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Show PAGE EIGHT MONDAY, MAY 6, 1974 INTERMOUNTAIN COMMERCIAL RECORD In The Supreme Court are hung up on ii whether you should have paid a commission If you sold it yourself? . A. That's right. ' As to the agreement Q. PMh. your- No. You didn't know you were obligating yourself to pay a "nation. Yes. Q. You knew that at the time you signed that agreement? A. Yes. 538: i Parole evidence may be received to clarify ambiguous language in a contract, to show what the agreement was relative to filling in blanks, and to supply omitted terms which were agreed upon but inadvertently left out of the written 1 However, under the general rule, which is applicable here, parole agreement. evidence may not be given to change the terms of a written agreement which are clear, definite, and unambiguous.? To permit that would be to cast doubt upon the integrity of all contracts and to leave a party to a solemn agreement at the mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given by one who in the subsequent light of events discovers that he made a bad bargain. Without that rule there would be no a..urance of the enforceability of a written contract. If such a..urance were removed today from our law, general di.a.ter would result, because of the consequent destruction of confidence, for the tremendous but closely adjusted machinery of modern business cannot function at all without confidence in the en. . . It is obvious that by the terms of the written agreement there was a promisi to pay a commission to plaintiff if the home was solid during the six months following the listing agreement. forceability of contracts. Ollerton, Supervisor, Division of Institutional Accounts, Utah State Hospital, Plaintiff and Appellant, WE CONCUR: F. Henri Henriod, Justice R. L. Tuckett. Justice No. 13399 FILED April 29. 1974 Steve Diamenti (an incompetent) and Lowell D. Nielson, Defendants and Respondents. 3. Allan E. Mecham, Clerk Plaintiff, a representative of the Utah State Hospital, initiated this action against the guardian of Steve Diamenti to recover the costs of his care and treatment in the sum of $13, 315. Plaintiff further sought an order compelling the guardian to make payments of $589. 20 per month for all future care. The trial court ruled that no payments were required by reason of U. C. A. 1953, which specifically excluded the provisions Section of Chapter 7, Title 64, in regard to the methods for the commitment and care of the criminally insane, Chapter 48 of Title 77. The trial court reasoned that the Code of Criminal Procedure, Title 77. Chapter 48. did not provide for the payment of the care of a person declared insane and committed thereU. C. A. 1953, was under to the Utah State Hospital, and that Section not applicable to the estate of a person criminally committed to the hospital; and, therefore, there was no statutory ground to compel payment. Plaintiff appeals. 54, 64-7-- 77-48-- Plaintiff's claim for recovery is under Chapter 7, Title 64, which deals with the Utah State Hospital, the primary facility for the treatment of those having psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs their U. C. A. 1953, mental health. Plaintiff relies specifically on Section which provides that the actual expense for the care of a patient in the Utah State Hospital shall be paid by the guardian of a patient, who has funds that may be used for such purpose. 64-7-- 6, Plaintiff concedes that the care and maintenance of a person convicted of a crime is assumed by the State. He urges that since Mr. Diamenti was adjudged insane and the proceedings were suspended, there has been no crimin; comtnitment pursuant to which the State must bear the cost, of care. Mr. Diamenti is merely an ill person, and his guardian should pay the costs of his medical care and treatment. U. 4, C. A. 1953, provides: Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to alter or change the method presently employed for the commitment and care of the criminally insane as provided in Chapter 48 of Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This statute, in effect, provides that the regular manner of caring for those who have been declared insane under the Criminal Code of Procedure 1. Sec. U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1971. 2. See definition of "method1 in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed shall not be changed by the chapter dealing with the Utah State Hospital. With the exception of Section 8, concerning preliminary examination, Chapter 48 of Title 77, does not provide that a person who has been criminally committed to the state hospital must pay for his care. Mr. Diamenti was not involuntarily hospitalized under the standards set forth in Section U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1971; he was declared "in.ane"3 and under the mandate of Section U. C. A. 1953, he wa. committed to the hospital and the criminal proceedings were suspended. Although insane, he will be detained in custody under the law to answer for his crime upon becoming sane. Hi. detention in the hospital is a consequence of his committing a crime; otherwise, although his mental condition were the same, he might not be so confined in the present facility. His commitment to the state hospital is part and parcel of the administration of the criminal law. His bail was exonerated upon commitment to. the hospital U.C.A. 1953), and upon being certified sane, he will be brought (Section to trial (Section U. C. A. 1953). His detention is pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code, and Section is inapplicable. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 64-7-28- : (a), 64-7-3- 77-48-- 5, 77-48- -7, 77-48- Justice: CROCKETT, (Dissenting) The po.ition of the defendant in this case is based on the fallacious assumption that Mr. Diamenti is held in the state hospital as a criminal and under criminal proceedings. The fact is otherwise. In a separate proceeding, which had no concern whatsoever with his guilt or innocence of crime, he wa. found to be incompetent and unable to stand trial; and was therefore committed to the state hospital for hospitalization and treatment, likewise unconcerned with his guilt or innocence of crime. He is presumed to be innocent. Insofar as criminality is concerned, his status is no different than any other person unconvicted of crime; and his relationship to the hospital is just the same as any other patient who is involuntarily committed. He remains so committed unless and until he is sufficiently recovered that the superintendent approves his release. Only when and if i this occurs, will any aspect of criminal procedure have application to him. 6, Steve Diamenti was charged with assault with intent to commit murder. to Prior trial he was declared insane and committed to the state hospital to remain there in custody until he should become sane, whereupon he was to be returned to the original custody, and all proceedings which had been suspended 5, U. C. A. 1953, as amended 1955. should be resumed, Section 64-7-5- See State v. Poulsen. 14 Utah 2d 213. 215, 381 P. 2d 93 (1963) for a definition of this term. C A LUSTER, Chief Justice: Section ... The trial court erred in permitting oral testimony tending to vary thi disputed paragraph and in finding that the agreement as signed was not the agreement of the parties. The judgment i. rever.ed and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff a. prayed. Cost, are awarded to the Mi E. 64-7-- in-t- ru contemporaneous .eu. ment may be helpful in understanding the meaning of the language H -- imply of a the defendant her. doe. not seek to explain the meaning courts cannot do. wants the court to eliminate it in its entirety. This the Utah 279. u P. M 294 932 . 1. Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co. , Inc. . 82 316. 24 P. 2d 384 (1933). 2. B. T. Moran, Inc. , v. Fir.t Security Corp. . 82 Utah Hatch vj Adams, 8 Utah 2d 82. 329 P. 2d 285 (1938). 198 The Minnesota case of Cargill Commission Co. v. Swartwood, any N.W. 536 (1924). is in point. There the defendant in writing guaranteed a and all sums of money furni.hed by plaintiff to flour milling When sued upon his contract, he contended that it was orally agreed for the purchase ot guaranty should only apply to .urn. of money furnished but the Minnesota Supreme grain locally. The jury found for the defendant, at page Court rever.ed and in .peaking about the parole evidence rule .tated real estate commission? A. If they sold the house I was. Q. You knew that you were to pay a six per cent commission if the real estate company sold the house? You knew that? A. Written word, can be examined so a- - to ascertain Thu. connection with particular conduct or particular objects. with the execution of a written and th. Mrti.. nrio, to itself, the defendant testified: Q. When you signed it you knew you were obligating self to pay a real estate commission, did you not? A. " State 6, It is noted that Chapter 48; Title 77, which deals with the commitment and care of the criminal insane, expressly provides for the costs of a preliminary examination into a defendant's sanity at public expense. But significantly, it does not provide that the State pay the expense, of one who. is subsequently committed, unless he is impecunious. to-b- Section e provides: 77-48- -8 Expenses of inquiry, how paid. - The expenses of the examination and of the sending of such persons, save convicts in the state prison, to and from the Utah state hospital shall be in the first instance chargeable to the county from which they are sent. But the county may recover them from the estates of any such persons, or from a relative legally 1. U.C.A. Sec. (1953) states: "No person while insane shall be tried and adjudged to punishment or punished for a public offense." bound to care for them, or from the county of which such persons may be resident. Expenses of the examination and of sending of an insane "convict to and from the Utah state hospital must be borne by the state if he is impecunious. 77-48- -1 There is nothing in that section to indicate that the State is obliged to pay the costs of maintenance of a person in Mr. Diamenti's position. But the contrary inference is to be drawn; and that his own estate should pay the costs if it can. Indeed it seems to me to be in accord with the most elementary concept of justice that his estate should bear the cost, rather than to preserve it to heirs and next of kin whose claim therein should mo.t certainly be subordinate to his own needs. It i. true that after a person has been convicted of a crime and committed to the state prison the State bears the cost of his maintenance; and likewise that if one so committed thereafter becomes insane,, and is transferred to the state hospital, the cost of his maintenance is borne by the State. But the adjudications on this subject make a distinction between' persons who have been convicted, and are therefore charges of the State, and persons who have not been convicted of crime. The Kentucky Supreme Court pointed out that one in such a position was not a "convict" and the 2 State did not have the responsibility to The Connecticut support him. Court made the valid and important observation that the legislature did not intend to confer a discriminatory favor on these patients by exempting them, or their estates, from costs of maintenance, while requiring others to bear them, adding that: It is only just that public funds be made good for amounts expended on a person's behalf before his heirs or next of kin receive anything from the estate. (Citing cases. ) It is not necessary to extend to those who are able to support themselves. Indeedcharity it would be unreason3 able to do so. ... . ... -5, 64-7- -6 Uz hlve " hel" and 1 im not (Contiimtd on pag 9) |