeks after the event, former President Richard Nixons first TV interview since Watergate is still Topic A in Washington. At watering places from Capitol Hill to Foggy Bottom, cries of indignation blend with armchair analysis. But the turn of the conversation, heard and overheard, seems to go one way. What irritates many, particularly those Washington veterans who knew or observed Nixon over the years, is not so much his This had been disingenuous disclaimer of wrongdoing. expected. The greatest outrage is over the former presidents contention that he did not immediately fire H.R. Haldeman and John Erlichman, when learning of their perfidy, out of friendship and kindness of heart. and is it to refer to him so familiarly had many attributes, both good and bad, but softness of heart and loyalty to his friends were not among them. As one old campaigner who gave his all for Nixon and ended up with a goose egg in his hand put it, The line stretches around the block of those friends whose throats Dick cut. If he had a heart, he kept it in cold storage. Dick Nixon lese-majes- ty This slightly overstates the case, but not very much. Take, for example, the cases of Herbert Klein and Rosemary Woods. in the From 1950 on, Klein was Nixons press secretary Senate campaign, in the vice presidential elections, in the first presidential try, and in 1968 when Nixon finally attained his hearts desire. Whatever the reporters who covered him may have felt about Nixon, they all had a deep and abiding affection for Klein. Herb looked after their interests, without compromising Nixons. He leveled with them at all times. When Nixon won in 1968, it was an accepted belief that Klein would be his press secretary. But because Haldeman wanted Ron Ziegler, Nixon cut Herbs throat with hardly a thought, director of relegating him to spinning his wheels as communications. Woods had been Nixons personal secretary also since 1950. She worked night and day with him and for him putting aside her personal life and woe unto him who said anything even gently critical of her boss. But Haldeman decided to consign Rosemary to outer darkness, simply because she was too loyal and too close to the president. And Nixon went along with it. The only thing that saved Woods was the prompt and stern intercession of Pat Nixon. Klein and Woods are but two instances of Nixons loyalty to friends. In his second broadcast, he inadvertently let out of the that the bag what Washington insiders always knew president sacrificed his longtime friend and adviser, former Secretary of State William Rogers, to the demands of Henry Kissinger for an absolute monopoly of American foreign policy. Rogers was sincere and unassuming and caught up in the belief that Nixon was his friend. But the then president stood by while d Rogers was politically him off. It was as cynical and Washington had ever seen. keel-haule- by Kissinger, and then cast a performance as cold-blood- ed (There are other and equally horrendous stories of the Nixon brand of loyalty to friends, but to tell them I would have to violate confidences.) When Nixon discussed his failure to fire Haldeman and Erlichman on learning of the cover-u- p in which he subsequently participated, he could simply have stated that he delayed because he did not know how much damage to him these "friends could or would do. The American people understand motivation of this kind. At the very least, they would have respected Nixon's honesty. But by doing the David and Jonathan act, the former president has merely given critics and disgruntled old friends the justification for telling all at Washington's many water holes. |