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Show MONDAY, MAY 20, 1974 PAGE SEVEN INTERMOUNTAIN COMMERCIAL RECORD In The Supreme Court Of The the benefits and protection! of its laws.'' 3. See Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats fc Motors, Inc. , 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 and see Hill v. Zale Corp., P. 2d 532 (1972), construing this subsection of 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332 (1971) for a discussion of "doing business" within this Sylvia Pellegrini, Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 13528 78-27-- v. Sachs And Sons, Ford Motor " Company, et al. , Defendants and Respondent. State Of Utah 24; state for jurisdictional purposes. FILED May 15, 1974 Allan E. Mecham, Clerk CROCKETT, Justice: 4. 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). 5. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 6. 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 7. Id. at 253. We are aware of differing views on the statement in the Hanson case. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P. 2d 57,63 (1969); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 53 Cal. 2d 222. 347 P. 2d 14 (1959) and cf. Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N. Y. U. L Rev. 20, 33 (1959); Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction, 42 Tex. L. Rev. 279, 301-3(1964); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. , 100 Aris. 251, 413 P. 2d 732 (1966). In her "situs of causation" argument plaintiff cites a number of cases over nonresidents in the states as being quite liberal in approving jurisdiction 8 where products have caused injury. But it will be found that most of those cases are against manufacturers. The adjudications are on the ground that in . sending their wares into foreign states they have a substantial and continuing interest in the sale and distribution; and that their conduct through their agents in promoting those objectives is sufficient to meet the "minimum contacts" 10 Sylvia Pellegrini sued Sachs and Sons, Lincoln automobile dealer of Downey, California, (Ford Motor Company, and others not involved here) alleging injuries and damages resulting from Sachs1 negligence in dealer and breach of warranty on a new Lincoln Continental she had purchased from it. The district court granted Sachs1 motion to dismiss on the ground that it did not have the requisite minimum contacts with this state to allow statute.1 Plaintiff appeals. assertion of jurisdiction under our "Long-Arm- " pre-parati- on test. Plaintiff was a California resident in July 1970 when she purchased the Lincoln. She registered it in California. A few days after the' purchase she noticed certain mechanical difficulties which were reported to, and supposedly corrected by, the defendant. In September 1970 she moved to Utah. She avers that there were further difficulties with the car, including the brakes and finally the failure of the steering mechanism. She blames the car's defects and the failure to remedy them for three collisions, including a final one for which she seeks recovery in this suit. We are not concerned with the merits of the question of jurisdiction. her claims, but We only with The argument of the plaintiff is that the Ford Motor Company is a national concern doing business in all of the states; and that there is a rebetween that company and all of its separate sponsible dealerships, and also among them, all of whom sell its cars in a common marketing and advertising program; who have mutual obligations in responding to warranties and servicing of the cars; that in addition to this, that in selling something as mobile as cars, defendant is charged with knowledge that they will travel into other states, and the reasonably to be expected consequences thereof. She couples with the foregoing the further argument that the vital fact of her action is that the-- situs of causation" of the injury was in Utah, so the car, and the witnesses as to the probative facts and events are here, wherefore the defendant should be subject to the jurisdiction of our court. inter-relations- hip Plaintiff's urgence that the trend of the law in recent years has been to minimize the barriers of state lines and to extend the jurisdiction of state courts over causes arising therein is not without some justification; She cites the statement of policy of our statute as being in harmony with that trend: that its provisions "should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."2 She places emphasii on: Jurisdiction Over nonresidents -Acts submitting person to jurisdiction. - Any person, . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person et seq, U.C. A. 1953 (Supp. 1973). Sec. 78-27-- 1. 2. 78-27-- U. C. A. 1953. 24, 78-27-- 22. or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: (3) are cognisant that our ruling herein makes what may be regarded as a somewhat technical distinction between those adjudications as to manufacturers, and the situation presented here, concerning a dealer. But we think that distinction is both correct under the law and justified as a matter of policy. Differing from the manufacturer, a dealer (defendant Sachs) has little or no interest in the sale of similar products in the foreign state. While it is true that he may reasonably expect that the car will go into other states, that does not seem overly important. The counterpoint is that it is also to be expected that most of the products he sells will be used where he is (in California) most of the time; and that even if one does leave, it will likely return, so that in the great preponderance of instances, the discharge of his duties as to the product will be where he is. It is more significant to to take advantage of its busi note that he does not go into the foreign state 10 ness climate or the protection of its laws. Some guidance on the problem of concern here is found in the decision of our sister states. In Granite States Volkswagen Inc. v. District Court plaintiff had purchased a Volkswagen in New Hampshire prior to moving to fire burned up the car, which she alleged resulted from the negligence of the New Hampshire dealer. In rejecting jurisdiction in its own courts, the Colorado Supreme Court made the distinction just pointed out above. 11 In a similar case, Tilley v. Keller Truck and Implement Corp. , the Kansas court made the same distinction and expressly mentioned that foreseeability that a product may be transported into another state and cause injury does 12not meet the minimum contact - substantial justice requirements of the law. In commenting on that principle the Washington Supreme Court stated that to base jurisdiction on "so slender and tenuous a thread would offend against traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."1 Colorado. A ... of the soundness and propriety in the plaintiff's argument for determining jurisdiction which places stress on the situs of the injury and the convenience of the forum. While we appreciate that the latter is a factor which may properly be weighed along with others in considering the question of fair play and due process, 14 this is true only when the other nd in any event the question of convenifundamental prerequisites exist, We are not persuaded ence is most always a one, as it is here. 8. We note our accord with plaintiff that this case is not concerned with "business presence," nor is it concerned with whether the defendant gave constructive consent by doing something in this state such as driving an automobile on our highways as in Hess v. Pawloskey, 274 U.S. 352, but it is concerned with the requirement of "sufficient minimum contacts" as discussed in the cases cited; and see, e.g. , Gray v. American Radiator and Sanitary Corp. , 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761 (1961); and Atkins v. Jones and Laughlin Street Corp. , 258 Minn. 571, 104 N. W. 2d 888 (I960). 9. See, for example, Gray v. American Radiator and Sanitary Corp. , footnote. 8 above, 176 N. E. 2d at 766. 10. See statement in Hill v. Zale Corp. , footnote 3 above. 11. 177 Colo. 42, 492 P. 2d 624 (1972). 12. 200 Kan. 641, 438 P. 2d 128 (1968). The Court said that: If the defendant advertises, solicits or sells its products in the forum state it then has or can anticipate some direct benefit from the sale, trade, use or servicing of its products in the forum state. It is then subject to in personam jurisdiction. two-sid- 22 Id.. Sec. 9 The causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of warranty;3 ' Whatever else may be said on this subject, the propositions set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington remain as foundational in this area of the law. In commenting upon the prerequisites to jurisdiction over a nonresident, the Court stated: ., . . due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not within the territory of a forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "4 13. 14. ed 70 Wash. 2d 870, 425 P. 2d 647, 656 (1967). See McGee v. International Life, footnote 5 above, 355 U.S. at 223-22- 4. It requires but a moment's reflection to see what practical difficulties could result if the many thousands of retailers, who sell the many thousands of products, which are transported into other states, were required to defend wherever it might be alleged that the product had arrived and caused injury. Consequently we think proper safeguards of the rights of both parties require that A case which goes perhaps as far as any in extending the "minimum conjurisdiction should not be predicated solely on the ground that an article sold a The Co. Life Insurance insured, tacts" doctrine is McGee v. International elsewhere by a dealer may be brought into the state and cause harm. There resident of California, accepted the Texas insurance company's mailed offer to fore, notwithstanding the liberal trend expressed in our statute toward extend Even to Texas. from California mailed and thereafter reinsure him; premiums ing jurisdiction for the "causing of any injury within this state whether tortious States the United in California, Suprerr or by breach of warranty in accordance with the authorities cited, and our though the company had no office or agents con of on substantial the had California must nevertheless show that the defendant, by that ground affirmed a Count discussion herein, plaintiff jurisdiction of the the that as offer, acceptance nection in that state. It regarded himself or agent, engaged in some substantial activity which constitutes a purpersuasive: were the that in California; premiums and the delivery of the contract occurred poseful minimum contact with this state upon which to predicate jurisdiction of our courts. Upon the basis of what has been said herein, we see no reason to mailed from there; and that the insured was a resident of California at the time 5 of his death. disagree with the determination of .the district court that the plaintiff has not so demonstrated here. All emphasis herein added. of of fundamentals the and a reminder that on doctrine limitations The Affirmed. Costs to defendant (respondent). International Shoe,- supra, were pointed out in Hanson v. Denckla. There it a Delaware over trustee was held that the Florida court did not have jurisdiction whose settlor was originally domiciled in Pennsylvania but subsequently moved Nettie P. Smoot, Executrix of the -to Florida because the trustee had insufficient affiliation with Florida. This Estate of I. A. Smoot, deceased, remark of the court has meaningful application to our case: Plaintiff and Appellant, NO. 13427 v. lt is a mistake to assume thatonthisthetrend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions personal jurisdiction Hydro Flame Corporation and Utah citations omitted These restrictions are of state courts, State Securities Commission, disor inconvenient of from a than Defendants and Respondents. more immunity guarantee of limitations a territorial are consequence tant litigation. They 6 No. 13435 on the power of the respective States. R. Earl Dillman, Plaintiff and Appellant, some act by be there case that each in essential is FILED lt v. which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege May 14, 1974 of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking - i |