OCR Text |
Show Extracts from Recent Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah ik ' . . - (Continued from page 3) ing iii thSa 'litigationL or work on the commodities of the plaintiff with the objects of 1 Dormans to cease do""Since the Association and the ) forcing business with any other perplaintiff Corporation were sep- ing son and 2) forcing the Associaarate entitles and business, the I labor problems of the Association tion to bargain with the union. .We think the. believable facts do not appear to us to be germane to the issues here, save as they in this case reasonably and success-- , constitute an (historical, causative fully challenge the contentions of backdrop leading to the picket- defendants' Point I and its subwhich are to the effect ing of Dorman and plaintiffs divisions, that: failed to show the Plaintiff the in equipment, resulting essential elements making compenof plaintiffs shipa sable of the act; A. Beviolation ments' to the former. cause not it did show an appeal 1) In May, 1955, one Rash, Secre- -' of Local 976, ac- - to Dormans nonsupervisory em2) who, they say, were incompanded by one Ballew, trou- ployees, fluenced only by their employers, bleshooter loaned toy- a Seattle in the only ones labor agency to assist Local 976 3) who, turn Wlere to by the union; B. Bein its negotiations with the Assoc- appealed cause it failed to show a statutory iation, went to New York to see- obiect by the picketing; C. one of the Efermans. They enlist- Aithouehsought 976 was not cerLocal Secreted the aid of one RiStuccia, tified .as for the -- ' ' ' dis-continu- ace tary-Treaso- rer - ary-Treasurer of New York bargaining agent Associations employees, it enjoyed a status tantamount thereto; and D. Because it failed to show an unlawful attempt by defendants to accomplish a statutory object Local Teamsters Union 277 that represented Dormans employees, in making the approach. The conceded purpose of the visit was to urge' Dorman to pressure the Touching on some of the subAssociation into bargaining With divisions of Point I. we are not Local 976, ann in aid therof to the arguments of - convinced urge Dorman to refuse accept- counsel for by defendants relating to ane of any more cheese manu.. . . ' factured by the Association.: an equivalance of certification in the' light of the facts that. 1) the union had suspended its members employed by the Association, for lack of cooperation with the union which now claims to be their bargaining aeent: 2) the picket banner emploved, itself negatived the idea that the union was bargaining agent by clearly branding the Asn sociations employees as and (see cut): anyway, 3) the was unions activity at the Dorman's place of business and alongestablishment and plaintiffs side plaintiffs truck; certification truck were picketed by Rash and as to the Associations emoloyees Lott, and the cheese .was not un- having nothing to do with the loaded until five o'clock the same issues involved here. To argue that certification or its day. Dorman contacted Gossner that him advised and in Utah equivalent had something to do there was a picket line in front with this case would be to assume of his place of business picketing that the Association, not the plain.Dairy Distributors truck, advis- -: tiff, delivered the cheese to Doring him (that his employees would mans in New York. The concession line and did of defendants that the Association . not cross the picket and the plaintiff Corporation were .not want to unload the cheese. The subjoined snapshot shows independent organizations, supportthe picket banner and the word- - ed by substantial evidence in the record, does away with any such ing used thereon. Plaintiff shipped no more cheese assumption and disposes not only to Dormans until aout six weeks of the defendants' suggestion to lalter, on September 7, when Ro- - the contrary, buf of any necessity sen told the driver the cheese to discuss ambulatory picketing and could not be unloaded until Dor- alter ego mateers, or the authorimans arrived. The Dormans ad- ties presented by either side in supvised him that the union would port thereof. Ast to the matter of who was inhave to be contacted. Following to act, we cannot agree duced such contact, he was told that the union would not permit the with defendants that there was no unloaded. The cheese was not evidence of any appeal or inducenloaded but was taken elsewhere ment directed to nonsupervisory : employees to refuse to unload or and placed in storage. Plaintiff made one more attempt handle the plaintiffs commodities, to ship cheese to Dorman's about because the union representatives two months lalter, on October 31, talked only to the Dormans and the foreman Rosen. To contend so 1955, when the plaintiffs equipchallenge the silent potency ment again was picketed. Plain- is to a of peaceful picket line, and is to tiffs truckdriver stated that the the very purpose of such a truck was unloaded "by Dormans ignore line: Persuasion. It is to blind oneand myself and a couple of the self to the words of the picket . Dorman boys Plaintiff made its with banner, suggestion pointed .no effort therafter to sell cheese that union (Dorloyal to Dormans, but liquidated its man's was a unionmembers establishment) .trucking business, a result caused should not handle the cheese. Furby the picketing and interference ther. it would seem to give little with plaintiffs business dealings credit to the understanding and rewith Dorman'. It had been made action of Dormans union emdear that Dormans place of bus- -. ployees by intimating that only the Iness and the plaintiffs equip- conversations of Rash and the othment would be the subject of ers with Dorman and Rosen, and continued picketing whenever it not the presence of or the suggeswas deemed advisable to foster tiveness of the picket banner, had the unions cause. anything to do with the refusal to Under such circumstances it handle the cheese and the subsewould not seem unreasonable for quent demise of a profitable busithe jury Ito conclude that defend-- ! ness. The cold facts are that after ants, in violation of the act, In- -, enjoying congenial and profitable duced and encouraged Dorman business relations with Dormans Land its employees to refuse to for more than two years, with deuse, process or otherwise handle liveries of cheese at least once a On July 26, 1955, a load of Dor'plaintiffs cheese arrived atmornr mans dock early in the s, ing, as did Local 976s represta-tiveLott. one Rash, Ballew and Mr. Rosen, member of the New York Teamsters Local and Dormans foreman, having been advised that his union had sanctioned the picketing, refused, to unload the shipment. A picket banner appeared and Dormans : "non-unio- . I v - . : -- : , . . i Monday, September 22, 1958 Salt Lake City, Utah Page 4 week, the first picketing by the union. agents ended all. shipments, the first being refused, requiring storage, and the second being picketed. Coupled with thes facts, Dorman. had advised the Association that his men would not cross the 'picket line and did not want to unload the cheese. It is not reasonable to believe that this course of events would have occurred without the picketing, and it is difficult to understand why the union would engage in this picketing if it were not designed to appeal to and influence the employees. We .believe the jury, contrary to the contentions of defendants, reasonably could have found that the picket line 1) did appeal to the employees, and that 2) the Dormans Disease, Inn, Predatory Animal C were expressing the feeling and intentions of the employees when they announced that their men woud not cross the picket line and could not unload cheese processed by the Association, and 3) that because the employees indicated they would not cross the picket line, plaintiffs relations with Dormans, as a practical matter, were terminated. Defendants Point II contends that the Western Conference of Teamsters is exempt from this litigation, not being a labor organization within the contemplation of Title 29, Sec. 152 (5) U.S.C.A.(2) There is evidence in the record to indicate that Western Conference of Teamsters had jurisdiction over local teamsters unions in the 11 western states; that Local 976, of which Rash was an officer, was affiliated with the Western Conference, and that it in turn was affiliated with the International Union. Under such circumstances we cannot say that the Western Conference of Teamsters was not a labor organization under the broad definition of the act. The facts hereinabove mentioned, together with the facts that defendants answer admitted that Local 976 of which Rash was an officer and Joint Council 67 engaged in picketing, the trustee for Local 976 apparently was appointed by the International Union and that Local 976 members paid part of their dues to the International, seem to dispose of defendants Points III and IV having to do with the contention that the Western Conference and the International were strangers to this action for relationlack of a principal-agen- t ship. We think a factual issue was precipitated such that we cannot say as a matter of law no agency existed. We are not unmindful of the administrative pronouncements cited by defendants relating to agency, nor the general proposition that agency must be shown by him who asserts it. We feel that a jury reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff sustained its burden of proving agency, and we choose to go along with plaintiffs cited authorities, insofar as the facts of the instant'ease are concerned, and also to assert that agency, provable circumstantially, has taken on a meany Act ing under the that includes ostensible authority, a matter not included within the Wagner Act (3). In a Ninth Circuit dccision(4) involving the same legislation as we have here, the court, after referring to Title 29, Sec. 185 (E) (5), stated: "Probably the practical result of the section In the case of labor unions was to restore the general rules of agency, particularly the rules of apparent authority which had been curtailed by the Wagner Act . . . and the decision of United Brotherhood' of Carpen ' Taft-Hartle- ters . . . v. U. S., 330 U.S. 395, cy in such testimony as it might 67 S.CL 775, 91 L.Ed. 973. We bear on an unlawfuli picketing sitthink the section was intended to cover the acts of officers of the union who deal with employers or with the public. That is, if a union puts or lets an officer or other representative get into a position where he can and does cause trouble proscribed by the act then the union is responsible." In United Mine Workers v. Patton (6), it was said: "The chief argument of defendants in support of their motion for directed verdict is that there is no evidence that they authorized or ratified the strikes upon which plaintiffs rely for recovery. It is true that there is no evidence of any resolution of either the United Mine Workers or District 28 authorizing or rati-- , fying the strikes. There is evidence, however, that the strikes were called by the Field Representative of the UJH.Wq who was employed by Dist, 28, and that he was engaged in the organization work that was being carried on- by the international union through Dist. 28, which was a mere division of the international union. Members of the union are members of local and district unions as well as the international; and of the $4 monthly dues paid by them, $2 goes to the international union, $1 to the local union and $1 to the district organization. It is clear that in carrying on organization work the field representative is engaged in the business of both the international union and the district and that both are responsible for acts done by him within the scope and course of his employment (citing cases)." Points V through IX claim error in failing to grant motions for directed verdict at various stages of the proceedings, because 1) any evidence of damage was so speculative as not to support the verdict, 2) plaintiff had no contract with the Association or Dormans, 3) there was no evidence that Dormans refused to purchase cheese because of the picketing, 4) Dormans were willing to continue said purchases, and 5) because plaintiffs hauling business was an unlicensed interstate operation. All of these contentions, except 2) are supported by evidence to the contrary which the jury could have resolved and did resolve in favor of the plaintiff, which conclusions we are not constrained to upset. As to plaintiff having no contract for any definite time with the Association or Dorman, we know of no authority that will preclude recovery of damages in a tort action because there is no such contract. Besides, there had been continuous contractual sales and purchases between plaintiff and Dormans for better than two years. The evidence shows that the Dormans wanted deliveries and plaintiff wanted to continue to make them, and it appears that such an extended business relationship at least presumptively would have prevailed indefinitely had it not been for the unauthorized picketing. As to Point X which claims error in rejecting an affidavit by one Corbett having to do with plaintiffs relationship with the Association, (which affidavit was filed after the trial) the facts recited therein were available to defendants during the trial by way of discovery or otherwise and there is no showing made of their nonavailability. Point XI complains that the court trrcd.in sustaining an objection to testimony that wages were less in another area than those paid by the Association. We can see no relevan uation between the union and the plaintiff, not the Association. We believe the remaining points are not well taken: One having to do with admission of a letter requested to be produced by defendants, because it appears to have materiality in support of plaintiffs claim of union interference; another having to do with the introduction in evidence of an audit, because it appears to have been received without objection; and .the last having to do with the contention that it was error not to have granted a new trial, because we fail to find any reasons stated therein warranting the granting thereof under rules that would justify the granting . thereof. WE CONCUR: Roger I. McDonough, Chief Justice Lester A. Wade, Justice CROCKETT and WORTHEN, JJ. concur in results. 1. - transport - ,'kM t a. It sail be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting, commerce, for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, or otherwise handle or work on- any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is "(1) forcing or requring any employer or person to join labor or employer any or any organization employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing bbsiness with any other person; "(2) forcing or requiring any other employe? to - self-employ- ed rec-cogni- ze or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor Organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title." 2. The term labor organization means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." - 3. 29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq. 4. International Longshoremens etc. Local 8 v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co. 226 F.2d 875. 5. "For the purposes of this sec-- . tion, in determining whether any person is acting as an agent of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling (June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title III, No 301, 61 Stat. 156.)" 6. 211 F.2d 742. 7. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. |