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Show WEDNESDAY, TMtBAIlY MCOftft AGE FOUft Office vdf the Attbrriey General OPINION NO. February 15, Ch. 79, Laws . UCA (1) Where a Utah Judges' Retirement Act require' addl- tional payments into the Judges' .Retirement Fund by juvenile court judges coming. into the new system so as to make their contributions equal to the other judges in the' system, but the . already j of their .excess contribution? : vy . ' ' justice or. Dis trict or City Court judge. Who has served pre- viously as a juvenile court judge bdt who was not so serving at the effective date of tfie . , . Judges' Retirement Act be given er- vice credit under the new act for such priornew Utah ; if ' J- - . '. . same that can be done consistent with its language. analysis of the quoted language of Sec. 13 of the act compels the conclusion that the aim and purpose of that language was the equalizing of the contributions from Juvenile .Court judges with those of all other judges. The only way that ; (3) if the answer to question Nov; 1, is affirsn ative and any refunds result in :an actuarliilly. unsound system, is it mandatory that the , accomplished is by repayment to the Juvenile Court judges of. their excess contributions, paid into the Utah State Retirement System. Such a result seems to be a necessary implication of the language we are dealing with. The Supreme Court of Ari- -. zona, treating the question of implication in the construction of a statute, said: "What is necessarily implied in a statute . is as much a part of it as what is expressed, " and quoted ToSutherthe land, Statutory Construction, in support of that rule. could-b- : Retirement Board adjust tne '.service retirement allowance for judges so as to maintain the ' judge's retirement trust account on an. acttiSr- - v; v ' CONCLUSION: r-- 49-- 10 An - juvenile court service? See Section consideration which transcends all others in regard to the interpretation and application of a statute is: What was the intent of the of statutory construclegislature? All other rules tion are subordinate to it and are helpful only inso- far as they assist in attaining that objective.con- -In determining that intent the statute should be sidered in the light of the purpose it was designed to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose . ' " predecessor acts. 1953. The fundamental ' exceed those of the other judges. are the juvenile court '.judges entitled to a refund. ' UCA .4, All such problems of statutory construction begin at intent is determining the intent of the legislature, and that and aims purposes most' of ten found in a consideration of the thus: stated has Court it of the act. Our Supreme . j juvenile court judges' contribution 49-7-5- footing and that if making them equal in Court contributions requires a payment back to the Juvenile must be done. judges of part of their contributions, then that provision of the newly enacted' Must a Supreme Court Section See 1953. to begin on the . i (2) 1963. a refund. It Clearly, the statute says nothing about is required is is susceptible of an interpretation that all that much that the Juvenile Court judges pay in at least as the as the requireother judges, and if they have paid in more, then to can be interpreted But also met. ment of the statute is it Court or otherwise, are mean that all judges, whether Juvenile . QUESTION: of Utah, 4Ch. 106, Laws of Utah, 1967, and 1972 ' Prepared by: State of Utah i 1 Leonard H. McDonald, Executive Directpt. Utah State Retirement Board; Frankiyn B. Matheson, chairman. State Advisory. Committee to the Juvenile Courts ' v4 v. Vernon B. Romney, Attorney Gertetal-KRoger Bean, Assistant Attorney General BY: REQUESTED 72-0- 03 FEBRUARY 23. 1972. e effect is 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 242. The implication refer to, requiring repayment, seems to be a necessary and result from the language used by the legislature and from the actual status of the Juvenile court judges' accounts. This same we fir v :v. J .V result ' ft statute itself since it is mea- ningless if literally interpreted. To attenpt to follow the litmeaning of the statute is not required if. it would produce an absurd result.7 In discussing departure from literal meaning, the author at 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 240 sums it up this eral ' . does no violence to the OPINION . i- - legislature enacted a new Utah. Judges.' Re tirement Act replacing the former act end transferring- the members of the prior system to the hew system. Members trah,s- - ; fcrred from the pripr judges' retirement system included Supreme Court justices. District Court judges, and full time City Cpurt' The 1971 ' Way: ' - judges, but did not include Juvenile Court judges. Such transferred members had contributed to the terminated judge's retirement system through a payroll deductiori from salary, with additional funding coming from increased filing fees on certain court pleadings. Juvenile Court judges, on tne other hand, had been members of the Utah State Retirement System.4 That system was funded by contributions from, the Juvenile Court judges and matching payments from their employer, the State of Utah. Hence, it is literal import of the words, canon of construction rule that the manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the - . miliar is within the is -- 6 . , . . other Ch. 87, Laws et seq. UCA of Utah, 1957; codified as Section -1 1953. )t , first mentioned possible way, amount on-th- Turning to the second question, there appears to new act. If the prior, repealed act gave any such credit for prior Juvenile court service, then the credit would have been standing in his service account, if it did not, then it must be presumed the legislature, in the prior judges' act, did not intend to allow such credit. If the ' ' , t 49-7- See judge a first . 17 U.2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 date of the (Emphasis added.) 49-7- a-l within I 2. , codified as Section were be no ambiguity in the statute on this point. Sec. 13 gives to members of the terminated judges' system a credit in the new system for. service "standing to their account" on the effective . 1Ch. 113, Laws of Utah, 1971; et seq. UCA 1953 (Supp.). if it 0 ! question stated above arises from, the-- ' fact that when the accounts of the Juvenile Court judges were examined it became apparent that many of them had ptohtributfetf more, not less, to the Utah State Retirement System than their judicial confreres had contributed to the pripr judges' system. Being possessed of legal minds and judicial sagacity, the Juvenile Court judges promptly requested a refund. a fa- the Juvenile court judges are also entitled to interrepaid. This ir consistent with the provisions .of Sec. 26 of the Utah State Retirement Act Which sets interest 'rates on withdrawals or refunds. . The is interpretation above would perpetuate an inequality between the contributions of the Juvenile Court judges and those of the other judges, and thus be inconsistent with the intention of the legislature, we reject that interpretation in favor of the second possibility, one requiring repayment to the Juvenile court judges. Inasmuch, too, as the statute requires interest charges to be added to the "contribution", and the payment in actuality runs the est ' 1. and a .thing which Since the , made. within the statute as (1966) . (19441 . . - a Maricopa County v. Douglas, (Arizona 1949), 208 P.2d. 646. also 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 377. 7johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 U. 114, 152 P.2d 98. Juvenile court judges transferring their service and contributions from the Utah state retirement system to the 'judges' retirement system shall re- ceive judicial service credit in the latter system upon payment to' the latter system of an additional member contribution which, together with the 'cohtri.-b-ut ion made to. the. Utah state retirement system, will, equal in total the contribution which' they would have made had they been members of the terminated ' system during their judicial service period, plus interest charges as set by the board. A decision to purchase such service credit must be made, within , one year of the effective date of this act under terms prescribed by the board; otherwise, the benefit based upon such' service shall be the same as that provided in the Utah state retirement system. had the transfer of service and credits not. been-- r-- much it that thing which intention of the makers of a statute 5Johnson v. State Tax Commission, act transfers the assets and liabilities of the prior judges' retirement system to the new system. It also brings the juvenile Court judges over from the Utah State Retirement System into the new judges' system. Judges vbo were members of the prior judges' system are given prior service credit for service performed under the prior system, but prior service credit for Juvenile Court judges is conditional. The pertinent part of the statute reads: r . as indeed, the letter; is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers. '' The new 4 a general judge became a member of the prior judge's system by judicial appointment or election while serving, or after having served, as a juvenile court judge; his rights under the prior act, again, were governed by .its provisions, in one section, the repealed act deals with city court judges and transfers their de- posits and equity to the system set up by that act, and in another section it defines "service" without any reference to juvenile court service. A judge referred to in the second question may in act lave retirement rights under two separate retirement sys- terns. Generally speaking, this is not a desirable and it probably results from a simple oversight of the thing legislature. is the question here under consideration involved, but the also question of those judges Who served as city court judges, or example, prior to going on to the district bench or as city Not only t H ' S'V--- --v-m, 'VF-i- -1 ShA rSur u |