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Show rOUR PAGE THE DAILY ably may be given its language, there are certain principles relating to statutory construction which may be resorted to for assistance in arriving at a proper solution to this problem. Wal or Service Agreements Jhn Bailey; l&H Stratford Ava Interatn Heating State Str 0 Taylor; I6(ft Yalwest Ave Mrs George v. Merril Wyo; S John Pritchett; 1557 Mrs Bntty K Leise; 0 P OM 1775 So 13th S Boj 362 P OM C Afton, 12th So Mrs W 190 St George; Box R Lawrence J Kuhnj 3766 Stephen 23rd So 1U?6 Srickson; Stratford R Zirker; P Nordell Weeks; S 132-43- 8 F David d Pa 133 Bingham; S P I Roy Terry Foote; B W Howard Adams; Lon R Terry W Leonard 195 B So 696 S 100 N, BntfL) Dr The reasonable deduction here is that the use of the term "may" in this statute in its ordinary meaning indicates that one "may" or "may not" have his contract reinstated upon a condition to be fulfilled, or a choice to be made. The plaintiff having made his choice by filing the application, the only remaining choice would be that of the Land Board. This reasoning then concludes: that the interpretation which gives the Land Board discretion as to whether the applicant "may . . . have his contract reinstated" harmonizes with the rule of statutory construction stated above in assuming that the term was used advisedly and in consonance with its most commonly accepted meaning. T So Conway Rd Wells; 5795 Crossland; 5175 G 21st E S Surrey Ct J Forsyth; OM Erie U60 11 6 D St; Ct S 125 T Str June T Forsyth; 116 U Gary H White; OM 1392 Obveorest Dr; Melbourne St S OM 125 T Str; S 2822 So G Spiur; 3258 Fbrtuna George E Lyman; V i! S 3O65 E 5th Rasmussen; 1990 Albert F Arguelles; Johnson; 859 Eswrson D 140 OM Str Kent Anderson; 1615 WinwardDr K Ave Elgin 8U2 E Durran; 2850 So 2830 So 11th Dittmr; M Robert Plucha; 1125 Harrison Ava 102 Str Rosenburg; 128 Layton Ave ELly 1214 Brovnir.g At OM Danielson; Peterson; 3095 378 F Gilmar Or Carol F Baker; 1127 Wilmington Are W V Fuehring; 2038 Stratford Dan B A 7180 So K S Benny Rushing; I36I Laird Ave Don Gordon James; 799 lit Ave Dr c Grin! Ledgamor.t Dr Wm L Stewart; 836 Linooln St - No. 12286 The general purpose of the law in giving the Land Board responsibility for administering the public lands is to encourage their settlement and FILED June 2, Utah State Land Hoard, 1971 L. M. Cummings, Clerk Defendant. Justice: The essential f.uts are not in dispute: The plaintiff had acquired personally, and by approved assignments, certain contracts of purchase of State lands, which were payable in installments. The payments were delinand after proper notice remained delinquent in excess quent in January, of 90 days, and were forfeited in accordance with the 7, provision of Sec. U.C.A. 1953. 1 Nearly three years later, on April 16, 1969, plaintiff presented his application for reinstatement of the contracts, together with one year's interest, as required by the section referred to. There had been no sale or lease of the lands meanwhile. 16, 65-1-4- The issue in this case is brought into sharp focus by the plaintiff's statement that the following portion of said Sec. vests in him "the absolute right to reinstate a forfeited certificate at any time before lands described in the certificate are made subject of another sales or lease agreement": 65-1-- 47 Any person whose contract of sale has been forfeited may upon application have his contract reinstated at any time before the land has again been sold or leased by paying one interest, and if said land has been leased, the board may reinstate said contract at the termination of said lease, or within thirty d;jys thereafter, upon the payment of one interest as aforesaid. . 2. See State v. Gates. 3. See Miles v. Wells, 4. See e.g. Bradley v. 5. See Board of County 1365 In this proceeding the plaintiff Maurice Grant seeks to reverse the action of Utah State Land Roard in denying his application for reinstatement of certain contracts of purchase of State land. . Supplementing what has been said about specific - terms of the statute, there is also this principle to be considered: that wh"- there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion of a statute, it is proper to look to me entire act in order to discern its meaning and intent; and if it is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be chosen which best harmonizes with its general purpose. . Plaiiititl. CROCKETT, Str The other important term concerning which the plaintiff's urged interpretation raises a question is "forfeit. The statute provides that after notice is given to a defaulting purchasers, his contract may be forfeited, which it is conceded was done here. The term "forfeited" in its usually accepted meaning as applied to rights to property is that they are taken away, or lot. Thus it would seem that the idea advocated by plaintiff that he retains an absolute' right to reinstate his contract is quite inconsistent with the true meaning and effect which should be given the wpdfl "forfeit" and "forfeiture" as used in the statute. Again, if the legislature had intended something so unlike a forfeiture as he contend" it should not have used that term. But it should have stated that the contra'- nhouk be under suspension, remain in abeyance, or some other like term- until if was reactivated or reinstated by the specified procedure. - Kss In The Supreme Court Of The State Of Utah Mauric Foundational rules require that we assume that each term of a statute was used advisedly; and that each should be given an interpretation and application in accord with their usually accepted meaning, unless the context otherwise requires. In this connection it must be realized that, although there are exceptions where the context does fairly require otherwise, the word "may" in its most usual meaning 4es not import certainty, but uncertainty. That is, that whatever is referred to, either may or may not be, or occur. This line of reasoning proceeds: that if the legislature had intended an applicant to have an absolute right of reinstatement, instead of saying that an applicant "may have his contract reinstated. " it could easily have used the word "shall" or "must," and thus have rendered a mandatory meaning clear. Str Wyo J Wiekham; 1195 So 113th Ave T So R Douglas M Bennett; 3022 W 109 Appli Co; Wight; 2269 R A A Our conclusion that no such incongruous result was intended is corrobwhich provides that: orated by the portion of said Sec. 65-1-- payments - Forfeiture - Exten-sio- Reinstatement. . . . who is in default for nonpayAny purchaser of ment principal, or interest, due the state for a period of one month, shall be notified by the board by letter of such default, said letter shall have printed a copy of this section; and if, within ninety days . . . has not thereon his delinquencies, and has procured no extension of time, . . . his conpaid of sale tract may be forfeited . . . ; upon application the board may extend the time for making interest payments not to exceed one year, and may extend the time for making principal payments not to exceed five extensions for one year each He contrasts this with the subsequent emphasi.ed clause, which deals with land which has been leased, with respect to which it states that the board may reinstate said contract at the termination of the lease . He urges that there it. sufficient contrast between the two provisions to indicate that the former is mandatory and the latter is discretionary. U.C.A. 19s. Default 111 47 the board may extend the time for making interest payments not to exceed one year, and may extend the time for making principal payments not to exceed five extensions for one year each. . . . On the basis of various considerations bearing on the interpretation and application of Sec. as discussed herein, it is our conclusion that the Land Board should and does have discretion as to whether a contract which has once been forfeited should be reinstated. Its action would of course be subject to review in appropriate court proceedings for any arbitrary action or abuse of discretion as would the action of any other administrative agency, 9 a matter which has not been raised here. (All emphasis added. ) Affirmed. "... 7. (Okla.). 65-1-- It is to l conceded that the problem involves some perplexity. This is particularly so because upon a first-blus- h impression from reading the above-quote- d of the the statute itself, by meaning might seem to portion depend upon where the emphasis is laid. Plaintiff argues that the language of the first emplu i.t d ilauef which deals with land which has not been leased, 111 slating that a purchaser may upon application have his contract reinstated" clearly mandates th.it the contracts must be reinstated. 65-1-4- A.L. R.2d In this provision two things are clearly shown: (1) an intent that there should be some finality to such contracts when they are not being performed; and (2) that the Board should have some discretion concerning how long they should be kept alive. The Land Roard contends to the contrary: that the statute is permissive; and that the plaintiff's contract having been forfeited, he may have it reinstated only at the discretion of the Roard. Sec. 118 Utah 182, 221 P. 2d 878. 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 534, 536. Cleaver, 150 Kan 699. 95 P. 2d 295. Commissioners v Litton, 315 P. 2d 239. 64 6. See Rowley v. Public Service Comm. , etal. , 112 Utah 116, 185 P. 2d 514; 82 C.J. S. , Sec. 323. n. 84. development so that they and their resources can be wisely used, managed and 'conserved.? It requires but little reflection to see that if any such contract becomes a permanent encumbrance upon the land, in that it may be revived at any time, no matter how many years have elapsed, upon the unilateral action of the purchaser, by simply paying one year's interest on the contract balance, the Board could very well be severely hampered in fulfilling its responsibility. A person could enter into such a contract for State lands at minimal price and payments, fail to perform, suffer forfeiture, and thereby in effect have acquired a permanent option to buy the State lands at the original contract price. He could sit by and, without further expense to himself, await developments. In case of enhancement of value for any reason, he could file an application for 8 reinstatement, pay one year's interest, and demand performance of the contract. The possible inequities and impracticability of such a situation are obvious. . yi-.-r'- 1. MONDAY, JUNE 7, 1971 RECORD E. R. Callister, Jr. , Chief Justice R. L. Tuckett, Justice ... F. Henri Henriod, Justice .... We are constrained to agree that this argument projected by plaintiff is not entirely without plausibility. Assuming then, for the purpose of our analysis of this Htatule, that there are different interpretations that reason costs awarded. WE CONCUR: ns "......" No 47 A. H. Ellett, Justice et seq. , U.C.A. 1953. See Sec. 9. The possibility of doing this is aided by Sec. U.C.A. 1953, which requires the Land Board in selling State lands to " . . . give notice of such sale by publication once a week for four successive weeks . . .." 7. 8. 65-1-1- 4, 65-1-2- |